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This thesis contributes to the literature on macroprudential policies for the South African econ-
omy. The main goal of the thesis is to enhance our understanding on how macroprudential
policies work, their effectiveness, transmission channels and their interaction with the mon-
etary policy. The thesis consists of three main chapters. Chapter 2 develops a real business
cycle dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that features a stylised banking
sector, a housing market and a role of a macroprudential policy, and examines the extent to
which the Basel III bank capital regulation attenuates fluctuations in housing and credit mar-
kets and fosters financial and macroeconomic stability. Secondly, we compare the effectiveness
of four different Basel III countercyclical capital requirement (CcCR) rules in terms of en-
hancing financial and macroeconomic stability. The results show that the rule-based Basel III
CcCR effectively attenuates fluctuations in credit and housing markets and mitigates the pro-
cyclicality of the Basel II capital regulation. The impact of a permanent increase in capital
requirement ratio (a 2.5% conservation capital buffer) is marginal. The comparative assess-
ment of the four Basel III CcCR rules suggests that the most effective policy rule is the one in
which the authority adjusts bank capital requirement ratio to credit and output gaps.
ii
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Chapter 3 investigates the implications of the countercyclical loan-to-value (CcLTV) regu-
lation in a setting where household and non-financial corporate borrowers co-exist. To do this,
we consider two policy regimes - one generic and one sector-specific. The results suggest that
both the generic and the sector-specific regimes are effective in enhancing financial and macroe-
conomic stability. A comparative effectiveness of the two policy regimes is shock dependent.
The effectiveness of the two policy regimes is more or less the same when the economy faces
a technology shock. However, the sector-specific regime outperforms the generic regime when
one sector of the credit market is hit by a financial shock. On the contrary, the generic regime
outperforms the sector-specific regime when the economy is hit by a housing demand shock
that has similar spillover effects on household and corporate credit markets.
Chapter 4 develops and estimates a new Keynesian DSGE model, which features a stylised
banking sector, a housing market and the role of monetary and macroprudential policies. The
estimated model is then used to compare the effectiveness of a simultaneous deployment of
monetary and macroprudential policies under the two alternative policy regimes against a
benchmark regime in which there is only monetary policy. The first alternative regime is a
combination of a standard monetary policy rule (Taylor rule) and a macroprudential policy
rule, which is exemplified by a CcCR rule. The second alternative regime is a combination
of an augmented monetary policy rule (an augmented Taylor rule), where the policy rate also
reacts to credit growth, and a CcCR rule. The results suggest that a policy regime that combines
a standard monetary policy and a macroprudential policy delivers a more stable economic sys-
tem with price and financial stability. A policy regime that combines an augmented monetary
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The financial crisis has highlighted that existing policies such as microprudential, monetary and
fiscal policies are not enough to assure the safety of the financial system as a whole (Claessens,
2014, 3). It also became evident that bank capital regulatory framework adopted in 2004,
Basel II capital regulation, is inherently flawed as it promotes pro-cyclicality in the financial
sector (see for e.g., De Walque et al., 2010; Covas and Fujita, 2010; Angelini et al., 2010;
Repullo and Suarez, 2013; Liu and Seeiso, 2012; Angeloni and Faia, 2013). The Basel II
capital regulation enables banks to provide excessive credit in economic boom, but forces banks
to sharply shrink credit in economic recession. This amplifies business cycle fluctuations, and
has negative implications for financial and macroeconomic stability. It is against this backdrop
that consensus emerged among world leaders to engage in financial sector reforms and move
towards systemic orientated approach to financial regulation.
After the crisis, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) introduced higher capital re-
quirements, liquidity requirements, and caps on leverage under a new Basel III accord in the
hope of strengthening financial institutions’ resilience. To tackle the too-big-to-fail problem,
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are identified and are subjected to higher
regulatory requirements, more intensive supervision, and resolution planning. In the derivatives
markets, requirements are in place for trade reporting, central clearing, and margining. Other
regulatory reforms include the development of the regulatory framework for shadow banking.
In addition, the new regulatory framework provides what is called a “macroprudential overlay"
to mitigate a build-up of systemic risk (Caruana, 2010). That is, the risk of disrupting provision
of financial services due to the impairment of either parts of the financial system or the entire
system with negative impact on the real economy (FSB-IMF-BIS, 2011). The main empha-
1
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sis on systemic risk originates from the greater interconnectedness of the financial institutions,
procyclical nature of the financial sector and its ability to amplify business cycle fluctuations.
From the policy perspective, there is now a consensus that financial regulation should start
moving from micro-based approach towards macro-based approach. This culminated to the
development of macroprudential policy framework as an overarching framework for financial
regulation with well-defined policy tools. Consequently, the role of macroprudential policies
emerged and gained prominence in policy discussions and academic research.1 The main ob-
jective of macroprudential policies is to mitigate the build-up of financial systemic risk and
reduce the macroeconomic cost of financial crises. The goal of macroprudential policies is to
strengthen the resilience of the financial system against adverse shocks for greater financial and
macroeconomic stability.
Macroprudential policies include tools and regulations aimed at addressing externalities
and market failures within the financial system with the ultimate goal of financial stability
(FSB-IMF-BIS, 2011). Cerutti et al. (2017) argue that macroprudential policies are mainly
justified by the existence of externalities and market failures associated with financial sector
activities which could lead to excessive pro-cyclicality and the build-up of systemic risk. These
instruments include, but not limited to, capital-related instruments (e.g, countercyclical capital
requirements and dynamic provisioning), liquidity-based instruments (e.g., liquidity coverage
ratio, net stable funding ratio and reserve requirement ratio) and credit-related instruments (e.g.,
caps on loan-to-value and debt-to-income ratios, limits on credit growth and foreign currency
lending). The intuition behind these policy instruments is to adjust them in a countercyclical
manner to lean against financial cycles. During an economic boom, these policy instruments are
tightened in order to dampen excessive credit growth and rapid increase in assets prices which
could manifest into bubbles. This limits excessive leverage in the financial sector and contains
the build-up of systemic risk. In economic downturn, when systemic risk has materialised,
these instruments are relaxed in order to prevent rapid deleverage in the banking sector and
asset price collapse. This mitigates the problem of credit squeeze and the spillover effects of
financial distress to the real sector.
While there is consensus for the adoption of macroprudential policies, little is known about
how these policies work (Bank of England, 2009; Hanson et al., 2011; Galati and Moessner,
1Although macroprudential policy gained prominence in the aftermath of the financial crisis, Clement (2010)
note that its concept has been around since 1970’s. Many of its tools have been used to supervise individual
institutions (Jonsson and Moran, 2014).
2
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2013; Claessens, 2014). The literature on their effectiveness, transmission channels, impact on
financial sector and the real economy is still limited. The channels through which these policies
work remain imperfectly understood. How these policies should be implemented still remains
an open question. This is especially so in the context of emerging market economies (EMEs)
such as South Africa. In general, the literature on the efficacy of macroprudential policies in
building resilience of the financial sector and stabilising financial cycles is still in its infancy
(Akram, 2014, 78). Some countries (where these policies have been used) have resorted on
using them on an ad-hoc or experimental basis with limited appreciation of their effectiveness
(Claessens, 2014, 3).
Furthermore, how macroprudential policy interacts with monetary policy, as their ultimate
goals have implication for the overall stability of the economy, still remains an open question.
This follows the move by many central banks around the world, including the South African
Reserve Bank, to expand their mandate by adding an explicit objective of financial stability to
the price stability objective in the aftermath of the financial crisis. The incorporation of macro-
prudential policy function into the central bank policy framework presents a new challenge for
central banks regarding the coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies. This
stems from the observation that the two policies do not affect economic conditions in isolation.
In particular, the goals of monetary and macroprudential policies are mutually dependent. Their
interaction extends from the consequences that failing to achieve the goal of one policy has for
the difficulty of achieving the goal of the other. Parallel to this, is a renewed debate on whether
monetary policy should also take into account the financial stability objective in addition to its
primary objective of price stability. One strand of the literature documents that there are some
stabilisation gains from allowing monetary policy to react to financial imbalances (e.g., Curdia
and Woodford, 2010; Gambacorta and Signoretti, 2014; Verona et al., 2017; Adrian and Liang,
2018). These studies argue that monetary policy should aim to achieve the broader objective of
overall economic stability rather than the narrower one of price stability alone. Another strand
of the literature documents that there are no significant gains when allowing monetary policy
to react to financial imbalances (e.g., Svensson, 2012; Gelain et al., 2013; Suh, 2014; Svens-
son, 2017; Turdaliev and Zhang, 2019). Specifically, these studies note that allowing monetary
policy to respond to financial imbalances compromises price stability and therefore welfare
detrimental. In a nutshell, while the greater emphasis on financial stability is welcomed, sev-
eral questions still remain unanswered to improve our understanding on how macroprudential
3
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policies work and their interaction with other policies such as monetary policy.
This thesis contributes to the ongoing research on macroprudential policies and their inter-
action with the monetary policy. The main goal of the thesis is to enhance our understanding
on how macroprudential policies work; their effectiveness, transmission channels and their in-
teraction with the monetary policy. The thesis also provides policy guidance on the optimal
design and the implementation of macroprudential policies. This is particularly important as
policymakers across the world are in the process of designing their own macroprudential policy
frameworks.
The thesis’ main objectives are three-fold. The first objective is to investigate the extent
to which macroprudential policies dampen the fluctuations in financial and business cycles and
contribute to greater financial and macroeconomic stability in the context of South Africa.2 The
second objective is to assess the effectiveness of various policy rules for implementing macro-
prudential policies with the ultimate goal of identifying appropriate design of macroprodential
policies. The third objective is to study the interaction between macroprudential and monetary
policies and its implications for financial and macroeconomic stability.
The thesis consists of three independent essays. The first essay develops a real business
cycle dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that features a stylised banking
sector, a housing market and a role of a macroprudential authority in implementing Basel capi-
tal requirement regulations. The calibrated model is then used, firstly, to investigate the extent
to which Basel III countercyclical capital requirements (CcCRs) attenuate fluctuations in credit
and housing markets and mitigate the pro-cyclicality of Basel II bank capital regulation in the
context of South Africa. To do this, a transition from Basel II to Basel III bank capital regula-
tions is decomposed into two stages - the permanent increase of the capital requirement ratio
(CRR) by 2.5% in line with the capital conservation buffer and the additional CcCR buffers.
Secondly, the essay considers four different Basel III CcCR rules and compare their effective-
ness in terms of enhancing financial and macroeconomic stability. The first CcCR rule says
the authority should adjust CRR to credit-to-output gap in line with the recommendation by
the Basel committee.3 The second rule says CRR should respond to credit gap. The third rule
2Although financial stability is acknowledged as a primary objective of macroprudential policy, Galati and
Moessner (2013) and Kahou and Lehar (2017) note that the literature is yet to establish a common ground on how
to measure it. However, in this thesis financial stability is measured in terms of volatility of financial variables
such as credit, credit-to-output ratio, house prices in line with Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and Agénor and
Pereira da Silva (2017).
3Throughout the thesis, credit-to-output gap refers to deviation of credit-to-output ratio from its steady-state.
Other similar variables (output gap, credit gap etc.) are defined analogously.
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says CRR should respond to credit and output gaps, whilst responding to credit, house prices
and output gaps in the fourth rule. The results suggest that Basel III CcCRs are effective in
attenuating fluctuations in the credit and housing markets and mitigating the pro-cyclicality of
the Basel II capital regulation. The permanent increase in capital requirement ratio (a 2.5%
conservation capital buffer) has a marginal impact in mitigating the pro-cyclicality of the Basel
II capital regulation. The comparative assessment of four Basel III CcCR rules suggests that
the most effective policy rule is the one in which the authority adjusts bank capital requirement
ratio to credit and output gaps.
The second essay investigates the implications of the countercyclical loan-to-value (CcLTV)
regulation in a setting where two types of borrowers (households and non-financial corporates)
from distinct sectors of the credit market co-exist. To do this, the model framework developed in
the first essay is extended to incorporate a role of a macroprudential authority in implementing
household and non-financial corporate CcLTV regulations. We propose two policy regimes
for implementing CcLTV regulations - one generic and one sector-specific - and compare their
effectiveness in enhancing financial and macroeconomic stability. Under the generic regime,
the authority adjusts the household and corporate LTV ratios to changes in aggregate credit
and output whilst adjusting these ratios according to their specific sectoral credit conditions
and output, with different intensities, under the sector-specific regime. The results suggest
that both the generic and the sector-specific regimes are effective in enhancing financial and
macroeconomic stability. A comparative assessment of the two policy regimes suggests that
the effectiveness of these regimes is shock dependent. When the economy faces a technology
shock, the effectiveness of the two policy regimes is more or less the same. However, when one
sector of the credit market is hit by a financial shock, the sector-specific regime outperforms the
generic regime in terms of enhancing financial and macroeconomic stability. On the contrary,
the generic regime outperforms the sector-specific regime when the shock originating from the
housing market (housing demand shock) effects the two sectors of the credit market.
The first two essays investigate the effectiveness and the implication of macroprudential
policies in isolation of monetary policy. The third essay extends the analysis by examining
the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies in a framework where hetero-
geneous borrowers (households and non-financial corporates) co-exist. To do this, the essay
develops and estimates a new Keynesian DSGE model, which features a stylised banking sec-
tor, a housing market and the role of monetary and macroprudential policies. Based on the
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estimated model, the essay compares the effectiveness of a simultaneous deployment of mone-
tary and macroprudential policies under the two alternative policy regimes against a benchmark
regime in which there is only monetary policy. The first alternative regime is a combination of
a standard monetary policy rule (Taylor rule) and a CcCR rule. The second alternative regime
is a combination of an augmented monetary policy rule (an augmented Taylor rule), where
the policy rate also reacts to financial variables, and a CcCR rule. The results suggest that
a simultaneous deployment of monetary and macroprudential policies enhances financial and
macroeconomic stability. The policy regime that combines a standard monetary policy and
macroprudential policy is the most the efficient policy regime and enhances both financial and
macroeconomic stability. The regime that combines an augmented monetary policy and macro-
prudential policy is superior in enhancing financial stability, but compromises price stability.
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 examines the extent to which the
Basel III bank capital regulation attenuates fluctuations in housing and credit markets, fosters
financial and macroeconomic stability and mitigates the pro-cyclicality of Basel II bank capital
regulation. Chapter 3 investigates the optimal design and the implications of the CcLTV regu-
lations in a model economy where household and non-financial corporate borrowers co-exist.
Chapter 4 investigates the optimal design and the effectiveness of monetary and macropruden-
tial policies in promoting macroeconomic (price) and financial stability. Chapter 5 provides a




Housing and credit market shocks:
Exploring the role of rule-based Basel III
countercyclical capital requirements1
2.1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has highlighted that the Basel II regulatory framework is inadequate
to safeguard the financial system as a whole. In fact, the Basel II bank capital regulation pro-
motes excessive credit growth (excessive leverage in the private sector) in economic booms,
which in turn can cause credit-induced asset price bubbles and increase the systemic vulnera-
bility. When the risk materialises and the cycle reverses, the framework cannot enable banks to
cope with adverse effects of negative financial shocks, forcing them into rapid deleverage and
credit squeeze with dire consequences for the real economy. In short, one of the main shortcom-
ing of this regulatory framework is pro-cyclicality.2 Against this backdrop, consensus among
world leaders emerged to adopt Basel III bank capital regulation with the overall objective of
financial stability as part of comprehensive reforms on financial sector regulation.
The Basel III bank capital regulation introduces two main elements to enhance the resilience
of the banking sector in periods of stress and mitigate the credit and housing boom-bust cycles,
and the associate macroeconomic instability. First, over and above the 8% minimum capital
1This chapter is published in Economic Modelling. See Liu and Molise (2019b).
2The framework requires banks to hold less capital in the upswing of the business cycle but more in the
downswing. This in turn amplifies financial and business cycles and has negative implications for financial and
macroeconomic stability. This is supported by Covas and Fujita (2010), Angelini et al. (2010), Liu and Seeiso
(2012) and Repullo and Suarez (2013).
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requirement of risk-weighted assets, the new regulation requires banks to hold a mandatory
2.5% capital conservation buffer. Second, to overcome the pro-cyclicality problem, it intro-
duces a countercyclical capital buffer as macroprudential policy tool that acts as an automatic
stabilizer. In economic boom (characterised by excessive credit growth and rapid increases in
asset prices), banks are required to hold more capital. This in turn, limits excessive leverage in
the banking sector and prevents the build-up of systemic vulnerability. In the downturn of the
cycle (characterised by rapid decline in credit and asset prices), the buffer is released and banks
hold less capital. That is, the regulation becomes more accommodating. This helps banks to
cope with the shock (and cover for losses) and aid recovery, without jeopardising their ability
to meet the regulatory requirement (BCBS, 2009).
Although the broader objective of the countercyclical capital buffer is clear3, its effective-
ness, transmission mechanisms, and impact on the financial sector and the real economy re-
main imperfectly understood. This is especially the case in the context of emerging markets
economies (EMEs) like South Africa. Most studies focus on developed countries (e.g., An-
geloni and Faia, 2013; Angelini et al., 2014; Benes and Kumhof, 2015; Karmakar, 2016; Rubio
and Carrasco-Gallego, 2016; Hollander, 2017) and little attention has been paid to EMEs. Fur-
thermore, how to implement the countercyclical capital buffer still remains an open question.
There is no consensus on the design of countercyclical capital buffer (the rule governing coun-
tercyclical capital requirements). For example, Angelini et al. (2014) consider the rule that
responds to credit-to-output gap, Agénor et al. (2013) present the one reacting to deviations of
the credit growth from its steady state, Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016) propose the one re-
acting to credit gap while Karmakar (2016) introduces countercyclical capital rule that responds
to output growth. Repullo and Saurina (2011) also criticise the design of countercyclical capital
buffer based on credit-to-output gap and propose the use of output growth as a reference guide
for taking buffer decisions. In South Africa, the Reserve Bank also raised concerns regarding
the proposed countercyclical capital rule based on credit-to-output gap (SARB, 2011).4 The
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) provides only a reference guide as a starting
point and encourages national authorities to use their own judgement when implementing the
3As in Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), “The primary aim of the countercyclical capital
buffer regime is to use a buffer of capital to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking
sector from periods of excess aggregate credit growth that have often been associated with the build-up of system-
wide risk."
4The argument is that the Basel III capital requirement, based on the credit-to-output ratio as a reference
guide, has potential to exacerbate the pro-cyclicality of bank capital regulation, especially in countries where the




The paper builds on the literature on the implications of Basel III capital requirements. A
non-exhaustive list includes Angeloni and Faia (2013), Cecchetti and Kohler (2014), Angelini
et al. (2014), Angelini et al. (2015), Benes and Kumhof (2015), Clerc et al. (2015), Lewis and
Villa (2016), Karmakar (2016), Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016) and Bekiros et al. (2018).
The main conclusion from these studies is that Basel III countercyclical capital requirements
(CcCRs) are effective in stabilising fluctuations in financial and macroeconomic variables and
have potential to deliver financial stability and improve welfare. For instance, Clerc et al.
(2015) and Karmakar (2016) show that higher capital requirements and the countercyclical
capital buffer are effective in mitigating fluctuations in financial and business cycles and im-
proving welfare. These findings are consistent with Repullo and Suarez (2013), Repullo (2013)
and Gersbach and Rochet (2017), who provide the rationale for cyclically-adjusted capital re-
quirements of Basel III. In particular, Repullo (2013) shows that cyclically-adjusted capital
requirements mitigate credit squeeze and sharp decline in investment in the downswing of the
business cycle. Gersbach and Rochet (2017) also document that CcCRs attenuate excessive
credit fluctuations and could enhance social welfare. This paper is also related to Bekiros et al.
(2018), in which the authors compare the effectiveness three alternative Basel III countercycli-
cal capital rules (reacting to credit-to-output, credit gap, or credit growth) and establish that the
countercyclical capital rule that reacts to credit gap is the most effective for enhancing banking
stability and improving household welfare.
This paper contributes to the research on bank capital regulations in several ways. First,
we decompose the transition from Basel II to Basel III into two stages, namely the permanent
increase of the capital requirement ratio (CRR) by 2.5% in line with the capital conservation
buffer and the additional countercyclical capital buffer. With this decomposition analysis, we
investigate whether Basel III capital regulation is able to, and through which channels, attenu-
ate the credit and housing markets boom-bust cycles and mitigate the pro-cyclicality of Basel
II. This is in contrast to most studies, which focus on the interaction between Basel III capi-
tal requirements and monetary policy.5 Secondly, we consider four different CcCR rules and
compare their effectiveness in terms of financial and macroeconomic stabilisation benefits. We
measure financial stability in terms of volatility of credit-to-output ratio and house prices and
5See, for instance, Angeloni and Faia (2013), Cecchetti and Kohler (2014), Angelini et al. (2014), Angelini
et al. (2015), Benes and Kumhof (2015), Lewis and Villa (2016) and Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016).
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macroeconomic stability with variability of output.6 In contrast to Bekiros et al. (2018), the
analysis in this paper also considers alternative policy rules that respond to house prices and
output in addition to credit. The benchmark rule (rule A) says the regulatory authority should
adjust the countercyclical capital requirement in response to the credit-to-output gap, in line
with the BCBS guide. The second rule (rule B) says the CcCR should respond to the credit
gap. The third rule (rule C) says the CcCR should respond to changes in credit and output
gaps. The fourth rule (rule D) says the CcCR should respond to credit, house prices and output
gaps. We argue that these rules capture the broad objective of macroprudential policy: financial
stability without compromising macroeconomic stability. The third contribution is the use of
a general equilibrium framework to evaluate the implications of Basel III bank capital require-
ments for the South African economy. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to do
so.7
The main objective of this paper is to demonstrate the role of countercyclical capital buffers
in attenuating fluctuations in credit and housing markets and mitigating the pro-cyclicality of
Basel II. To achieve this objective, we develop a real business cycle dynamic stochastic gen-
eral equilibrium (DSGE) model with a stylised banking sector and macroprudential authority.8
Specifically, the model builds on the framework of Iacoviello (2015) and incorporates an ex-
plicit role of macroprudential policy along the lines of Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016).
Since this paper purely focuses on bank capital requirements and financial stability, the model
abstracts from nominal rigidities. The model is calibrated to the real South African data. We
consider the two sources of economic instabilities; a positive housing demand shock to mimic
economic boom prior 2007 and a negative financial shock to capture the subsequent economic
collapse post 2007 (see Fig. 2.1). While there are many factors behind the recent economic
boom-bust cycle in South Africa, we only consider these two shocks to illustrate the role of
Basel III bank capital requirements in mitigating the kind of credit and housing boom-bust
cycles that marked the recent developments in South Africa.
The main findings of the paper are as follows. In comparison to Basel II capital regulation,
6See for e.g., Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2017).
7The only related study on the South Afican economy is Liu and Seeiso (2012), in which the authors develop
a DSGE model and study the impact of the Basel II bank capital regulation on business cycle fluctuations. Their
results show strong evidence of the pro-cyclicality of Basel II.
8We are aware of some of the criticisms of DSGE models, especially for policy analysis in periods of distress.
For example, Bekiros et al. (2016) postulate that this class of models fail to capture non-linearities inherent in data
and are not good for calibration outside normal times. However, the objective of this paper is to illustrate the role
of countercyclical capital buffers in dampening credit and house price cycles and mitigating the pro-cyclicality in
the banking sector. We do not attempt to model crisis episodes per se.
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Basel III CcCRs are effective in attenuating credit and housing market boom consequent upon
housing demand shock. In fact, the increase in the regulatory requirements limits the extent to
which banks can take on leverage and restrain credit supply in the economy. In this way, the
new bank capital regulation can prevent potential credit and housing market bubbles and contain
the build-up of systemic risk in an economic boom. By doing so, the regulation enhances
financial and macroeconomic stability. We found that when the economy is hit by a negative
financial shock (a credit and housing bubbles bust), the fall in the capital requirement ratio
(the relaxation of the regulatory requirement) enables banks to better cope with the adverse
effects of the shock without rapid deleverage. This mitigates the problem of credit squeeze
in an economic downturn and reduces the severity of the recession. In contrast, the impact
of a permanent increase in capital requirements (a 2.5% conservation capital buffer) has only
marginal effects in attenuating fluctuations in the credit and housing markets and mitigating the
pro-cyclicality of the Basel II capital regulation.
The comparison analysis of the four CcCR rules suggests that the most effective rule for en-
hancing financial and macroeconomic stability is rule C, the one in which the authority adjusts
bank capital requirement ratio to changes in credit and output. The optimal implementation of
this rule requires an aggressive response to changes in output and a stronger reaction to credit
than that of rules A and B, in which the authority adjusts capital requirement ratio to changes
in credit-to-output or credit only. The second best rule is rule D (in which the CcCR responds
to credit, house prices and output), while rule B and rule A are ranked third and fourth, re-
spectively. These rankings of the policy rules hold irrespective of whether the objective of
the macroprudential authority is financial stability only or both financial and macroeconomic
stability.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section highlights some stylised
facts about the relationships between bank lending, house prices and the business cycle in
South Africa. Section 2.3 describes the model in detail. Section 2.4 explains the calibration of
the model and Section 2.5 explains business cycle properties of the model. In Section 2.6, we
investigate the effectiveness of the new regulatory framework in attenuating the fluctuations in
credit and housing markets and mitigating the pro-cyclicality of Basel II. Section 2.7 sets out
the optimal rules for implementing countercyclical capital buffers. Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 Stylised Facts: Financial variables, house prices and the
business cycle in South Africa
This section presents the empirical evidence regarding the relationships between South Africa’s
house prices, financial and key macroeconomic data over the period 1994Q1 - 2016Q4.9 We
first highlight the co-movement between these variables and then provide a more formal analy-
sis by considering the vector autoregressive (VAR) evidence on the impact of a positive house
price shock and a negative bank capital shock. Both empirical exercises serve as references for
the development and evaluation of the DSGE model in the paper.
2.2.1 The data
Fig. 2.1 shows the annual growth rates of bank credit, house prices and the key macroeconomic
aggregates, such as household consumption and output (i.e., gross domestic product (GDP)).
The upper panel in Fig. 2.1 shows the relationships between house prices, output and consump-
tion. It is clear that house prices co-move closely with consumption and output, with house
prices leading consumption and output growth. In particular, South Africa’s housing boom pe-
riod (2000 - 2006) is characterised by a sustained increase in house prices, consumption and
output. During the 2007/08 financial crisis the trend reverses with the slowdown in house price
inflation and subsequent decline in 2009, followed by a slowdown in consumption and output
growth. Prior to 1998 and during the period 2010 - 2013, there is little (or no) indication of the
co-movement between house prices and the two macroeconomic aggregates.
The lower panel in Fig. 2.1 highlights the relationships between house prices, consump-
tion and household mortgage credit. It is evident that house prices and consumption move in
tandem with mortgage debt over the sample period. This suggests that an increase in house
prices generates wealth effects that enable home-owners to borrow more and spend more on
consumption, particularly when they use housing wealth as collateral to secure credit. The in-
crease in demand for consumption goods that follows an increase in house prices provides an
incentive for firms to increase production. Hence the positive relationship between house prices
and output observed in the upper panels in Fig. 2.1.
Fig. 2.2 shows the relationships between house prices and total mortgage credit (left hand
9Data source: South African Reserve Bank (SARB).
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Figure 2.1: Relationships between house prices, financial and key macroeconomic variables in South Africa.
panel), and bank capital and total mortgage credit (right hand panel). It shows that house prices
and mortgage credit move together closely, with house prices leading total mortgage debt. The
only exceptional periods are prior to 1997 and the period 2012 - 2015, when the two series
move in opposite directions. The right hand panel of Fig. 2.2 also provides evidence of the co-
movement between bank credit and bank capital. Specifically, the co-movement between the
two series is evident during the period 2002 - 2008. Prior to 2002 (the period associated with the
1997/98 Asian crisis) and during the post 2007/08 financial crisis period, the two series move
in opposite directions. This suggests that during a crisis, while being restrained from lending,
banks still need to take measures to replenish their capital to meet regulatory requirements.
2.2.2 VAR Evidence
In this section we establish empirically the extent to which bank capital and house price shocks
shape the dynamics of the financial sector and the real economy. The empirical exercise serves
as a reference for the development and evaluation of the DSGE model. We use a vector autore-
gressive (VAR) model which contains six variables: GDP, consumption, house prices, bank cap-
ital, the lending rate and the credit-to-output ratio over the sample period 1994Q1 to 2016Q4.
We use share capital and reserves as measures for bank capital, and total mortgage credit to
13
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Figure 2.2: Relationships between house prices, bank credit and bank capital in SA.
households and non-financial corporates for bank credit. Nominal variables are deflated by
the GDP deflator to get their real counterparts. The real interest rate is obtained by using the
formula, r = (1 + R)/(1 + π) − 1, where r is the real interest rate, R is the nominal interest
rate and π is the inflation rate measured by the annual percentage change in GDP deflator. To
identify the system, we use Cholesky decomposition, ordering the variables as GDP, consump-
tion, house prices, the lending rate, credit-to-GDP ratio and bank capital. Variables in the VAR
system are in log-differences except for the lending rate. The VAR system includes up to 4 lags.
The ordering of the variables is based on the assumption that real variables (GDP, consump-
tion, house prices) do not respond contemptuously to shocks in financial variables (lending rate,
credit-to-GDP ratio and bank capital), which is in line with Berrospide and Edge (2010) and
Mésonnier and Stevanovic (2017). Different ordering schemes were explored in preliminary
exercises, but these did not affect the results significantly.
We study the role of a bank capital shock in our empirical analysis for two reasons. First,
the bank capital constraint (that ties bank lending to bank capital) plays a critical role in the
transmission channel through which the banking sector interacts with the real sector. Second,
since the macroprudential instrument (in this case, the capital requirement ratio) works to re-
strain or free banks’ own available resources for lending, it is important to establish the impact
of bank capital on bank lending. A negative bank capital shock serves as a proxy for loan re-
payment shock (financial shock), corresponding to unexpected increase in loan losses. In fact,
unexpected increase in loan losses leads to a decline in banks’ profits (retained earnings), and
ultimately erodes bank capital.
Fig. 2.3 shows the impulse responses of the variables following a negative bank capital
shock. Consistent with the literature, the results show that a negative bank capital shock reduces
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credit-to-output ratio and leads to a fall in house prices, consumption and output.10 Although
these studies use different measures of bank capital (e.g., the capital-asset ratio), they establish
that a negative bank capital shock induces banks to shrink their balance sheets and curtail
credit with negative implications for real economic activity. The results suggest a negative
relationship between banks’ net worth (capital) and lending rates, and provide further evidence
regarding the co-movements between bank capital, bank lending, house prices, consumption












































Figure 2.3: VAR impulse responses to a negative shock on bank capital. Note: red dashed lines represent one
standard error bands.
Fig. 2.4 shows the impulse responses of the variables following a positive shock in house
prices. The shock results in an increase in credit-to-output ratio, consumption and output.
The same is also true for bank capital. The shock causes a temporary increase in the lending
rate with the impact becoming negative 4 quarters after the shock occurs. In general, the re-
sults suggest that a positive shock in house prices has an expansionary impact on bank credit,
consumption and output. These findings are consistent with the findings in the South African
literature (see e.g., Aye et al., 2014; Apergis et al., 2014) and confirm the co-movement between
house prices, bank lending, consumption and output highlighted in Figs. 2.1 and 2.2.
10See for e.g., Berrospide and Edge (2010), Michelangeli and Sette (2016), Mésonnier and Stevanovic (2017)

















































Figure 2.4: VAR impulse responses to a positive shock on house prices. Note: red dashed lines represent one
standard error bands.
2.3 The model
The model framework is a closed economy real business cycle model featuring a banking sec-
tor, financial frictions and a macroprudential authority. Specifically, the model is built on the
workhorse of Iacoviello (2015) and incorporates the role of a macroprudential authority in ac-
cordance with the Basel II and III capital regulatory frameworks following Rubio and Carrasco-
Gallego (2016). In contrast to monetary business cycle models, the model abstracts from nom-
inal rigidities. This is because the interest is not on the role of monetary policy or its interplay
with countercyclical capital requirements (CcCRs). For similar studies on macroprudential
policy that abstract from sticky prices, see Clerc et al. (2015), Karmakar (2016) and Hollander
(2017). We keep the model simple, but sufficiently detailed to provide insights on how CcCRs
contribute to financial and macroeconomic stability.
In this section, we first present the baseline model and lay out the transmission mechanisms
through which housing demand and loan repayment shocks affect the financial sector and the
real economy and the role of the rule-based CcCRs. The baseline model features three agents:
households, entrepreneurs and banks (financial intermediaries). In this setup, we assume that
households are the net savers in the economy while entrepreneurs are the net borrowers. In the
subsequent section, we extend the baseline model and relax this assumption. Specifically, we
introduce heterogeneity in the household sector and allow one group of households to be savers
and the other to be borrowers. This helps us to capture some of the salient features of the South
16
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Africa’s economy described in sub-section 2.2.1 and affords a more realistic analysis of South
Africa’s housing market and mortgage credit market.
2.3.1 The baseline model
The model economy is populated by households, entrepreneurs and banks. Households con-
sume final output and housing services, and supply labour to entrepreneurs. They are net savers
in the economy and provide banks with funds in the form of savings deposits which earn a
risk-free return. Entrepreneurs produce final output using labour and housing (commercial real
estate) as inputs. To finance their production, entrepreneurs borrow funds from banks against
their stock of housing wealth. Banks accept savings deposits from households (savers) and
provide credit to entrepreneurs (borrowers). Banks are subject to a risk-weighted capital re-
quirement. The macroprudential authority is responsible for setting bank capital requirements
in line with Basel capital regulations.
2.3.1.1 Households
The representative household chooses real consumption (Cs,t), residential real estate or hous-







(1− ηs)log(Cs,t − ηsCs,t−1) + jAtlog(Hs,t) + τ log(1−Nt)
]
, (2.1)
where E0 and βs ∈ (0, 1) denote the expectation operator and household’s subjective discount
factor, respectively. ηs measures the degree of external habit persistence for consumption.
In line with Iacoviello (2015) and Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), the scaling factor 1 − ηs,
ensures that the marginal utility of consumption is independent of the habit parameter in the
steady state. j and τ are the weights of housing and leisure in the utility function, respectively.
At denotes a housing demand shock that evolves according to the following law of motion:
log(At) = ρalog(At−1) + ξa,t, 0 < ρa < 1, (2.2)
where ρa is the persistence parameter of the shock process. ξa,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2a) is the white
noise process, normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2a. The housing demand shock
captures exogenous factors which can shift households’ preference and demand for housing.
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Iacoviello (2005) suggests that the housing demand shock offers a parsimonious way to analyse
exogenous disturbances on house prices.
In each period, the household begins with housing stock (Hs,t−1) and savings deposits
(Dt−1) coming to maturity. Households also supply labour to entrepreneurs and receive a real
wage rate Wt. Let Rd,t denote the real gross return on one-period risk-free deposits and qt de-
note the relative price of housing (in units of consumption), the household’s budget constraint
is given by:
Cs,t +Dt + qt(Hs,t −Hs,t−1) = WtNt +Rd,t−1Dt−1. (2.3)
Let UCs,t = 1−ηsCs,t−ηsCs,t−1 be the marginal utility of consumption, the first order conditions


















Eq. (2.4) is the standard consumption Euler equation. Asset pricing equation (2.5) for hous-
ing equates the marginal cost of housing to its marginal benefit. For households, the marginal
benefit of housing is given by the direct utility benefit of consuming one extra unit of housing
service in units of consumption (marginal rate of substitution between housing and consump-
tion) plus the present discounted value of housing (benefit housing provides in the next period
as a store of wealth). Eq. (2.5) can also be regarded as households’ demand function for hous-
ing. Labour supply condition (2.6) equates the real wage rate to the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure.
2.3.1.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs produce final output (Yt) using labour (Nt) and housing (He,t) as inputs. Housing
(commercial real estate) includes retail, office and industrial properties. The representative




βte(1− ηe)log(Ce,t − ηeCe,t−1), (2.7)
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where βe < βs and Ce,t is the entrepreneur’s real consumption. Since entrepreneurs are the
owners of firms, their consumption can be regarded as profits or dividends payout. As such,
ηeCe,t−1 captures some form of dividend smoothing in line with Liu et al. (2013). Liu et al.
(2013) highlight that this form of dividend smoothing is essential to adequately explain the
dynamics between asset prices and real variables. The budget constraint of the entrepreneur is
given by:
Ce,t + qt(He,t −He,t−1) +Re,tLe,t−1 +WtNt + ACle,t = Yt + Le,t + ζe,t, (2.8)
where Le,t is the amount of loans borrowed from banks, which accrue real gross interest rate
of Re,t. ACle,t = φle2
(Le,t−Le,t−1)2
Le
is the quadratic loan adjustment cost, where Le is the steady-
state value of Le,t. This cost penalizes entrepreneurs for adjusting their loan portfolios rapidly
between periods.
Following Iacoviello (2015), we introduce an exogenous loan repayment shock ζe,t. Intu-
itively, the loan repayment shock can be thought of as partial defaults by borrowers on their
loan contracts. The shock represents an income gain (increase in wealth) for borrowers. This is
because by paying less than the contractual amount of loans, borrowers are able to spend more
than previously anticipated. The same shock appears on the liability side of banks’ balance
sheet, but with a negative sign. For banks, this represents losses that banks incur when borrow-
ers fail to honour their contractual obligations. The shock evolves according to the following
law of motion:
ζe,t = ρζζe,t−1 + ξζ,t, 0 < ρζ < 1, (2.9)
where ρζ is the parameter representing the persistence of the shock process. ξζ,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2ζ )
is the white noise process, normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2ζ .








Eq. (2.10) suggests that the total amount of credit entrepreneurs can secure from banks cannot
exceed a fraction me of the expected market value of their collateral assets. me can be regarded
as loan-to-value ratio associated to housing wealth. The dual role of housing as collateral
asset and productive input is widely acknowledged in DSGE literature (see for e.g., Iacoviello,
2005; Chaney et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Minetti and Peng, 2013). As will be shown later, the
condition βe < βs ensures that the borrowing constraint (2.10) is binding in the neighbourhoods
of the steady state.
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Let UCe,t = 1−ηeCe,t−ηeCe,t−1 be the marginal utility of consumption and λe,t be the multiplier on















WtNt = (1− ν)Yt, (2.12)
1− φle
Le




Eq. (2.11) represents entrepreneurs’ demand function for housing. It equates the marginal
cost of one extra unit of housing (current price of housing) to its marginal benefits. For en-
trepreneurs, the marginal benefit of housing is given by the present discounted value of the
next period’s real return on housing plus the benefit of housing as a collateral asset for securing
credit. Entrepreneurs’ real return on housing is given by the marginal product of housing and
future resale value of housing. Eq. (2.12) is the labour demand condition. Eq. (2.13) is the asset
pricing equation for bank loans.







where the parameter ν ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output with respect to housing. A technology
shock ( Zt) evolves according to the following law of motion:
log(Zt) = ρzlog(Zt−1) + ξz,t, 0 < ρz < 1, (2.15)
where ρz is the persistence parameter of the shock process. ξz,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2z) is the white
noise process, normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2z .
2.3.1.3 Banks
Banks (financial intermediaries) mediate funds between savers (patient households) and bor-
rowers (entrepreneurs). The representative bank chooses real consumption (Cf,t) to maximize




βtf (1− ηf )log(Cf,t − ηfCf,t−1), (2.16)
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where βf denotes the bank’s subjective discount factor. Note that Cf,t can be interpreted as
profits generated by banks, which are assumed to be fully consumed by banks (as owners).
ηfCf,t−1 represents some form of dividend smoothing. Banks’ budget constraint is given by:
Cf,t +Rd,t−1Dt−1 + Le,t + ACef,t = Dt +Re,tLe,t−1 − ζt, (2.17)





is the quadratic loan adjustment cost, reflecting costs associated with moni-
toring and redeeming existing loans and granting new ones. ζt is the loan repayment shock
that represents unexpected loan losses. From banks’ perspective, loan losses represent a shock
on their capital positions (bank net worth). An increase in loan losses reduces banks’ profits
and impairs their balance sheets. This results in a decline in bank capital. That said, the loan
repayment shock can be regarded as a shock on bank capital.
Banks are subject to a capital requirement constraint in line with Basel capital regulations.
Specifically, banks are required to hold a certain amount of bank capital that covers, at least,
a specified fraction of their assets (loans). South African banks consistently maintain capital
adequacy ratios over the regulatory requirements. Over the period 2008 - 2015, the average
amount of bank capital held by South African banks is approximately 12% of risk weighted
assets. For simplicity, the paper does not distinguish between required capital and excess capital
held voluntarily by South African banks.
Let bank capital be BKt = Le,t−Dt−Etζt+1, the capital adequacy constraint is given by:
Le,t −Dt − Etζt+1
Le,t − Etζt+1
≥ κt, (2.18)
where κt is the capital adequacy ratio (CAR). The capital adequacy constraint (2.18) can be
rewritten and re-interpreted as a borrowing constraint as follows:
Dt ≤ (1− κt)(Le,t − Etζt+1). (2.19)
Eq. (2.19) states that the amount of deposits that banks can take cannot exceed a fraction (1−κt)
of banks’ assets net off the expected loan losses. The assumption βf < βs ensures that the
constraint (2.19) is binding in the steady state. In the absence of this assumption, banks may find
that it is optimal to postpone current consumption indefinitely and accumulate capital (through







be the marginal utility of consumption and λf,t be the multiplier
on the banks’ borrowing constraint (2.19), the banks’ optimal conditions for deposits and credit
are given by:







Re,t+1 = 1− (λf,t/UCf,t)(1− κt) +
φef
Le
(Le,t − Le,t−1). (2.21)
The banks’ behavioural rule for taking deposits (2.20) suggests that the current period pay-
off from taking one extra unit of deposit from households should equal the present discounted
cost of raising such deposits from households. Eq. (2.21) equates the present discounted pay-
off of providing one extra unit of credit to the marginal cost of providing such credit. It suggests
that by reducing the pay-off, through reduction in credit and tightening the capital requirement
constraint, banks can reduce next period’s marginal cost of credit extension (in terms of for-
gone interest earning per unit of loan). λf,t/UCf,t is the utility cost of tightening the capital
requirement constraint through credit reduction.














Aside from portfolio adjustment costs, this condition implies that the presence of bank
capital regulation creates a wedge between the lending rate and the deposit rate (marginal cost
of funding in this case). In the absence of equity financing, banks need to accumulate retained
earnings to meet higher regulatory requirement. As such, a high capital requirement creates
incentive for banks to increase the credit spread and boost profits to meet the tighter regulatory
requirement. Intuitively, Eq. (2.22) implies that banks pass the cost of capital regulation onto
borrowers by requiring high compensation as the regulatory requirement becomes tighter.





That is, so long as banks are more impatient than households (βf < βs), the borrowing con-
straint and the capital requirement constraint hold with equality at the steady state. Further-





(λf/UCf )κ > 0. (2.24)
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Using Eqs. (2.13), (2.21) and (2.23), the necessary condition for entrepreneurs’ borrowing
constraint to hold with equality is given by:
1
βe






This implies that βs > βf > βe.
2.3.1.4 Macroprudential policy







where, κ is the steady state value of the capital adequacy ratio in accordance with the Basel
capital regulation. Lt/Yt and L/Y are the credit-to-output ratio and its steady-state value,
respectively. The parameter χx measures policy response to changes in credit-to-output gap,
proposed by the Bank for International Settlements (BCBS, 2009).11
Eq. (2.26) can be regarded as a general specification for Basel capital regulation regimes
since different values of χx correspond to different regimes of the bank capital regulation.
χx = 0 represents the case of fixed capital requirement ratio under Basel I. A negative value of
χx corresponds to the pro-cyclical Basel II, that is, the capital requirement ratio decreases in the
upswing of business cycle and increases in the downswing. Lastly, setting χx > 0, Eq. (2.26)
represents the leaning-against-the-wind policy of the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer
– promoting the build-up of capital buffers in good times, which can then be released in bad
times.
2.3.1.5 Market clearing conditions and equilibrium
The economy’s aggregate resource constraint is given by:
Yt = Cs,t + Ce,t + Cf,t + Adjt, (2.27)
where Adjt = ACle,t + ACef,t.
The housing market clearing condition requires:
Hs,t +He,t = 1, (2.28)
where the total supply of housing is fixed and normalised to one.
11In the optimal policy analysis, we will consider alternative policy rules with different indicators.
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2.3.2 The extended model
To gain more insight into the implications of Basel III CcCRs and capture some of the salient
features of the South African economy as highlighted in sub-section 2.2.1, we extend the base-
line model by introducing impatient households (borrowers) in the household sector. Impatient
households use their housing wealth as collateral assets to secure credit from banks. The prob-
lem of patient households (savers) remains unchanged. This extension accommodates the fact
that, over the period 1994 - 2016, the average share of household mortgage loans in total mort-
gage loans is approximately 77 percent.12 It is, therefore, more realistic to have household
borrowers in the model. In addition, there is growing evidence that house prices are important
in explaining household consumption in South Africa (e.g., Apergis et al., 2014; Aye et al.,
2014).
For the sake of brevity, the section only lays out additional features of the extended model:
the problem of impatient households and the modified parts of the model for entrepreneurs and
banks. The complete set of equations (including the first order conditions) for the extended
version of the model is presented in appendix A.2.
2.3.2.1 Impatient Households (Borrowers)
Analogous to patient households, impatient households maximise the present discounted value






(1− ηb)log(Cb,t − ηbCb,t−1) + jAtlog(Hb,t) + τ log(1−Nb,t)
]
, (2.29)
where βb is impatient households’ subjective discount factor, and βb < βs. Cb,t denotes real
consumption,Hb,t is housing stock andNb,t denotes impatient households’ labour supply. Their
budget constraint is given by:
Cb,t +Rb,t−1Lb,t−1 + qt(Hb,t −Hb,t−1) + AClb,t = Wb,tNb,t + Lb,t + ζb,t, (2.30)
where Lb,t represents bank loans to impatient households which accrue a real gross interest rate




adjustment cost, assumed to be external to impatient households. φlb denotes the adjustment
cost parameter, whereas Lb is the steady-state value of Lb,t. ζb,t is a household loan repayment
12The average share of household credit (mortgage loans plus other loans and advances) in total private sector
credit from commercial banks is approximately 52 percent over the period 1994-2016.
24
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
shock that represents an indirect income gain (increase in wealth) for impatient households in
the event of loan default.
Analogous to entrepreneurs, impatient households also face a credit constraint that limits













βte(1− ηe)log(Ce,t − ηeCe,t−1). (2.32)
The budget constraint for entrepreneurs is now given by:
Ce,t + qt(He,t−He,t−1) +Re,tLe,t−1 +Ws,tNs,t +Wb,tNb,t +ACle,t = Yt +Le,t + ζe,t, (2.33)
where Ns,t and Nb,t are patient and impatient households’ labour supply, respectively.









where σ ∈ (0, 1) measures the share of impatient households labour income.
2.3.2.3 Banks




βtf (1− ηf )log(Cf,t − ηfCf,t−1). (2.35)
The budget constraint (2.17) becomes:
Cf,t+Rd,t−1Dt−1 +Lb,t+Le,t+ACbf,t+ACef,t = Dt+Rb,t−1Lb,t−1 +Re,tLe,t−1−ζt, (2.36)











are quadratic loan portfolio adjustment
costs associated with household and entrepreneur loans, respectively. ζt = ζb,t + ζe,t is the loan
repayment shock that represents loan losses that banks incur when impatient households and
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entrepreneurs default. Let bank capital be BKt = Lt − Dt − Etζt+1, the capital adequacy
constraint is given by:
Lt −Dt − Etζt+1
wbLb,t + weLe,t − Etζt+1
≥ κt, (2.37)
where Lt = Lb,t +Le,t is the total credit. wb and we capture different degrees of risk associated
with household and entrepreneur loans, respectively. The capital adequacy constraint (2.37)
can be rewritten as a borrowing constraint as follows:
Dt ≤ (1− weκt)(Le,t − Etζe,t+1) + (1− wbκt)(Lb,t − Etζb,t+1). (2.38)
2.3.2.4 Market clearing conditions
The economy’s aggregate resource constraint becomes;
Yt = Cs,t + Cb,t + Ce,t + Cf,t + Adjt, (2.39)
where Adjt =
∑
ACij,t. Aggregate resource constraint shows that final output is consumed
and used to finance adjustment costs.
The housing market clearing condition requires:
Hs,t +Hb,t +He,t = 1. (2.40)
The total supply of credit is given by:
Lt = Lb,t + Le,t. (2.41)
2.4 Calibration
We calibrate the model to the South African economy over the sample period 1994Q1 - 2016Q4.
Some of the parameters are calibrated using the real data to match steady state conditions of
the model, while others are borrowed from the DSGE literature for EMEs.
Table 2.1 shows the calibrated parameter values for both the baseline and extended models.
The discount factor for patient household (savers) is set at βs = 0.991 to match the South
Africa’s average real deposit rate of 3.5 percent (annualized) over the sample period. Following
Iacoviello (2015), impatient households’ and entrepreneurs’ discount factors are calibrated at
βb = βe = 0.94. The discount factor for banks is set at βf = 0.945, which is lower than patient
households’ discount factor (βs) to guarantee that the capital adequacy constraints (2.18) and
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(2.37) are binding in the neighbourhood of steady state.13 The discount factors, together with
the banks’ leverage ratio (discussed below), are calibrated such that the borrowing constraints
of impatient households and entrepreneurs hold with equality at steady state. These values
also imply a spread of 200 basis points between the lending rate and the deposit rate, which is
broadly in line with South Africa’s interest rate data.
The share of housing in production is set at ν = 0.1 in the ballpark of the values widely
used in the literature for EMEs (e.g., Iacoviello and Minetti, 2006). The housing weight in the
utility functions is calibrated at j = 0.1. The choice of these values pins down the steady state
ratio of housing wealth to output at 3.0 (annualized), of which 2.2 is residential housing wealth
and 0.8 is commercial housing wealth. These ratios are fairly in line with the South African
data on housing wealth.14
Leverage ratios for impatient households and entrepreneurs are set based on credit market
data over the sample period. The loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for impatient households is set at
mb = 0.9. This value is fairly consistent with the minimum down-payment that South African
banks require for providing home loans. In the case of entrepreneurs, LTV is set at me =
0.7. The choice of these values are well within the observed maximum LTV ratios for a first-
time mortgage buyer typically found in emerging and developing economies, including South
Africa. See for example IMF (2011). These values imply that the steady state ratio of household
mortgage loans to total output is approximately 0.35, while the ratio of corporate credit to
output is 0.53. The banks’ leverage ratio is set to mimic Basel bank capital requirements; 0.08
under Basel II and 0.105 under Basel II.5 and III. For the values of the parameter governing
macroprudential policy rule (2.26), see Section 2.6. The risk weights assigned to household
and entrepreneur loans are both set at wb = we = 1.
The weight on leisure in households’ utility function τ is set at 2, implying that households
spend approximately one third of their time working. The impatient households’ labour income
share is calibrated at σ = 0.31, broadly in line with the estimated value of 0.27 in Gupta and Sun
(2018) for the South African economy. Habit persistence for all agents is set at η = 0.7, which
is broadly in line with the literature. Impatient households’ and entrepreneurs’ loan adjustment
cost parameters are set at φlb = φle = 0.05. For banks, these parameters are calibrated at
13See section 2.3.1.3 for a detailed discussion on the conditions under which the capital adequacy constraint is
binding in the steady state.
14The 2016 Property Sector Charter Council’s (PSCC) report suggests that the share of South Africa’s housing
wealth to total output is approximately 2.3, 75 percent of which constituted residential housing wealth while the




Table 2.1: Calibrated parameters.
Description Parameter
Value
Baseline model Extended model
Patient household discount factor βs 0.991 0.991
Impatient household discount factor βb - 0.94
Entrepreneur discount factor βe 0.94 0.94
Bank discount factor βf 0.945 0.945
Habit persistence, i = {s, b, e, f} ηi 0.70 0.70
Impatient household LTV ratio mb - 0.90
Entrepreneur LTV ratio me 0.70 0.70
Housing preference j 0.10 0.10
Utility parameter for labor supply τ 2.0 2.0
Housing share in production ν 0.10 0.10
Impatient household income share σ - 0.31
Impatient household borrowing Adj. cost φlb - 0.05
Entrepreneur borrowing Adj. cost φle 0.05 0.05
Bank loans to household Adj. cost φbf - 0.05
Bank loans to entrepreneurs Adj. cost φef 0.05 0.05
Risk weight (impatient household lending) wb - 1.00
Risk weight (entrepreneurs lending) we - 1.00
Steady state Basel II CAR κII 0.08 0.08
Steady state Basel II.5 & III CAR κIII 0.105 0.105
Autocorr. technology shock ρz 0.95 0.95
Autocorr. housing demand shock ρa 0.97 0.97
Autocorr. loan repayment shock, j = {b, e} ρζj 0.90 0.90
φbf = φef = 0.05.
Lastly, the persistence of the shocks are calibrated as follows. The autocorrelation coeffi-
cients for technology and housing demand shocks are set at ρz = 0.95 and ρa = 0.97 consistent
with Liu and Gupta (2007) and the estimated value in Gupta and Sun (2018), respectively. The
persistence of loan repayment shock is set at ρζj = 0.90 (where, j = {b, e}) based on the
estimates in Iacoviello (2015).
2.5 Business cycle properties
This section assesses the business cycle properties of the baseline and extended models. Ta-
ble 2.2 reports standard deviations of the main variables and their correlations with output
implied by the baseline and extended models and those calculated from the actual data. For the




Table 2.2: Business cycle properties.
Variable
Standard deviation (%) Correlation with output
Data
Baseline model Extended model
Data
Baseline model Extended model
Basel II Basel III Basel II Basel III Basel II Basel III Basel II Basel III
Output 1.16 1.29 1.23 1.11 1.06 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Household consumption 1.76 1.18 1.12 1.09 1.03 0.81 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99
House prices 4.59 2.00 1.89 1.60 1.53 0.30 0.80 0.80 0.89 0.89
Household deposits 2.77 5.84 4.46 4.38 3.26 0.23 0.86 0.88 0.86 0.91
Household loans 4.08 - - 5.42 4.76 0.51 - - 0.85 0.89
Corporate loans 4.81 5.64 4.67 3.58 2.67 0.31 0.82 0.83 0.88 0.91
Lending rate 0.83 0.42 0.67 0.58 0.77 -0.16 -0.50 -0.33 -0.11 -0.09
Data over 1994Q1 – 2016Q4 are obtained from the South African Reserve Bank (SARB). With the exception of
lending rate, all variables are log-transformed and de-trended using HP filter.
The results show that the baseline and extended models reproduce the cyclical moments of
the real sector fairly well. Standard deviations of output generated from both models are fairly
close to the one observed from the data. The two models also do a reasonably good job in
matching the standard deviation of consumption, but underestimate it to a certain extent. Both
models underestimate the standard deviation of house prices, and this is particularly so for the
extended model.
Both the baseline and the extended models reproduce variability of the lending rate which is
fairly in line with the data, especially under Basel III. Though the baseline model somewhat ex-
aggerates the volatility of deposits, the extended model reproduces it well in line with the data.
This is particularly so under Basel III. The baseline model does a good job in replicating the
standard deviation of corporate loans, whereas the model under Basel II slightly overestimates
and the model under Basel III slightly underestimates it. The extended model also performs
well in replicating standard deviations of household and corporate loans. Both the baseline and
the extended models reproduce the fact that house prices, deposits and loans are more volatile
than output, whereas the lending rate is less volatile than output.
The results further show that the baseline and extended models reproduce the co-movements
between output and the main variables, which are fairly consistent with the data. Both models
predict the positive correlation of output with consumption, house prices, deposits and loans,
but overestimate these positive correlations. The baseline and the extended models also do
a fairly good job in mimicking the negative correlation between the lending rate and output.
While the extended model reproduces the negative correlation which is fairly in line with the
data, the baseline model somewhat overestimates this negative correlation.
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2.6 Rule-based Basel III countercyclical capital
requirements
In this section, we investigate the extent to which the rule-based Basel III capital requirements
dampen the fluctuations in the credit and housing markets and foster financial and macroe-
conomic stability. To do this, we decompose the transition from Basel II to Basel III capital
requirement regime into two stages. The first stage entails a permanent increase in the capital
adequacy ratio from 8% to 10.5%, in line with the conservative capital buffer. The second stage
involves the introduction of a countercyclical capital buffer – the dynamic component of Basel
III bank capital requirements.
To illustrate this transitional effect we compare model dynamics under the three regulatory
regimes following a positive housing demand shock to mimic dynamics in economic boom and
a negative loan repayment shock to mimic those in economic downturn.15 The first regime
corresponds to the Basel II capital requirement defined by κ = 0.08 and χx = −0.5 to mimic
the pro-cyclicality of Basel II regime. The second regime corresponds to the Basel II capital
requirement plus the capital conservation buffer of 0.025, that is, κ = 0.105 and χx = −0.5.
This can be regarded as the first stage of the transition from Basel II to Basel III and is referred
to as Basel II.5. The third regime corresponds to the full implementation of Basel III, defined
by setting κ = 0.105 and χx = 0.5 to mimic the countercyclical buffer.
2.6.1 Housing demand shock
We first illustrate the results with a positive housing demand shock in Figs. 2.5 and 2.6. The
shock increases house prices, and through the collateral channel, enables entrepreneurs to in-
crease borrowing and stimulate production in the economy. To accommodate more lending,
banks increase demand for deposits. Lending rates (credit spreads) also increase in response to
higher demand for credit. All in all, the shock results in an increase in output and aggregate
consumption.16 These results are consistent with the VAR evidence reported in sub-section
2.2.2, suggesting that a positive house price shock has expansionary effects on the economy.
15Here we report the results for the baseline model only, whereas the results for the extended model are reported
in appendix A.4.
16Aggregate consumption is the sum of households’, entrepreneurs’ and banks’ consumption. That is, Ct =
Cs,t + Ce,t + Cf,t.
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Basel II Basel II.5 Basel III
Figure 2.5: Impulse responses to a positive housing demand shock under alternative Basel regimes. Notes: Black
asterisk line: Basel II; Blue dashed line: Basel II.5; Red solid line: Basel III. Variables are expressed in %
deviations from steady states, and interest rates are in percentage points. Entrep stands for entrepreneur.
The black asterisk lines in Fig. 2.5 illustrate the impact of the shock under the Basel II
regime while the right hand side of Fig. 2.6 summaries the transmission channel graphically. In
this case, bank capital requirement ratio declines when credit-to-output ratio increases.17 This
creates scope for banks to extend more credit and amplify the initial impact of the shock on
house prices, consumption and output. In fact, the fall in capital requirement ratio promotes
excessive credit growth, which may leads to the formation of credit-induced house price bubbles
and threatens financial stability.
The blue dotted lines and red solid lines in Fig. 2.5 illustrate the impact of a 2.5% per-
manent increase in capital requirement ratio (conservation buffer) and countercyclical capital
buffer, respectively. The decomposition analysis of the transition to Basel III suggests that the
countercyclical capital buffer significantly mitigates the pro-cyclical effects of Basel II, whereas
the attenuation effect of the conservation buffer (Basel II.5) is marginal. Under the Basel III
17The reasoning is as follows. Under the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, bank capital
requirement ratio increases with the riskiness of the loan portfolio. Since this riskiness is negatively related to the
credit (business) cycle, banks are required to hold less capital in the upswing of the credit (business) cycle when
the credit risk is lower and more in the downswing when the risk is higher.
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regime, the macroprudential authority increases capital requirement ratio when the credit-to-
output ratio increases. This forces banks to adjust their balance sheets and curtail credit growth
to meet the higher regulatory requirements.18 In addition to this first round effect stemming
from the quantitative restriction on the volume of lending, tighter capital requirements also
lead to an increase in lending rates (credit spreads). This in turn works to curtail demand for
credit. Consequently, the extent of an increase in credit, house prices, aggregate consumption
and output is smaller under the Basel III regime than under the Basel II regime. The left hand











L∗II ↑ > L ↑
Amplification effect







(Y,C, L, q)↑ > (Y,C, L, q)III↑
r∗III ↑ > r∗II ↑
(Y,C, L, q)III ↑ < (Y,C, L, q)II ↑
Figure 2.6: The effects of a positive housing demand shock under Basel II and III regimes. Note: An up arrow
indicates an increase while a down arrow denotes a fall in a variable. The notations for the variables are as in the
paper. The superscript II and III denote Basel II and III regimes.
In brief, the results show that Basel III CcCRs are effective in attenuating credit and housing
markets boom following a housing demand shock. In this way, the new regulatory framework
can prevent potential credit and housing market bubbles and contain the build-up of systemic
risk. This promotes financial stability and contributes to the achievement of macroeconomic
stability. Furthermore, we observe that the Basel III bank capital regulation has asymmetric ef-
fects across economic agents. The new regulation generates countercyclical effects on patient
18Banks can also meet higher regulatory requirement by either increasing capital through a reduction in con-
sumption. However, this option is ruled out by the assumption made earlier that banks are relatively impatient.
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households’ and entrepreneurs’ (borrowers) consumption, but pro-cyclical with respect to that
of banks.19 The fall in credit supply reduces borrowers’ ability to finance investment in pro-
duction. This in turn, leads to a moderate increase in households’ and entrepreneurs’ income
(relative to the Basel II regime). Consequently, their consumption and hence output do not
increase as much as under Basel II regime.
2.6.2 Loan repayment shock
Fig. 2.7 shows the impulse responses of the main variables to a negative loan repayment shock,
corresponding to an unexpected increase in loan losses on entrepreneurs’ loans. The shock
reduces banks’ net worth (capital). This forces banks to reduce credit supply and increase
lending rates (credit spread) in order to meet the regulatory requirement. The fall in credit
supply and higher lending costs induce entrepreneurs to reduce investment in housing. This
decline in entrepreneurs’ demand for housing drives down house prices. Consequently, output
and aggregate consumption decrease while entrepreneur consumption increases. The increase
in entrepreneur consumption is due to the income gain as the consequence of default. These
results concur with the finding by Iacoviello (2015) that a negative loan repayment shock has
recessionary effects. Furthermore, the results conform with the VAR evidence on the impact of
a negative shock on bank capital (see sub-section 2.2.2).
The black asterisk lines in Fig. 2.7 and the right hand side of Fig. 2.8 illustrate the impact
of a negative financial shock under Basel II regime. In this case, bank capital requirement ratio
increases because of a recession (a fall in credit-to-output ratio).20 This in turn forces banks
to curtail the supply of credit further and exacerbate the initial impact of the shock on credit,
house prices, aggregate consumption and output.
The transition towards higher capital requirements (Basel II.5) plays a negligible role in
attenuating the impact of the shock and the pro-cyclicality of the Basel II regime on financial
and real variables. It is the full implementation of Basel III, particularly the introduction of
countercyclical capital buffers, that has pronounced effect in mitigating the negative impact of
the shock. Under the Basel III regime (red solid lines in Fig. 2.7 and the left hand side of
Fig. 2.8), the fall in the credit-to-output ratio triggers capital requirement ratio to decline. This
19While the results of banks’ consumption may look counter-intuitive, it is important to highlight that this is
due to the model set-up. Since there is no other investment opportunity for banks in this model set-up, a higher
capital requirement forces banks to accumulate more capital (financial resources), which they ultimately consume.
20As mentioned earlier, under Basel II regime banks are required to hold more capital when credit risk materi-
alisation is high (typically in recession) and less when the risk is low (in economic boom).
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Basel II Basel II.5 Basel III
Figure 2.7: Impulse responses to a negative loan repayment shock under alternative Basel regimes. Notes: Black
asterisk line: Basel II; Blue dashed line: Basel II.5; Red solid line: Basel III. Variables are expressed in %
deviations from steady states, and interest rates are in percentage points. Entrep stands for entrepreneur.
reduces pressure on banks to deleverage rapidly and increase lending rates more. In fact, the
drop in credit supply and the increase in lending rate are less drastic under Basel III than under
Basel II. As a result, the extent of the fall in house prices, aggregate consumption and output
becomes smaller under Basel III regime.
In general, the results suggest that Basel III regime (particularly countercyclical capital
buffer) is effective in mitigating the negative effects of the financial shock. The relaxation of
the regulatory requirements, in economic downswing, enables banks to better cope with the
adverse effects of the shock without rapid deleverage. This mitigates the problem of credit
squeeze and a sudden collapse of asset prices when the economy is hit by a negative shock.
In this way, the new regulation can help to reduce the severity of economic recession and
contribute to economic stability. The results are consistent with other studies (e.g., Angeloni
and Faia, 2013; Angelini et al., 2014; Benes and Kumhof, 2015; Karmakar, 2016; Rubio and
Carrasco-Gallego, 2016), which show that Basel III bank capital requirements are effective in
attenuating the pro-cyclical effects of the Basel II framework, particularly when the economy is













L∗II ↓ > L ↓
Amplification effect





L∗III↓ < L ↓
Attenuation effect
(Y,C, L, q)↓ > (Y,C, L, q)III↓
r∗III ↑ < r∗II ↑
(Y,C, L, q)III ↓ < (Y,C, L, q)II ↓
Figure 2.8: The effects of a negative loan repayment shock under Basel II and III regimes. Note: An up arrow
indicates an increase while a down arrow denotes a fall in a variable. The notations for the variables are as in the
paper. The superscript II and III denote Basel II and III regimes.
effects with respect to banks’ and borrowers’ consumption, but countercyclical with respect to
patient households’ consumption.
Although the focus of the study is on the stabilisation effects of countercyclical capital
requirements, it is important to note that tighter regulatory requirements could reduce the po-
tential level of bank lending, which in turn reduces economic activity. As such, there will be
welfare cost implications.
2.7 Optimal rules for implementing countercyclical capital
buffers
Having established that the rule-based Basel III bank capital requirements are effective in atten-
uating fluctuations in housing and credit markets and have potential to foster financial stability,
to complete our analysis, we now address the question relating to the design and implementa-
tion of countercyclical capital buffer.21 We consider four policy rules for setting countercyclical
capital buffers and examine their effectiveness in enhancing financial stability and to the extend
21This issue still remains an open question in the literature. See Section 2.1 for a detailed discussion of this.
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possible macroeconomic stability. We use the volatility of credit-to-output ratio and house
prices as the measures of financial stability. This is consistent with the literature, which suggest
that excessive credit-to-output growth and asset price booms are often associated with financial
distress (e.g., Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Mallick and Sousa, 2013; Aikman et al., 2015). On
the other hand, macroeconomic stability is measured by output volatility.
2.7.1 Countercyclical capital requirement rules
The benchmark rule (rule A) is given by the macroprudential policy rule (2.26), in line with the







where L and Y are steady-state values of credit and output, respectively. χl > 0 measures
policy’s response to changes in the credit-to-output gap. The first alternative rule (rule B)
assumes that the regulatory authority adjusts capital requirement ratio in response to changes







where χx > 0 measures policy’s response to changes in the credit gap. In rule C, the regulator










where χl > 0 and χy > 0 measure policy’s response to changes in credit and output gaps,
respectively. In rule D, capital requirement ratio is reacting to deviations of credit, house prices











where q is the steady-state value of house prices and the coefficients χl > 0, χy > 0 and χq > 0
measure policy’s response to changes in credit, output and house prices gaps, respectively.
The three alternative rules (Rules B, C and D) capture the intuition behind the Basel III
countercyclical capital buffer: to protect the banking sector from excessive fluctuations in
credit, which could have negative implications for financial stability. In rule C, the authority
also consider the cyclical position of the economy when setting countercyclical capital buffer.
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In the case of South Africa, where the regulator is concerned not only about excessive fluctu-
ations in credit but also fluctuations in asset prices (e.g., house prices), rule D seems to be the
suitable option. In a way, the three alternative policy rules can be thought of as attempts to
address some of the critics of the countercyclical rule, especially the use of the credit-to-output
ratio as a reference guide for taking buffer decisions.
2.7.2 Macroprudential authority loss function
In order to make a concise comparison between the four policy rules, we use a standard (fre-
quently used) criterion, whereas the main objective of the authority is to minimise volatilities
in key policy variables: primarily, the credit-to-output ratio, asset prices and output in the case
of macroprudential authority. Along the lines of Angelini et al. (2014), we define the macro-
prudential authority’s loss function as follows:







κ are the unconditional variances of credit-to-output ratio, house prices,
output and the capital requirement ratio (macroprudential instrument), respectively. The pa-
rameters λq ≥ 0, λy ≥ 0 and λκ ≥ 0 represent the relative weights on the variabilities of
house prices, output and the policy instrument in the loss function. Consistent with the broad
objective of macroprudential policy, the aim of the authority is to reduce systemic risk by sta-
bilising fluctuations in credit and to the extent possible excess volatility in asset prices (house
prices) and output. In essence, the loss function (2.46) implies that the macroprudential author-
ity strives to achieve financial stability (measured by fluctuations in credit and house prices)
without compromising macroeconomic stability (measured by output fluctuations). The inclu-
sion of σ2κ in the loss function is warranted by the notion that the authority may want to avoid
undue fluctuations in the policy instrument (Angelini et al., 2014). To simplify our analysis, we
set λκ = 0.1 and conduct the experiments with different values of the relative weights on house
prices and output within the following ranges: λq = [0, 0.5] and λy = [0, 0.5].22 For each com-







22The assignment of the relatively lower weight on house prices in the loss function is also consistent with the
empirical evidence suggesting that fluctuations in credit is relatively more important than asset prices in predicting
financial instability and financial distress (Agénor and Pereira da Silva, 2017). As such, the authority may want to
assign higher weight on credit than on asset prices.
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in Eqs. (2.42) to (2.45) that minimise the loss function (2.46) subject to the constraints given
by the model.23
2.7.3 Optimal countercyclical capital requirement rules
Table 2.3 shows the optimal parameters for each of the four policy rules together with the
values of the objective function under the four different weighting schemes.24 In column three,
we assume that the authority only cares about fluctuations in credit. In columns four and five,
the assumption is that the authority also attaches some weights on the stabilisation of either
output (column four) or house prices (column five). The last column corresponds to the case
where the authority not only cares about financial stability but also macroeconomic stability. In
fact, columns three and five are consistent with the financial stability objective with different
degrees of house prices stabilisation, while the fourth column and the last column take into
account both financial and macroeconomic stability.
The results suggest that moving from rule A to rule B (the CcCR rule responding to changes
in credit only) reduces welfare loss. When the authority follows rule C and adjusts the policy
instrument to changes in credit and output, the loss function value decreases tremendously.
The optimal implementation of rule C requires aggressive response to changes in output (as
indicated by a big value of χy compared to χx and χl) and a strong reaction to credit (χRuleCl >
χRulesAl > χ
RulesB
x ). Moving from rule C to rule D results in a slight increase in welfare loss.
This implies that the inclusion of house prices in the macroprudential policy reaction function
(rule D) does not necessarily enhance the effectiveness of the policy. However, under rule
D the authority does not need to respond to changes in output as aggressively as under rule
C: χy decreases significantly under rule D. The results indicate that rules C and D are more
effective in stabilising the loss function of macroprudential authority than rules A and B, in
which the authority reacts solely to a measure of credit (either credit or credit-to-output). That
is, the inclusion of output (and house prices) in the policy rule enhances the effectiveness of
macroprudential policy.
In the nutshell, the results show the most effective policy rule for fostering financial and
macroeconomic stability is the one in which the authority adjusts capital requirement ratio to
23We conduct the optimisation exercise using the extended model. This is because the extended model is more
detailed than the baseline model and therefore provides more insights on the implications of countercyclical capital
requirements.
24To perform the optimisation exercise, we use optimal simple rule (osr) optimisation routine in Dynare.
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Table 2.3: Optimal countercyclical capital requirement rules.
Policy rule Parameter
Optimal policies: weighting scheme (λκ, λq, λy)
(0.1, 0.0, 0.0) (0.1, 0.0, 0.5) (0.1, 0.5, 0.0) (0.1, 0.5, 0.5)
Policy rule A χx 0.7138 0.7138 0.7138 0.7138
Loss function value 0.0151 0.0151 0.0208 0.0209
Policy rule B χl 0.7164 0.7164 0.7164 0.7164
Loss function value 0.0124 0.0124 0.0179 0.0179
Policy rule C χl 0.7392 0.7394 0.7411 0.7410
χy 6.3252 6.3391 6.8040 6.8057
Loss function value 0.0018 0.0019 0.0058 0.0058
Policy rule D χl 0.7542 1.0206 0.7575 0.7582
χy 2.0698 1.9372 2.2482 2.2474
χq 3.2280 2.9895 3.4587 3.4574
Loss function value 0.0021 0.0019 0.0062 0.0062
changes in credit and output (rule C). These results hold irrespective of whether the objective
of the authority is financial stability only (columns three and five in Table 2.3) or both financial
and macroeconomic stability (columns four and six). It is worth noting that the inclusion of
house price stabilisation objective (columns five and six) requires a more aggressive response
to changes in output and house prices (compare column three with column five and column
four with column six). Taking the house price stabilisation objective into account significantly
increases the value of the loss function. This in turn requires an aggressive policy response to
stabilise the loss function. On the other hand, the optimal coefficients on credit and credit-to-
output remain virtually unchanged across the weighting schemes..
2.7.4 Constant vs. optimal rule-based countercyclical capital
requirements
In this section we conduct a counterfactual analysis by comparing the dynamics of the model
with the CcCR rule C and with a constant capital requirement. For brevity, we present only
the results for the optimal rule C, which reacts to changes in credit and output.25 To keep this
consistent with the previous analysis, we consider the same shocks: a positive housing demand
shock and a negative loan repayment shock. The results from both shocks show that the rule-
based CcCR significantly attenuates the effect of the shock. This implies that the optimal
25Rule C is the most effective policy rule based on our previous analysis. The results with other policy rules
(rules A, B and D) are available upon request.
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rule-based CcCR is more effective in enhancing financial and macroeconomic stability than a
constant capital requirement.
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Constant CAR Rule-based CcCR
Figure 2.9: Impulse responses to a positive housing demand shock under the optimal countercyclical capital
requirement rule C (red dash dot lines) and the counter-factual regime where there is no macroprudential policy
(black solid lines). Note: Variables are expressed in % deviations from steady states, interest rates are in percentage
points. HHs and Entrep stand for households and entrepreneur.
Fig. 2.9 presents the impulse responses of the key variables to a positive housing demand
shock under a constant capital requirement ratio (black solid lines) and the optimal CcCR rule
C (red dash dot lines). Under CcCR rule C, the increase in credit and output causes the coun-
tercyclical capital buffer to tighten credit conditions in an economic boom. This moderates
borrowers’ demand for housing and attenuates the impact of the shock on the real economy.
From a policy perspective, these findings support the notion that cyclically adjusted capital re-
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quirements can contain the build-up of systemic risk and foster financial stability by preventing
credit and housing market bubbles.
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Constant CAR Rule-based CcCR
Figure 2.10: Impulse responses to a negative loan repayment shock (impatient household) under the optimal
countercyclical capital requirement rule C (red dash dot lines) and the counter-factual regime where there is no
macroprudential policy (black solid lines). Note: Variables are expressed in % deviations from steady states,
interest rates are in percentage points. HHs and Entrep stand for households and entrepreneur.
Fig. 2.10 presents the results with a negative financial shock. Under the optimal CcCR
rule C, capital requirement ratio declines when credit and output fall. The relaxation of the
regulatory requirement enables banks to absorb loan losses without needing to adjust their bal-
ance sheet drastically or increase interest rates substantially. Consequently, the magnitude of
the credit and housing market bust is smaller than that under the constant capital requirement
regime. The decline in aggregate consumption and output also becomes smaller. This im-
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plies that CcCRs can reduce a systemic credit crunch and lessen the severity of a recession by
relaxing the regulatory requirements.
2.8 Conclusion
The paper presents a real business cycle DSGE model with a stylised banking sector and macro-
prudential authority, and studies the effectiveness of the rule-based Basel III CcCRs in atten-
uating fluctuations in credit and housing markets and mitigating pro-cyclicality of Basel II in
the context of South Africa. We decompose the transition from Basel II to Basel III capital
requirements into two stages, namely the permanent increase of capital requirement ratio by
2.5% in line with the capital conservation buffer, and the introduction of the countercyclical
capital buffer. We find that the rule-based Basel III CcCRs are effective in attenuating credit
and housing markets boom-bust cycles and mitigating the pro-cyclicality of the Basel II capital
regulation, while the impact of the conservation capital buffer is negligible. Taken together,
these findings support the view that the new bank capital regulation can prevent potential credit
and housing market bubbles and contain the build-up of systemic risk in a boom period. In
economic downswing, the regulation mitigates the problem of credit squeeze and helps avoid
severe recession.
We also compare the effectiveness of four alternative CcCR rules and establish that the one
reacting to changes in credit and output improves the ability of the macroprudential authority to
deliver on financial and macroeconomic stability mandates. The optimal implementation of this
rule requires an aggressive response to output and a moderate response to credit. The second
best rule is the one in which the CcCR responds to credit, house prices and output while those




The effectiveness of the countercyclical
loan-to-value regulation: generic versus
sector-specific rules1
3.1 Introduction
Policy makers and academics have been emphasising the role of macroprudential policy in
strengthening the resilience of the financial system and fostering financial stability since the
2007/08 global financial crisis. One of the key issues is the design of the macroprudential pol-
icy. This includes measures to reduce the systemic risk that arises from excessive fluctuations
in credit supply and the pro-cyclical nature of the financial sector (Claessens et al., 2013). One
of these measures is the countercyclical loan-to-value (CcLTV) regulation. The intuition be-
hind the CcLTV regulation is to adjust the LTV ratio in a countercyclical manner to lean against
credit and house-price cycles. During an economic boom, the LTV ratio is tightened in order
to dampen the excessive credit growth and prevent bubbles, such as a house price bubble. In
this way, the regulation can contain the build-up of systemic risk and promote financial stabil-
ity. When systemic risk materialises, the LTV ratio is relaxed, to prevent a sharp decline in
the demand for credit, house price collapse and rapid deleverage in the banking sector. This
relaxation mitigates the spillover of financial vulnerabilities to the real sector.
While there is consensus that financial regulation is moving towards the macroprudential




approach with well-defined policy toolkits, the design and the implementation of the policy
tools remain a challenge. Most studies in the literature examine a unique CcLTV regulation
in a model economy regardless of the type of borrower - either household or non-financial
corporate or both.2 Very few studies examine a borrower-specific CcLTV regulation in a model
where borrowers of more than one type from distinct sectors of the credit market co-exist. An
exception is the paper by Punzi and Rabitsch (2018), which examines a general equilibrium
model with low- and high-leveraged household borrowers and considers the effectiveness of
CcLTV regulations that target the two types of household borrowers. This study, however,
lacks a rigorous analysis of the CcLTV regulation in this model. It is thus not informative for
policymakers looking for the optimal design for the CcLTV regulation in an environment where
there are several types of borrowers from distinct sectors of the credit market.
As cyclical patterns of household credit and non-financial corporate credit differ, macro-
prudential tools should be designed and implemented to suit the different patterns. Fig. 3.1
shows how household and corporate credit behaved differently over the sample period 1994Q1
to 2016Q4 in South Africa. Household credit experienced a sustained growth from 2002 to
2008, associated with the South Africa’s housing market boom. Before this steep climb, house-
hold credit had been decreasing since 1998, and it decreased again after the financial crisis. In
contrast, corporate credit had been flat since 1998 and only started catching up with household
credit from 2005. It is also worth noting that corporate credit started recovering again from
2013, whereas household credit continued to decline after the crisis. The figure also shows that
the credit-to-GDP ratio for corporate credit is, on average, above 30% over the sample period,
which is approximately 10% higher than that of household credit.
This paper contributes to the literature on macroprudential policy by investigating the im-
plications of the CcLTV regulation where heterogeneous borrowers from distinct sectors of the
credit market co-exist. Our aim is to identify the optimal design. This is in contrast to studies
that consider a single CcLTV regulation in a setting where there is only one type of borrower,
or where there are homogeneous borrowers from one sector of the credit market. We argue that
fluctuations in different types of credit affect the real economy through different channels. For
2A non-exhaustive list includes Lambertini et al. (2013), Angelini et al. (2014), Quint and Rabanal (2014),
Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014), Mendicino and Punzi (2014), Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015), Ravn (2016),
Rubio and Yao (2017) and Garbers and Liu (2018). These studies find that the CcLTV regulation delivers more
stable financial and macroeconomic conditions and improves social welfare. For example, Lambertini et al. (2013)
establish that the CcLTV rule reacting to credit growth is effective in stabilising fluctuations in house prices and
credit, and leads to Pareto optimality. Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) show that the CcLTV rule that responds
to changes in credit is effective in mitigating the fluctuations in credit growth and enhances welfare.
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Figure 3.1: Credit-to-output ratios in South Africa.
example, changes in household credit affect the economy through the demand for consump-
tion goods and services and for housing investment, whereas changes in corporate credit affect
the economy through investment in physical capital and housing (commercial real estate) and
through the demand for labour. That is, changes in household credit affect the economy mainly
from the demand side, whereas changes in corporate credit affect the economy mainly from the
supply side. The regulatory authority should therefore assess potential risks in specific sectors
of the credit market and implement the CcLTV accordingly. This would avoid the potential
costs that arise from implementing a one-size-fits-all CcLTV, which over-reacts in a sector of
the market where there are no risks and under-reacts in one where there are high risks.
We propose two policy regimes for the implementation of the CcLTV regulation: one
generic and one sector-specific. Under the generic regime, the authority adjusts the household
and corporate LTV ratios to changes in aggregate credit and output; under the sector-specific
regime, the authority adjusts those ratios according to their specific sectoral credit conditions
and output, with different intensities.3 We then compare the effectiveness of the two policy
regimes in enhancing financial and macroeconomic stability. To measure financial stability we
use the volatility of credit and house prices, and to measure macroeconomic stability we use
the volatility of output, along the lines of Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and Agénor and
3By different intensities we mean that the policy coefficients on output in the household CcLTV rule and the
corporate CcLTV rule are different.
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Pereira da Silva (2017). We pose the question whether the authority should use the generic
CcLTV regime or the sector-specific CcLTV regime when implementing the CcLTV regula-
tion in a setting where there are two types of borrowers: households, which borrow to finance
consumption, and entrepreneurs, who borrow to finance production.
To do so, we develop a real business cycle dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE)
model that incorporates the role of macroprudential policy. Our model abstracts from nominal
rigidities because in this paper we focus on the role of the CcLTV regulation in fostering finan-
cial and macroeconomic stability. The model is based on the framework of Iacoviello (2015),
and populated by patient households (savers), banks, a macroprudential authority and two types
of borrower - household (impatient households) and corporate (entrepreneurs). The two types
of borrower face borrowing constraints which state that the amount borrowed cannot exceed a
certain fraction of the value of their collateral assets. The macroprudential authority adjusts its
policy instrument, the loan-to-value ratio, in a countercyclical manner to foster financial and
macroeconomic stability. The model is calibrated using South African data. It reproduces the
cyclical moments of both the financial and real sectors fairly well. Given its simplicity and the
small number of shocks considered, the model performs fairly satisfactorily in matching what
we observe in the data.
Our key findings are as follows. We first derive the optimal rules for generic and sector-
specific regimes and compare their effectiveness in minimising the macroprudential authority’s
loss function (welfare loss). We find that the sector-specific regime is more effective than the
generic regime in minimising welfare loss, particularly when the economy is hit by technology
and financial shocks. However, when a housing demand shock hits the economy the generic
regime is more effective in minimising welfare loss. For both regimes, therefore, optimal policy
rules depend on the kind of shock. Both the corporate and the household CcLTV regimes
require an aggressive reaction to credit following financial and housing demand shocks and only
a moderate reaction to credit following a technology shock. Under the sector-specific regime,
the policy requires a stronger response to credit and output for the corporate CcLTV rule than
for the household CcLTV rule. Compared to the baseline case (with constant LTV), both the
generic and the sector-specific regimes are effective in minimising the volatility of the three
key policy variables (credit, house prices and output), especially for credit. The sector-specific
regime provides a higher degree of macroeconomic stability than the generic regime. This




The results of an impulse response analysis suggest that both the generic and the sector-
specific regimes are effective in achieving the two objectives of macroprudential policy: finan-
cial and macroeconomic stability. This is achieved mainly by attenuating the amplification ef-
fects of the borrowing constraint channel. The effectiveness of both regimes is, however, shock
dependent. When the economy faces a technology shock, their effectiveness is more or less the
same. When the economy faces a financial shock, the sector-specific regime significantly out-
performs the generic regime in attenuating the business cycle fluctuations, whereas the opposite
is true when the economy is hit by a housing demand shock. When one sector of the credit mar-
ket is hit by a financial shock, while the other sector is unaffected, the sector-specific regime
plays an important role in stabilising fluctuations in the two credit market sectors and hence
reducing the fluctuations in output. This implies that by adopting the sector-specific regime the
macroprudential authority can avoid the potential costs arising from implementing the generic
regime and achieve both financial and macroeconomic stability in a more effective way. On the
other hand, when both sectors of the credit market are hit by the same shock (the housing de-
mand shock), the generic regime outperforms the sector-specific regime in achieving financial
and macroeconomic stability. Since the CcLTV regulation works through the borrowing con-
straint channel and housing is used as a collateral asset for both types of borrowers, the shock
affects both types of borrower in the same way. In this case the macroprudential authority can
implement the generic regime and not only achieve its two policy objectives but also minimise
the welfare loss.
Importantly, these results indicate that when uncertainty occurs in the credit market, the
macroprudential authority should first identify the source of the uncertainty. If the shock hits
one sector of the credit market only, implementing the generic CcLTV regime can lead to an
over-reaction in the other credit market sector and under-reaction in the sector that is hit by the
shock. Instead of correcting financial imbalances in the shock-affected credit market sector, the
generic regime exacerbates the effect of the shock on this shock-affected sector. We argue that
this potential drawback of over-reaction in one sector of the credit market and under-reaction
in the other can be eliminated by implementing the sector-specific regime. The regulator’s
flexibility in customising the CcLTV regulation according to the specific conditions of each
credit market sector will enable the regulator to eliminate the imbalances in both sectors.
The efficient policy frontiers under the two policy regimes present a clear trade-off between
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financial and macroeconomic stability, as the authority adjusts its preference between the two
policy objectives. Our results show that the sector-specific CcLTV regime is more effective
than the generic CcLTV regime in stabilising the volatility of credit and output and can deliver
a larger reduction in output volatility at a lower cost of financial instability.
In terms of the implementation of the two CcLTV regimes, we find that the proposed CcLTV
regimes have the potential to deliver on financial and macroeconomic stability mandates. How-
ever, this stabilising effect on financial stability diminishes if the regulator responds aggres-
sively to changes in credit. Responses to changes in output can achieve financial stability only
if the regulator responds moderately to changes in financial variables. However, regardless of
whether the regulatory authority responds to changes in output aggressively or not, an aggres-
sive response to changes in credit does not contribute to macroeconomic stability, whereas a
moderate response to changes in credit has a significant impact.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 3.2 describes the model and Sec-
tion 3.3 presents the calibration of the model. Section 3.4 describes the model’s business cy-
cle properties. Section 3.5 presents the optimal simple rules for implementing the generic and
sector-specific CcLTV regimes and compares their effectiveness in minimising the loss function
of the macroprudential authority. Section 3.6 presents the impulse response functions analy-
sis, Section 3.7 explains the efficient policy frontier for the two CcLTV regimes, Section 3.8
describes the implementation of the optimal CcLTV and Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 The model
Our model is a closed economy real business cycle model, featuring a banking sector, a housing
market and the macroprudential authority. Specifically, the model is built on the workhorse of
Iacoviello (2015) and incorporates the role of the macroprudential authority in implementing
the CcLTV regulation to foster financial and macroeconomic stability. Since our focus is on
the optimal design and the effectiveness of macroprudential policy, our model abstracts from
nominal rigidities.
The model features two types of households (patient and impatient), entrepreneurs, the bank
and the macroprudential authority. Households work (i.e. supply labour), and consume the final
output (consumption goods) and housing. Patient households are the savers in the economy and
provide the bank with savings deposits. Impatient households are one type of borrower in the
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economy, using their housing as a collateral asset to secure credit from the bank. Entrepreneurs
are the other type of borrower in the economy, producing the final output using household
labour and housing as inputs. To finance their production, entrepreneurs borrow funds from the
bank against their stock of housing. The bank mediates funds between savers (patient house-
holds) and borrowers (impatient households and entrepreneurs). The macroprudential authority
is responsible for financial stability using the CcLTV regulation. While there is no consensus
in the literature on which variables to include in the macroprudential policy rules, we assume
that the authority adjusts the LTV ratios to changes in credit and output. This kind of policy
rule is consistent with the main objective of macroprudential policy: to protect the financial
system from the risks associated with excessive credit growth without compromising macroe-
conomic stability. For the purpose of our study, we consider two CcLTV regimes, generic and
sector-specific.
3.2.1 Patient Households (Savers)
The representative patient household chooses real consumption (Cs,t), housing (Hs,t) and leisure






(1− ηs)log(Cs,t − ηsCs,t−1) + jAtlog(Hs,t) + τ log(1−Ns,t)
]
, (3.1)
where E0 and βs ∈ (0, 1) are the expectation operator and the household’s subjective dis-
count factor, respectively. Consumption appears in the utility function relative to external habit
formation, with ηs measuring degree of habit persistence. In line with Iacoviello (2015) and
Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), the scaling factor 1 − ηs ensures that the marginal utility of
consumption is independent of the habit parameter in the steady state. j and τ are weights of
housing and leisure in the utility function, respectively. At is the housing demand shock, which
evolves according to the following law of motion:
log(At) = ρalog(At−1) + ξa,t, (3.2)
where ρa is a parameter representing the persistence of the shock. ξa,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2a) is white
noise process, normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2a. The housing demand
shock captures exogenous factors that shift the household’s preference and demand for housing.
Iacoviello (2005) suggests that the housing demand shock offers a parsimonious way to analyse
exogenous disturbances to house prices.
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In each period, the household begins with housing stock (Hs,t−1) and savings deposits
(Dt−1) coming to mature. The household supplies labour to entrepreneurs and receives real
wage rate Ws,t. Rd,t is the real gross return on a one-period risk-free deposit and qt is the rela-
tive price of housing (in units of consumption). The household’s budget constraint is given by:
Cs,t +Dt + qt(Hs,t −Hs,t−1) = Ws,tNs,t +Rd,t−1Dt−1. (3.3)
Let UCs,t = 1−ηsCs,t−ηsCs,t−1 be the marginal utility of consumption. The first order conditions


















Eq. (3.4) is the standard consumption Euler equation. Asset pricing Eq. (3.5) for housing
equates the marginal cost of housing to its marginal benefit. For the household the marginal
benefit of housing is given by the direct utility benefit of consuming one extra unit of housing
in units of consumption plus the present discounted value of housing. Eq. (3.5) can also be re-
garded as household’s demand for housing. The household’s labour supply condition Eq. (3.6)
equates the real wage rate to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
3.2.2 Impatient Households (Borrowers)







(1− ηb)log(Cb,t − ηbCb,t−1) + jAtlog(Hb,t) + τ log(1−Nb,t)
]
, (3.7)
where βb is the household’s subjective discount factor and βb < βs. Cb,t is the household’s real
consumption, Hb,t is its housing stock and and Nb,t is its labour supply. Its budget constraint is
given by:
Cb,t +Rb,t−1Lb,t−1 + qt(Hb,t −Hb,t−1) = Wb,tNb,t + Lb,t + ζb,t, (3.8)
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where Lb,t is the bank’s loan to the household which accrues a real gross interest rate of Rb,t.
Wb,t is real wage rate for the household. Following Iacoviello (2015), we introduce an exoge-
nous loan loss shock ζb,t.4 Intuitively, this shock can be thought of as a partial default by the
household on its loan. For the household, a loan default is an indirect increase in wealth. By
paying less than the contracted amount, the household can spend more than it anticipated. The
same shock appears with a negative sign in the bank’s budget constraint. The shock evolves
according to the following law of motion:
ζb,t = ρζζb,t−1 + ξζ,t, (3.9)
where ρζ is the parameter representing the persistence of the shock. ξζ,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2ζ ) is the
white noise process, normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2ζ .
The household faces a credit constraint that limits the amount borrowed to a fraction mb,t








mb,t ∈ (0, 1) is the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio for the impatient household. The LTV ratio is
determined by the macroprudential authority as its regulatory instrument.
Let UCb,t = 1−ηbCb,t−ηbCb,t−1 be the marginal utility of consumption and λb,t be the multiplier on
























Eq. (3.11) represents the household’s demand for a bank loan. It differs from the stan-
dard Euler equation because of the borrowing constraint. Asset pricing Eq. (3.12) for housing
equates the marginal cost of housing to its marginal benefit. For the household, the marginal
benefit of housing is given by the direct utility benefit of consuming one extra unit of housing
service in units of consumption (the marginal rate of substitution between housing and con-
sumption) plus the present discounted value of housing (the benefit the housing provides in the




next period as a store of wealth). Eq. (3.12) is the household’s demand for housing. Eq. (3.13)
is the household’s labour supply condition.
3.2.3 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs produce final output (Yt) using two types of household labour supply (Ns,t and





βte(1− ηe)log(Ce,t − ηeCe,t−1), (3.14)
where βe < βs. Ce,t is the entrepreneur’s real consumption, which can be regarded as profits or
dividends. Therefore, ηeCe,t−1 captures some form of dividend smoothing in line with Liu et al.
(2013). Liu et al. (2013) note that this form of dividend smoothing is essential to adequately
explain the dynamics between asset prices and real variables. The budget constraint for the
entrepreneur is given by:
Ce,t + qt(He,t −He,t−1) +Re,tLe,t−1 +Ws,tNs,t +Wb,tNb,t = Yt + Le,t + ζe,t, (3.15)
where Ns,t and Nb,t are patient and impatient households’ labour supply, respectively. Le,t is
the amount borrowed from the bank, which accrues a real gross interest rate of Re,t. The term
ζe,t captures an exogenous loan repayment shock.5 Like the impatient household’s loan loss
shock, the shock represents an indirect increase in wealth in the event of default. The shock
evolves according to the following law of motion:
ζe,t = ρζζe,t−1 + ξζ,t, (3.16)
where ρζ is the persistence of the shock. ξζ,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2ζ ) is the white noise process,
normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2ζ .










where the parameter ν ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output with respect to housing and σ ∈
(0, 1) measures the impatient households’ labour output share.6 Technology shock (Zt) evolves
5Entrepreneur loan losses are scaled by steady-state value of bank loans to entrepreneurs analogous to Ia-
coviello (2015).
6As in Iacoviello (2015), the production technology assumes that the two types of labour (patient and impatient
households) are complements. This assumption ensures that we obtain a close-form solution for the steady state
of the model (Mendicino and Punzi, 2014).
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according to the following law of motion:
log(Zt) = ρzlog(Zt−1) + ξz,t, (3.18)
where ρz is the parameter representing the persistence of the shock. ξz,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2z) is the
white noise process, normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2z .








Eq. (3.19) suggests that the total amount of credit the entrepreneur can secure from the bank
cannot exceed a fraction me,t of the expected market value of the entrepreneur’s collateral
assets. me,t ∈ (0, 1) represents the LTV ratio for the entrepreneur (the corporate LTV ratio) and
is determined by the macroprudential authority as its regulatory instrument.7 The dual role of
housing as collateral asset and productive input is widely acknowledged in the DSGE literature
(see for e.g., Iacoviello, 2005; Chaney et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013; Minetti and Peng, 2013).8
As we show later, the condition βe < βs ensures that the borrowing constraint Eq. (3.19) is
binding in the neighbourhood of the steady-state.
Let UCe,t = 1−ηeCe,t−ηeCe,t−1 be the marginal utility of consumption and λe,t be the multiplier on
the borrowing constraint Eq. (3.19). The first order conditions which define the entrepreneur’s














Ws,tNs,t = (1− σ)(1− ν)Yt, (3.21)
Wb,tNb,t = σ(1− ν)Yt, (3.22)




Eq. (3.20) represents the entrepreneur’s demand for housing. It equates the marginal cost
of one extra unit of housing (price of housing) to its marginal benefits. For the entrepreneur,
7Throughout the paper, corporate LTV ratio means LTV ratio for entrepreneurs.
8Using housing stock as one production input provides a motive for entrepreneurs to hold housing stock, which
is in turn being used as a collateral asset for securing bank credit. This also allows us to analyse the impact of
house prices (one of our measures of financial stability) on the entrepreneur’s investment and production decisions.
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the marginal benefits of housing are given by the present discounted value of the next period’s
real return on housing plus the benefit of housing as a collateral asset for securing credit. The
entrepreneur’s real return on housing is given by the marginal product of the housing and the
future resale value of the housing. In essence, condition Eq. (3.20) equates the current price
of housing to its expected resale value plus the pay-off from holding this asset for one period
(given by the marginal productivity of housing and its ability to serve as collateral). Eqs. (3.21)
and (3.22) are labour demand conditions. Eq. (3.23) is the asset pricing equation for the en-
trepreneur’s demand for credit.
3.2.4 The bank
The bank is a financial intermediary that mediates funds between savers (patient households)
and borrowers (impatient households and entrepreneurs). The representative bank chooses real




βtf (1− ηf )log(Cf,t − ηfCf,t−1), (3.24)
where βf is the bank’s subjective discount factor. Note that Cf,t can be interpreted as dividend
payments from the bank, which are assumed to be fully consumed by the bank. ηfCf,t−1
represents some form of dividend smoothing. The bank’s budget constraint is given by:
Cf,t+Rd,t−1Dt−1 +Lb,t+Le,t+ACbf,t+ACef,t = Dt+Rb,t−1Lb,t−1 +Re,tLe,t−1−ζt, (3.25)
where Dt is the household’s deposits. Lb,t and Le,t are bank lending to impatient households











quadratic loan portfolio adjustment costs associated with household and entrepreneur loans,
respectively. ζt = ζb,t + ζe,t is the loan repayment shock. This represents loan losses that
the bank incurs when impatient households and entrepreneurs default on their loans. From the
bank’s perspective, loan losses also represent a shock to their net worth. An increase in loan
losses reduces the bank’s profits and impairs its balance sheet. This results in a decline in the
bank’s capital.
The bank is also subject to capital requirement in line with the Basel capital regulations.
Specifically, the bank is required to hold a certain amount of bank capital that covers, at least, a
specified fraction of its assets (loans). Let BKt = Lt −Etζt+1 −Dt be the bank’s capital. The
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capital requirement constraint is given by9:
Lt − Etζt+1 −Dt
wb(Lb,t − Etζb,t+1) + we(Le,t − Etζe,t+1)
≥ κ, (3.26)
where κ ∈ (0, 1) is capital requirement ratio and Lt = Lb,t+Le,t is the aggregate credit. Etζt+1
represents allowance for expected loan losses. wb and we denote risk weights on household
and entrepreneur borrowing, respectively. These parameters capture different degrees of risk
associated with household and entrepreneur borrowing. The capital requirement constraint
(3.26) can be rewritten as a borrowing constraint as follows:
Dt ≤ (1− weκ)(Le,t − Etζe,t+1) + (1− wbκ)(Lb,t − Etζb,t+1). (3.27)
Eq. (3.27) states that the amount that the bank can take as a deposit from households cannot
exceed a weighted sum of the bank’s assets net of the expected loan losses, where the weights
on the two classes of the bank’s assets are given by (1 − wiκ), for all i = {b, e}. The capital
requirement constraint limits the extent to which the bank can take on leverage. The assumption
is that the bank is more impatient than the patient household; that is βf < βs, ensures that the
borrowing constraint (3.27) is binding in the steady state. In the absence of this assumption, the
bank may find that it is optimal to postpone current consumption indefinitely and accumulate




be the marginal utility of consumption and λf,t be the multiplier
on the bank’s borrowing constraint (3.27). The bank’s optimal condition for deposits and credit








Rb,t = 1− (1− wbκ)(λf,t/UCf,t) +
φbf
Lb




Re,t+1 = 1− (1− weκ)(λf,t/UCf,t) +
φef
Le
(Le,t − Le,t−1). (3.30)
The banks’ demand for deposits (3.28) equates the current pay-off from taking one ex-
tra unit of deposit from the patient household to the discounted cost of raising such deposits.
9For simplicity, the paper does not distinguish between required capital and excess capital held voluntarily
by South African banks. South African banks consistently maintain capital adequacy ratios over the regulatory
requirements. Over the period 2008 - 2015, the average amount of excess bank capital held by SA banks is
estimated at 4% of risk weighted assets (Liu and Seeiso, 2012)
55
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Eqs. (3.29) and (3.30) equate the present discounted pay-off of providing one extra unit of credit
(to impatient households and entrepreneurs) to the cost of providing such credit.



























In the steady state, Eqs. (3.4) and (3.28) suggest that the bank’s borrowing constraint (3.27)






βf < βs. (3.34)
Furthermore, if conditions (3.33) and (3.34) hold there will be a positive spread between the
lending rate and deposit rate. That is, from Eqs. (3.31) to (3.34), it follows that:
Rb −Rd =




weκ(βs − βf )
βsβf
> 0. (3.36)
Given the lending rate Rb, Eq. (3.11) suggests that the necessary condition for impatient house-




Alternatively, using Eqs. (3.29) and (3.33), the condition for impatient household’s borrowing




























The authority uses the countercyclical loan-to-value (CcLTV) regulation as its macroprudential
tool. Adjusting the LTV ratio to changes in credit and output in a countercyclical manner
captures the main objective of the macroprudential policy: to protect the financial system from
the risks associated with excessive credit growth, which can have undesirable consequences
for the real economy. The literature proposes several ways to implement the CcLTV. One
frequently cited rule is the Taylor-type rule that says the policy instrument, the loan-to-value
(LTV) ratio, should respond to variables such as credit-to-GDP ratio, credit, output, house
prices or some combination of these variables (e.g., Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2014). There
is, however, no consensus on which variables to include in the policy rule.
We consider generic and sector-specific CcLTV policy regimes. Under the generic regime,
the authority does not differentiate between the two credit market sectors and adjusts both








, ∀ i = {b, e}, (3.41)
where mi is the steady-state value of the LTV ratio, L and Y are the steady-state values of
aggregate credit and output, respectively. χl,m ≥ 0 and χy,m ≥ 0 measure the response of the
LTV ratio to deviations of credit and output from their steady states, respectively.
Under the sector-specific regime, the authority differentiates between the two credit market
sectors and adjusts the two LTV ratios to changes in sectoral credit. The LTV ratios of the two








, ∀ i = {b, e}, (3.42)
where χl,mi ≥ 0 and χy,mi ≥ 0 measure the responses of the LTV ratios to deviations of sectoral
credit and output from their steady states, respectively.
The CcLTV regulation requires the authority to decrease the LTV ratios in an upswing of
the business and credit cycle, thus tightening the borrowing constraints and restraining credit
growth and leverage in the credit-dependent sector. In a downswing of the cycle, the regulation
requires the authority to increase the LTV ratios, thus relaxing the borrowing constraints to
encourage credit growth. In this way, the authority prevents excessive fluctuation in credit
and contains the build-up of systemic risk in the financial sector and the spillover of financial
vulnerabilities to the real sector.
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3.2.6 Market clearing conditions and equilibrium
The economy’s aggregate resource constraint becomes:
Yt = Cs,t + Cb,t + Ce,t + Cf,t + Adjt, (3.43)
where Adjt = ACbf,t + ACef,t.
The housing market clearing condition requires:
Hs,t +Hb,t +He,t = 1. (3.44)
The aggregate supply of credit is given by:
Lt = Lb,t + Le,t. (3.45)
3.3 Calibration
We calibrate our model to the South African economy using quarterly data over the sample
period 1994Q1 to 2016Q4.10 Some of the parameters are calibrated using real data to match
the steady-state conditions of the model and others are borrowed from the literature.
Table 3.1 shows the calibrated parameter values for the model. The discount factor for
patient households (savers) is set at βs = 0.99 in line with the literature. Following Iacoviello
(2015) and Minetti and Peng (2013), impatient households’ and entrepreneurs’ discount factors
are calibrated at βb = βe = 0.94, which ensure that the borrowing constraints for both are
binding in the neighbourhood of the steady state.
The weight on leisure in the households’ utility function is set at τ = 2, in line with the
literature. This value implies that households devote approximately one third of their time to
work. The impatient household’s labour income share is calibrated at σ = 0.31, broadly in
line with the estimated value of 0.27 in Gupta and Sun (2018) for South African economy.
Parameters governing habit persistence and loan portfolio adjustment costs are calibrated as
follows. Habit persistence for all agents is set at ηi = 0.7, which is broadly in line with the
literature. The bank’s loan portfolio adjustment cost parameters are set at φbf = 0.25 and
φef = 0.05 for household loans and entrepreneur loans, respectively.
The share of housing in production is set at ν = 0.1 in the ballpark of the values widely used
in the literature for emerging market economies (EMEs) (e.g., Iacoviello and Minetti, 2006).
10Data source: South African Reserve Bank.
58
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Table 3.1: Calibrated parameters.
Parameter Symbol Value Parameter Symbol Value
Discount factor (patient HH) βs 0.99 Impatient HH’s income share σ 0.31
Discount factor (impatient HH) βb 0.94 Labor supply parameter τ 2
Discount factor (Entrep.) βe 0.94 Loan to HH adj. cost, Bank φbf 0.25
Discount factor (Bank) βf 0.945 Loan to Entrep. adj. cost, Bank φef 0.05
Habit persistence, i = {s, b, e, f} ηi 0.70 Risk weight (Impatient HH’s loan) wb 1
Housing preference j 0.10 Risk weights (Entrep. loan) we 1
Steady state LTV ratio, impatient HH mb 0.90 Autocorr. technology shock ρz 0.95
Steady state LTV ratio, Entrep. me 0.70 Autocorr. housing demand shock ρa 0.97
Steady state capital requirement ratio κ 0.105 Autocorr. loan loss shock, i = {b, e} ρζi 0.90
Housing share in production ν 0.1
HH - Household; Entrep. - Entrepreneur.
Housing weight in the utility functions is calibrated at j = 0.1. The choice of these values
pins down steady state ratio of housing wealth to output at 3.0 (annualized), of which 2.2 is
residential housing wealth and 0.8 is commercial housing wealth. These ratios are fairly in line
with the South African data on housing wealth.11
The steady state leverage ratios for impatient households and entrepreneurs are based on the
South Africa’s credit market data over the sample period. LTV ratio for impatient households
is set at mb = 0.9. This value is fairly consistent with the minimum down-payment that South
African banks require for providing home loans. For the entrepreneur, LTV is set at me = 0.7.
These values are also well within the observed maximum LTV ratios for a first-time mortgage
buyer in an EME like South Africa (see, e.g. IMF, 2011). These values imply that the steady-
state ratio of household mortgage loans to total output is approximately 0.33 while the ratio of
corporate credit to output is 0.54, consistent with the South African credit market data.
The bank’s capital requirement ratio is set to mimic the Basel III bank capital requirements.
It is calibrated at κ = 0.105. The risk weights assigned on household and entrepreneur loans
are both set at wb = we = 1. The discount factor for the bank is set at βf = 0.95. This value is
lower than the patient households’ discount factor (βs), which satisfies condition (3.34), which
is required for the capital requirement constraint to hold with equality in steady state. Together
with the impatient households’ and entrepreneurs’ discount factors, these values also guarantee
that impatient households’ and entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints are binding in the steady
state.12 Furthermore, they imply a 200 basis points spread between the lending rate and the
11The 2016 Property Sector Charter Council’s (PSCC) report suggests that the share of South Africa’s hous-
ing wealth to total output is approximately 2.3, 75 percent of which is constituted of residential housing wealth
while the remaining is commercial housing wealth. Source: http://www.sacommercialpropnews.co.za/property-
investment/8211-sa-property-sector-volumes-to-r5-8-trillion.html.
12See sub-section 2.4 for a detailed discussion on the conditions for the capital requirement constraint and
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deposit rate, which is broadly in line with the SA interest rate data.
Lastly, the persistence of the shocks is calibrated as follows. The autocorrelation coeffi-
cients for technology and housing demand shocks are set at ρz = 0.95 and ρa = 0.97 respec-
tively, consistent with Liu and Gupta (2007) and the estimated value in Gupta and Sun (2018).
The choice of a highly persistent housing demand shock is also consistent with the DSGE lit-
erature. See for example Lambertini et al. (2013),Iacoviello (2015) and Brzoza-Brzezina et al.
(2015). The persistence of the financial (loan loss) shock is set at ρζi = 0.90 based on the
estimates in Iacoviello (2015).
3.4 Business cycle properties
In this section we assess the model’s ability to reproduce the facts of the South African data
observed over the period 1994Q1–2016Q4.13 Table 3.2 shows the standard deviations of the
main variables and their correlations with output as implied by the model and as calculated
from the data. Model 1 shows the second moments generated from the technology shock and
Model 2 shows those generated from the technology, housing demand and financial (household
and corporate loan loss) shocks to capture the housing and financial market properties of the
data.14
The results show that Model 1 (technology shock only) reproduces the cyclical moments
of the real sector fairly well. The volatility of the output generated from the model is in line
with the data. However, the model somewhat underestimates the volatilities of household con-
sumption and house prices. The model is able to account for the fact that house prices are more
volatile than output, but marginally fails to account for the fact that household consumption
is also more volatile than output. Model 1 reproduces the positive correlation of consumption
and house prices with output, but overestimates these correlations. Consistent with the data,
the model generates stronger co-movement between output and household consumption than
impatient households’ and entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints to hold with equality in steady state.
13Data on household and corporate lending rates are only available from 2008Q1. To back-cast the missing
data for the two lending rates over the period 1994Q1-2008Q4, we first run regressions of the household and the
corporate lending rates (each) on a constant and the prime lending rate for the period 2008Q1-2016Q4 and then
use the resulting regression coefficients together with the actual prime lending rate data.
14In line with the literature, we assume that the standard deviation of the housing demand shock is slightly
larger than that of the technology shock while that of the financial shock is slightly smaller. In particular, we
experiment with the values of σz = 0.01, σa = 0.035 and σζi = 0.0025 for all i = {b, e}. See for example
Lambertini et al. (2013), Liu et al. (2013), Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014), Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015),
Iacoviello (2015) and Ravn (2016).
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Table 3.2: Business cycle properties.
Variable
Standard deviation (%) Correlation with output
Data Model 1 Model 2 Data Model 1 Model 2
Output 1.16 1.15 1.19 1.00 1.00 1.00
Household consumption 1.76 1.09 1.10 0.81 1.00 0.98
House prices 4.59 1.66 2.19 0.30 0.88 0.77
Household deposits 2.77 3.26 4.60 0.23 0.84 0.71
Household loans 4.08 3.28 4.55 0.51 0.84 0.68
Corporate loans 4.81 3.26 4.70 0.31 0.85 0.70
Household lending rate 0.73 1.10 1.45 -0.19 -0.19 -0.19
Corporate lending rate 0.60 0.69 0.96 -0.26 -0.09 -0.10
Note. Model 1 is simulated with a technology shock only. Model 2 is simulated with technology,
financial (loan loss) and housing demand shocks. Except for the lending rates, all variables are
log-transformed and de-trended using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter. Source: Data are from
South African Reserve Bank.
between output and house prices.
Model 1 also does a reasonably good job of matching the cyclical moments of the bank-
ing sector. It performs well in replicating the standard deviations of deposits, household and
corporate loans, which are fairly in line with the data. The model is able to produce a good
account of the fact that these variables are more volatile than output, whereas the lending rates
are less volatile than output. Furthermore, the model replicates the pro-cyclicality of deposits
and the two types of loans, and does a good job of mimicking the negative correlation between
the output and the lending rates.
When we simulate the model with all three shocks (Model 2), the results are improved. The
inclusion of the housing demand and financial (loan loss) shocks increases the volatility of all
variables and reduces the correlation of these variables with output. Model 2 is better able to
reproduce the volatility of house prices and household and corporate loans. It is able to account
for the fact that corporate loans are slightly more volatile than household loans as revealed in
the data. However, it slightly exaggerates the volatility of the lending rates. Given its simplicity
and the small number of shocks considered, the model performs fairly satisfactorily in matching
what we observed in the data.
61
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.5 Optimal CcLTV rules: generic versus sector-specific
In this section we derive the optimal rules for generic and sector-specific CcLTV regimes and
compare their effectiveness in fostering financial and macroeconomic stability. Following the
literature (e.g., Angelini et al., 2014), we define the macroprudential authority’s loss function
as follows:15
Lmp = λlσ2l + λqσ2q + λyσ2y, (3.46)




y are the unconditional variances of credit, house prices and output, re-
spectively. The parameters λl ≥ 0, λq ≥ 0 and λy ≥ 0 represent their weights in the loss
function.
The loss function (3.46) implies that the macroprudential authority strives to achieve fi-
nancial stability (measured by fluctuations in credit and house prices) without compromising
macroeconomic stability (measured by fluctuations in output). To simplify our analysis, we
conduct experiments with the weights of λ1 = 1, λq = 0.05 and λy = 0.5 in the loss func-
tion. The assignment of a lower weight on house prices than on credit is consistent with the
empirical evidence that fluctuations in credit are more important than asset prices in predict-
ing financial distress (Agénor and Pereira da Silva, 2017; Agénor et al., 2018). The assigned
weight on output is also smaller than that on credit, reflecting the fact that the primary objective
of macroprudential policy is financial stability. We then derive the optimal policy parameters
(χ∗l,j, χ
∗
y,j), for all j = {mb,me}, in Eqs. (3.41) and (3.42) that minimise Eq. (3.46) subject to
the constraints given by the model.
Table 3.3 shows the optimal simple rules for both the generic and the sector-specific CcLTV
regimes, the corresponding loss function values and the standard deviations of the key policy
variables (credit, house prices and output). To provide more insights, we report the results
for the three shocks: technology (column 2), financial (household loan loss) (column 3) and
housing demand (column 4).16
The results indicate that the optimal sector-specific CcLTV regime is more effective than
the optimal generic CcLTV regime in minimising the welfare loss. This is particularly so
15Other studies using a similar approach are Agénor et al. (2018), Rubio and Yao (2017) and Glocker and
Towbin (2012).
16To save space, Table 3.3 shows only the household loan loss shock. The results for the entrepreneur loan loss
shock are qualitatively similar to those for the household loan loss shock. For the optimal policy analysis we use
the optimal simple rule (osr) unconstrained optimisation routine in Dynare. A smaller loss function value in the
same column implies a more effective policy regime.
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when the economy faces technology and financial shocks - the loss function values under the
sector-specific regime (5.2991 for the technology shock and 1.2398 for the financial shock) are
smaller than those under the generic regime (5.5218 for the technology shock and 1.5406 for
the financial shock). When the housing demand shock hits the economy, the generic regime
outperforms the sector-specific regime in terms of minimising welfare loss.
The corresponding optimal parameters (the χs) are shock dependent for both the generic
and the sector-specific regimes. As the table shows, both the household and corporate CcLTV
regimes require an aggressive reaction to credit following a financial or a housing demand
shock, whereas they require only a moderate reaction to credit following a technology shock.
The optimal reaction to output is also moderate under technology and housing demand shocks
but slightly stronger under a financial shock. Under the sector-specific regime, the corporate
CcLTV requires a stronger response to credit and output than the household CcLTV. That is,
χl,me > χl,mb and χy,me > χy,mb, except when the economy faces a housing demand shock, in
which case the household CcLTV requires a stronger reaction to credit than the corporate LTV
(χl,mb > χl,me).
Table 3.3 also shows the standard deviations of the three key policy variables (credit, house
prices and output) obtained from the optimal CcLTV regimes compared with the baseline
regime in which there is no CcLTV (constant LTV ratios). The results show that both the
generic and sector-specific CcLTV regimes are effective in minimising the volatility of the
three key policy variables, especially for credit. Compared to the generic regime, the sector-
specific regime provides a higher degree of macroeconomic stability. This stabilisation effect
becomes more significant when the economy faces financial and housing demand shocks.
As a caveat, in interpreting these results it is important to note that the findings in this
section only serve to illustrate the effectiveness of the two CcLTV policy regimes. We are not,
in any way, suggesting that the authority should be as aggressive as the results suggest. In
fact, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) note that large values of the optimal policy coefficients
are difficult to communicate to policymakers or the public. Rubio and Unsal (2017) note that
it is not surprising to obtain large values for the optimal policy parameters, especially when
the values of the parameters are not constrained within reasonable ranges in the optimisation
exercise, as is the case in this paper.17 In some cases, the welfare loss (the value of the loss
function) can continuously improve even at large values of the policy parameters, but at a very
17We do not restrict the values of the parameters in the optimisation exercise because the literature has yet to
reach consensus on the reasonable ranges or bands for the parameters in macroprudential policy rules.
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slow rate (Rubio and Unsal, 2017). That is, the optimisation exercise can have diminishing
marginal stabilisation effects on the welfare loss, to the point where the additional stabilisation
effect is negligible and the welfare loss flattens out as the policy parameters increase further.18
Table 3.3: Optimal rules: generic versus sector-specific.
Parameter Technology shock Financial shock Housing demand shock
Optimal generic CcLTV rule
χl,m 1.8534 22.5042 38.6552
χy,m 0.9461 3.5905 0.7570
Loss function value (×10−4) 5.5218 1.5406 0.4184
Std. dev. relative to baseline+
Lt 0.0617 0.0073 0.0115
qt 0.7836 0.6954 0.8811
Yt 0.9821 0.9268 0.8000
Optimal sector-specific CcLTV rule
χl,mb 1.4663 12.7687 50.1661
χy,mb 0.5968 2.4979 0.5730
χl,me 1.9586 34.0370 20.3158
χy,me 1.1799 5.3523 0.9479
Loss function value (×10−4) 5.2991 1.2398 0.4412
Std. dev. relative to baseline+
Lt 0.0606 0.0083 0.0115
qt 0.7665 0.6260 0.9055
Yt 0.9643 0.7805 0.6000
+ This value is calculated as the standard deviation (Std. dev.) of a variable i, i = {L, q, Y }, under
the generic or sector-specific CcLTV regime divided by that under the baseline model where there is no
CcLTV (i.e. the LTV ratios are constant). A value less than 1 means that a particular policy rule reduces
the volatility of variable i relative to the baseline regime.
3.6 Impulse response analysis
In this section, to investigate the effectiveness of the two CcLTV regimes and the transmission
mechanisms through which they achieve the two objectives of the macroprudential policy, we
present the impulse responses of the main variables (shown in Fig. 3.2 to Fig. 3.4) following
technology, financial and housing demand shocks. We contrast the baseline regime, defined
by constant LTV ratios in Eqs. (3.10) and (3.19), with the optimal generic and sector-specific
18In monetary policy studies, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) also find that unconstrained optimal policy rules
call for a much larger inflation coefficient (about 332) but yield a negligible welfare improvement.
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CcLTV regimes.19 This allows us to investigate whether the sector-specific regime is more
effective than the generic one in achieving financial and macroeconomic stability, where there
are two types of borrowers from distinct sectors of the credit market. The analysis with the
three shocks also enables us to establish whether the effectiveness of the CcLTV depends on
the type of shock.
3.6.1 Technology shock
Fig. 3.2 shows the impulse responses of the main variables to a positive technology shock under
the baseline regime and the generic and sector-specific CcLTV regimes. The shock generates
expansionary effects in the economy. Under the baseline regime (the black solid line), it in-
creases the marginal productivity of housing, which in turn increases entrepreneurs’ demand
for housing and hence house prices. Through the borrowing constraint channel, the rise in
house prices stimulates credit growth as the value of the collateral asset increases, and results
in an increase in output and consumption. The bank also increases its lending rates, in response
to the higher demand for credit.
Turning to the generic (the red dash-dot line) and sector-specific (the blue asterisk line)
CcLTV regimes, we find that both regimes imply that the increase in credit and output trig-
gers the household and corporate LTV ratios to decline temporarily. This tightens households’
and entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints and reduces the extent of an increase in borrowers’
demand for credit and investment in housing. House prices increase less than they did under
the baseline regime. In addition to this indirect effect, the CcLTV also has a direct effect on
house prices through the borrowers’ optimal conditions for housing (Eqs. (3.12) and (3.20)):
the fall in the LTV ratios leads directly to a decline in house prices. This further tightens collat-
eral constraints and mitigates the amplification effects of the financial accelerator mechanism
(Bernanke et al., 1999).
Both CcLTV regimes are effective in attenuating the impact of the technology shock on
financial variables, including house prices, but have limited effects on the real variables (con-
sumption and output). The CcLTV limits the extent to which the borrowers can take on leverage
and hence the demand for credit. With the lower demand for credit, lending rates do not need
to respond as aggressively as in the baseline regime. The moderate increase in demand for
credit, in turn, reduces the borrowers’ debt burden, and somewhat enables them to consume
19The macroprudential policy parameter values are taken from Table 3.3 in the optimal rule analysis.
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Figure 3.2: Impulse responses to a positive technology shock under the baseline, generic and sector-specific
CcLTV regimes. HH and Entrep denote household and entrepreneur, respectively. Variables are expressed in %
deviations from the steady state, and interest rates are in annualised percentage points. Ordinate: time horizon in
quarters.
more under the two CcLTV regimes than under the baseline regime. On the other hand, the
moderate increase in credit and deposits, coupled with the fall in interest rates, reduces the
bank’s and the patient households’ interest income. As a result, the bank and the patient house-
holds consume less under the CcLTV regimes than under the baseline regime. Therefore, the
borrowers’ higher consumption compensates for the lower consumption by patient households
and the bank, such that the overall impact of the CcLTV on aggregate consumption and hence
output becomes limited. These findings are also consistent with the literature (see, e.g., Rubio
and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and Ravn (2016)).
A comparison of the two CcLTV regimes suggests that their effectiveness is more or less the
same following the technology shock. However, the sector-specific regime marginally outper-
forms the generic regime in dampening fluctuations in house prices, aggregate consumption and
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output. In the credit and housing markets, Fig. 3.2 shows that the sector-specific CcLTV regime
is slightly more effective than the generic regime in dampening fluctuations in entrepreneurs’
credit and housing stock while the generic regime outperforms the sector-specific regime in
dampening fluctuations in households’ credit and housing stock. This is because the optimal
implementation of the corporate CcLTV requires a stronger policy response to credit under
the sector-specific regime than under the generic regime. However, the optimal household
CcLTV requires stronger policy response to credit under the generic regime than under the
sector-specific regime.
3.6.2 Financial (household loan loss) shock
Fig. 3.3 compares the attenuation effects of the generic and sector-specific regimes following a
negative financial shock (modelled as an exogenous increase in bank loan losses on household
loans).20 The negative financial shock causes a recession in the real economy through the
spillover from the financial sector. Under the baseline regime, the shock impairs the bank’s
balance sheets and reduces its net worth. Through the bank’s capital constraint channel, this
decreases the credit supply to both impatient households and entrepreneurs. Consequently, the
demand for housing declines, dragging house prices down. This in turn results in a further
decline in credit through the borrowing constraint channel. In an attempt to boost profits and
rebuild net worth, the bank increases its lending rates. This further depresses the demand for
credit, reduces aggregate consumption and results in a protracted recession.
The presence of CcLTV mitigates the recessionary effect of the financial shock. Under
both the generic and sector-specific regimes, the fall in credit and output activates the CcLTV.
The LTV ratios increase temporarily, leading to an increase in the value of collateral assets
(housing). This enables borrowers to borrow more out of their housing wealth and therefore
mitigates the decline in demand for credit. As a result, the fall in borrowers’ demand for
housing, and hence the fall in house prices, becomes smaller under the CcLTV than under the
baseline regime. This, in turn, dampens the amplification effects of the borrowing constraint
channel. Consequently, the extent of the increase in lending rates becomes smaller under both
CcLTV regimes than under the baseline regime. The recessionary effect of the shock becomes
less pronounced.
20Here we only report the results of the household loan loss shock. The results are similar for the entrepreneurs’
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Figure 3.3: Impulse responses to a negative financial shock (household loan loss shock only) under the baseline,
generic and sector-specific CcLTV regimes. HH and Entrep denote household and entrepreneur, respectively.
Variables are expressed in % deviations from the steady state, and interest rates are in annualised percentage
points. Ordinate: time horizon in quarters.
The results further show that the CcLTV affects consumption by the different agents (pa-
tient and impatient households, entrepreneurs and the bank) asymmetrically. For borrowers,
the increase in the LTV ratios mitigates the decline in demand for credit and this effectively in-
creases their debt service burden more than the baseline regime does. As a result, the increase
in the impatient households’ consumption is reduced while the entrepreneurs’ consumption
drops further.21 Similarly, the attenuation effect of the CcLTV mitigates the fall in the patient
households’ and the bank’s consumption by reducing the fall in their interest income.
Comparing the impact of the two CcLTV regimes, we find that the sector-specific regime is
21For household borrowers, the shock increases their income indirectly. By paying less than the contractual
amount of the loan, household borrowers are able to spend more than previously anticipated. The results in Fig. 3.3




more effective than the generic CcLTV regime in mitigating the fall in the entrepreneurs’ credit
and hence their demand for housing. On the other hand, the generic CcLTV regime is more
effective in mitigating the fall in the impatient households’ credit and their demand for housing.
This is because the optimal implementation of the household CcLTV requires a stronger policy
response to credit under the generic regime than under the sector-specific regime. However,
the optimal corporate CcLTV requires a stronger policy response to credit under the sector-
specific regime than under the generic regime. Compared to the case of the technology shock,
Fig. 3.3 shows that the sector-specific regime significantly outperforms the generic regime in
dampening the fluctuations in aggregate consumption, output and house prices. In this case, the
extent of over-reaction in the household credit market sector and under-reaction in the corporate
credit market sector under the generic regime is more pronounced. Instead of mitigating the
fall in household credit, the generic regime causes it to increase.
It is important to note that when only one sector of the credit market is hit by a negative
financial shock (in this case the household loan market), the sector-specific CcLTV regime
plays a very important role in stabilising the financial sector. We can see this because when we
implement the sector-specific regime rather than the generic regime, the CcLTV regime mod-
erately mitigates the decline of household credit while significantly stabilising corporate credit.
Consequently, the negative effect of the shock on entrepreneurs’ consumption under the sector-
specific regime is less than under the generic regime. At the same time, the sector-specific
CcLTV regime has a larger positive impact on impatient households’ consumption. This, in
turn, contributes significantly to macroeconomic stability – output recovers significantly under
the sector-specific regime.
3.6.3 Housing demand shock
Fig. 3.4 shows the impulse responses of the main variables following a positive housing demand
shock. As with the case of a positive technology shock, the shock generates expansionary
effects in the economy, leading to an increase in the demand for housing and in house prices.
Through the collateral constraint channel, the increase in house prices allows borrowers to
increase their borrowing and stimulates aggregate consumption and output.22 In response to the
higher demand for credit, the bank also increases its lending rates.
22At disaggregate level, the shock leads to an initial fall in household savers’ consumption. This is because the
increase in the return to deposits creates an incentive for them to increase savings and forgo consumption.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse responses to a positive housing demand shock under the baseline, generic and sector-specific
CcLTV regimes. HH and Entrep denote household and entrepreneur, respectively. Variables are expressed in %
deviations from the steady state, interest rates in annualised percentage points. Ordinate: time horizon in quarters.
Under the two CcLTV regimes, the regulatory authority decreases the LTV ratios in re-
sponse to the increase in credit and output, and this reduces the increase in house prices and
the demand for credit through the borrowing constraint channel. Since the CcLTV reduce the
increase in borrowing and lending rates, the borrowers’ debt service costs decline. This, in
turn, allows borrowers to consume more than they did under the baseline regime. Similarly, the
interest income accruing to both the bank and the patient households falls and this causes a fall
in the patient households’ consumption and reduces the increase in the bank’s consumption.
Unlike the effect we saw in the case of a negative financial shock, the generic regime is
more effective than the sector-specific regime in reducing fluctuations in output and house
prices. Indeed, except for the impatient households’ credit and housing, the generic regime
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outperforms the sector-specific regime in achieving financial and macroeconomic stability.23
This implies that when both sectors of the credit market are hit by the same shock, the generic
regime is more effective than the sector-specific regime. In the case of a housing demand
shock, since the CcLTV works through the borrowing constraint channel and housing is used
as a collateral asset for both types of borrowers, the shock affects both types of borrowers in
the same way. The regulatory authority can, therefore, implement the generic CcLTV regime
accordingly. In this way, the authority can achieve its macroprudential policy objectives of
financial and macroeconomic stability.
3.7 Efficient policy frontier
In this section, we present the outcome of the generic and the sector-specific regimes in the
form of a two-dimensional efficient policy frontier on credit and output. The efficient policy
frontier shows the locus of the volatility of credit and output calculated at each set of optimal
policy coefficients that are obtained for different combinations of loss function weights. To
perform the exercise, we simplify the loss function (3.46) by setting the weight on the volatility
of house prices to zero, λq = 0, and allow the weights on credit and output to vary inversely
within the range λ ∈ [0, 1]. That is:
Lmp = λσ2l + (1− λ)σ2y. (3.47)
For each combination of the loss function weights, we compute the set of optimal policy coeffi-
cients that yields the lowest welfare loss and then plot the corresponding volatility of credit and
output in a two-dimensional plot, as shown in Fig. 3.5.24 Moving from left to right in Fig. 3.5,
the weight on the volatility of credit (λ) increases from 0 to 1 while that on volatility of output
decreases from 1 to 0.
The efficient policy frontiers under the two alternative policy regimes present a clear trade-
off between financial and macroeconomic stability, as the authority adjusts its preference be-
tween the two policy objectives. The maximum attainable reduction in output volatility can be
achieved at the expense of increasing credit volatility. Compared with the baseline regime (the
small black square), the two alternative CcLTV regimes can virtually eliminate credit volatility
23This is because the optimal household CcLTV rule requires a stronger response to credit under the sector-
specific regime than under the generic regime.
24The analysis is conducted for financial shock. We perform a similar exercise for the other two shocks (tech-
nology and housing demand) and obtain similar results. These results are reported in appendix B.3.
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Figure 3.5: The efficient policy frontier (λ ∈ [0, 1]).
without increasing output volatility. This means that, compared to the baseline case, the two
policy regimes can achieve the maximum attainable financial stability benefits without compro-
mising macroeconomic stability.
A comparison between the two CcLTV regimes suggests that the sector-specific CcLTV
regime is more effective than the generic CcLTV regime in stabilising both credit and out-
put volatility. Furthermore, the sector-specific regime can deliver a larger reduction in output
volatility at a lower cost of financial instability. This can be seen in the flatter frontier. In
summary, the results suggest that the appropriate implementation of CcLTV has the poten-
tial to deliver both financial and macroeconomic stability. This concurs with the findings in
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) and Rubio and Yao (2017), in which the authors establish that
the CcLTV reduces the volatility of both credit and output. The sector-specific regime delivers
a more stable economic system than the generic regime.
3.8 Implementing the CcLTV regulation: generic versus
sector-specific rules
To understand better how the proposed CcLTV regimes work, we simulate the model with
different values of parameters in the policy rules Eqs. (3.41) and (3.42) and trace the impact
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on the volatility of credit, house prices and output. This exercise demonstrates the possible
trade-off between financial stability and macroeconomic stability when the regulatory authority
responds more aggressively to changes in credit and output. To perform this exercise, we allow
the two policy parameters to vary and plot the variance surfaces of credit, house prices and
output against these two parameters.25
Fig. 3.6 shows the results for the generic CcLTV regime. The first two panels show that this
regime is effective in delivering financial stability. A more aggressive response to aggregate
credit (movement along χlm−axis) leads to a substantial fall in the volatility of aggregate credit
and house prices. Nonetheless, this stabilisation benefit diminishes as the policy becomes more
aggressive. The mesh plots further show that a more aggressive response to changes in output
(movement along χym − axis) can only enhance financial stability with a moderate response
to changes in credit (with χlm < 2). The third panel of Fig. 3.6 shows that the generic CcLTV
regime has a potential to deliver macroeconomic stability if authority adjusts the LTV ratios
to changes in output more aggressively (χy,m =⇒ 2), but only marginally to changes in credit




















































































Figure 3.6: Policy response impact (different values of χlm and χym): generic CcLTV regime.
Figs. 3.7 and 3.8 show the results for the sector-specific CcLTV. In this case, we perform
the same exercise with household and corporate CcLTV independently. That is, we perform
the simulation exercise with the household (corporate) CcLTV while holding the corporate
(household) LTV ratio constant. Fig. 3.7 shows the results for the household CcLTV rule and
Fig. 3.8 shows the volatility of corporate credit, as opposed to the aggregate credit.
25We simulate the model with all the shocks and perform the grid search over the ranges χl,m = [0, 5] and
χy,m = [0, 2] with the grid step of 0.1 and 0.04 for χl,m and χy,m, respectively, as these are sufficient for the

















































































































































































Figure 3.8: Policy response impact (different values of χlme and χyme, given χlmb = χymb = 0): sector-specific
CcLTV regime.
The results are similar to those for the generic CcLTV regime. However, the effect of
the response to changes in output on sector-specific credit differs for household credit and
corporate credit. With a moderate response to sector-specific credit, the stabilisation effect of
the response to changes in output on corporate credit increases monotonically as it becomes
more aggressive. For household credit, however, this effect increases only up to χymb = 1.5,
and thereafter it becomes weaker - the volatility of household credit starts increasing. Another
difference is that the corporate CcLTV enhances macroeconomic stability when the regulation
becomes more aggressive to changes in corporate credit and output, whereas an aggressive
household CcLTV does not improve macroeconomic stability.
The general conclusion to be drawn from this exercise is that the proposed CcLTV regimes
have the potential to deliver on financial and macroeconomic stability mandates. However,
this stabilisation effect on financial stability diminishes if the regulator responds aggressively
to changes in credit. Responses to changes in output can achieve financial stability only if
the regulator responds to changes in financial variables moderately. However, regardless of
whether the regulatory authority responds to changes in output aggressively or not, an aggres-
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sive response to changes in credit does not contribute to macroeconomic stability, whereas a
moderate response to changes in credit has a significant impact.
3.9 Conclusion
This paper considered the optimal design and the implications of the CcLTV regulation in a
model economy where there are two types of borrowers from distinct sectors of the credit
market. We looked at two policy regimes, generic and sector-specific, and compared their
effectiveness in enhancing financial and macroeconomic stability. We found that both regimes
are effective, especially when the economy is hit by financial and housing demand shocks. This
is achieved mainly by reducing the amplification effects of the borrowing constraint channel.
The effectiveness of both regimes is, however, shock dependent. When the economy faces
a technology shock, their effectiveness is more or less the same. When the economy faces
a financial shock, the sector-specific regime significantly outperforms the generic regime in
reducing business cycle fluctuations, whereas the opposite is true when the economy is hit by a
housing demand shock. The efficient policy frontiers under the two alternative policy regimes
present a clear trade-off between financial and macroeconomic stability, as the authority adjusts
its preference between the two policy objectives. The sector-specific CcLTV regime is more
effective than the generic CcLTV regime in reducing the volatility of credit and output.
Our findings highlight the importance of identifying the origin of the shock in order to
implement the CcLTV regulation appropriately. More importantly, our findings suggest that, in
order to enhance the effectiveness of the macroprudential policy, the regulator should consider
borrowers’ heterogeneity and tailor the CcLTV regulation according to the specific conditions
of each sector of the credit market, rather than to the aggregate credit market condition. In
this way, the regulator can directly target the credit market sector, or the borrower type, where




The optimal monetary and
macroprudential policies for the South
African economy
4.1 Introduction
The main objective of macroprudential policy is to prevent the build-up of systemic risk in
the financial markets. Since the 2007/08 financial crisis, most central banks around the world,
including the South African Reserve Bank, have expanded their mandate by adding a finan-
cial stability objective to the macroeconomic (price) stability objective.1 This presents a new
challenge for central banks - how to achieve the optimal interaction between monetary and
macroprudential policies. The difficulty is that the two policies mutually affect each other.
While macroprudential policy provides a channel through which central banks promote finan-
cial stability, at the same time it affects macroeconomic conditions and the performance of
other policies, especially monetary policy. For example, through its effect on credit growth,
macroprudential policy affects monetary conditions and hence the conduct of monetary policy.
Similarly, monetary policy can affect credit conditions through its interest rate channel.
The goals of monetary and macroprudential policies are mutually dependent. The liter-
ature has yet to find common ground on how central banks should coordinate monetary and
macroprudential policies to facilitate a simultaneous pursuit of macroeconomic and financial
1Jeanneau (2014) surveys 114 central bank laws and statutes and establishes that approximately 82% of central
banks have an explicit financial stability objective. The South African Reserve Bank enacted the explicit mandate
of maintaining and enhancing financial stability in 2017, through the Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017.
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stability. One strand of the literature examines the way a standard monetary policy that re-
acts to inflation and output interacts with macroprudential policy (e.g., Angelini et al., 2014;
Quint and Rabanal, 2014; Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego, 2014, 2016). The general conclusion
of these studies is that a combination of a standard monetary policy and macroprudential policy
is effective in enhancing macroeconomic and financial stability, especially when the economy
faces housing market and financial market shocks. Using a general equilibrium framework with
endogenous credit risk, Tayler and Zilberman (2016) establish that a policy regime combining
a strong anti-inflation monetary policy and an aggressive macroprudential policy that reacts
to credit risk is effective in enhancing financial and macroeconomic stability when the econ-
omy is facing a technology (non-financial) shock. In a nutshell, these studies suggest that a
policy regime in which monetary policy is exclusively assigned to the price stability objective
while macroprudential policy is exclusively assigned to the financial stability objective facil-
itates a simultaneous pursuit of both macroeconomic and financial stability. This finding is
consistent with studies that advocate a separation of responsibilities for monetary and macro-
prudential policies, such as Svensson (2012), Gelain et al. (2013), Suh (2014), Svensson (2017)
and Turdaliev and Zhang (2019).
Another strand of the literature establishes an augmented monetary policy that reacts to fi-
nancial variables, such as credit, interest rate spread and asset prices, in addition to inflation
and output, and examines its interaction with macroprudential policy (e.g., Kannan et al., 2012;
Angeloni and Faia, 2013; Agénor et al., 2013; Lambertini et al., 2013; Mendicino and Punzi,
2014; Bailliu et al., 2015). These studies suggest that a policy regime that combines an aug-
mented monetary policy and macroprudential policy enhances macroeconomic and financial
stability. Curdia and Woodford (2010), Gambacorta and Signoretti (2014), Verona et al. (2017)
and Adrian and Liang (2018) argue that monetary policy should aim to achieve the broader
objective of overall economic stability rather than the narrower one of price stability alone.
In contrast, Benes and Kumhof (2015), Tayler and Zilberman (2016) and Turdaliev and Zhang
(2019) show that a monetary policy rule that reacts to financial imbalances causes welfare to de-
teriorate, irrespective of whether it is implemented in conjunction with macroprudential policy
and irrespective of what kind of shock is hitting the economy.
This paper is the first of its kind to investigate the interaction between monetary and macro-
prudential policies in South Africa. Most of the literature examines the interaction between
monetary and macroprudential policies in developed economies and little research has been
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done on emerging market economies like South Africa.2 One of the few studies that examine
the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies in the context of developing
economies is Agénor et al. (2013). In South Africa, bank lending is more or less equally dis-
tributed between households and corporates. The South African credit market data show that
over the period 2000Q1–2016Q4 the average ratio of household loans to total bank loans was
52% while that of corporate loans to total bank loans was 48%. In addition, the two types of
credit behaved differently in the past.3 Therefore, a framework with heterogeneous borrowers
allows us to examine the impact of a broader range of financial shocks emanating from differ-
ent sectors of the credit market and the stabilisation effect of monetary and macroprudential
policies in South Africa. This comprises the second contribution of the paper.
The paper also contributes to the literature by examining the optimal interaction between
monetary and macroprudential policies in a framework where heterogeneous borrowers (house-
holds and non-financial corporates) from distinct sectors of the credit market co-exist. Most of
the literature focuses on the interaction between the two policies in a framework where there
is only one type of borrower: either household or non-financial corporate. We argue that pol-
icy analysis based on this kind of framework is likely to miss some of the key transmission
channels and the trade-off between macroeconomic and financial stability in the economy, and
is therefore less informative for policymakers. Angelini et al. (2014) is one of the few studies
which examine the interaction between monetary and macroprudential policies in a framework
where household and non-financial corporate borrowers co-exist. In contrast to Angelini et al.
(2014), we also consider a monetary policy rule that reacts to credit growth and study its inter-
action with macroprudential policy. Furthermore, our analysis considers three types of financial
shock: housing demand, loan-to-value (LTV) and non-performing loan (NPL) shock.
The main objective of the paper is to determine the optimal design of a simultaneous deploy-
ment of monetary and macroprudential policies and investigate its effectiveness in enhancing
macroeconomic and financial stability. We measure macroeconomic stability in terms of the
volatility of inflation, and financial stability in terms of the volatility of credit-to-output ratio
and house prices, in line with Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014) and Agénor and Pereira da
Silva (2017). We consider two alternative policy regimes, in which monetary and macropru-
2A non-exhaustive list is Kannan et al. (2012), Angeloni and Faia (2013), Lambertini et al. (2013), Angelini
et al. (2014), Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014), Quint and Rabanal (2014), Mendicino and Punzi (2014), Bailliu
et al. (2015), Benes and Kumhof (2015), Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2016), Tayler and Zilberman (2016), Gelain
and Ilbas (2017) and Turdaliev and Zhang (2019).
3See Chapter 3 for a detailed discussion.
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dential policies are jointly implemented, and compare their effectiveness against a benchmark
regime in which there is only monetary policy. The macroprudential policy considered in this
study is a countercyclical capital requirement (CcCR) rule that relates the bank capital require-
ment ratio to deviations of the credit-to-output ratio from its steady state, which is in line with
Basel III countercyclical capital buffers. In the benchmark regime (regime I), monetary policy
follows a standard Taylor-type interest rate rule that relates the policy rate to inflation and out-
put growth. There is no macroprudential rule in regime I, and the capital requirement ratio is
constant. The first alternative policy regime (regime II) is a combination of a standard Taylor
rule and the CcCR rule. The second alternative policy regime (regime III) is a combination of
an augmented Taylor rule and the CcCR rule. The augmented Taylor rule relates the policy rate
to credit growth in addition to inflation and output growth. Under regime III, we also investigate
whether monetary policy should promote financial stability in addition to its primary objective
of price stability.
To conduct our analysis, we first develop a New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with financial frictions, a housing market, a stylised banking sector
and the role of monetary and macroprudential policies. Specifically, we add price stickiness to
Iacoviello (2015) model, which allows us to study the price stabilising effect of the monetary
policy. Second, in line with Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012), we introduce endogenous loan losses
in the model by assuming borrowers do not repay a proportion of loans borrowed from the
previous period. This is in contrast to Iacoviello (2015), in which the author assumes that loan
losses are exogenous. Lastly, we incorporate the role of macroprudential policy into the model.
We first estimate the model using Bayesian techniques with South African data over the
sample period 2000Q1–2016Q4. Based on the estimated results, we then derive the optimal
combination of monetary and macroprudential policy rules assuming the central bank min-
imises a policy loss function. The loss function is in terms of a weighted sum of the volatility
of inflation, output, credit-to-output ratio and house prices.4 We find that, to achieve financial
and macroeconomic stability objectives, the optimal monetary policy rule requires a smaller
response to inflation and a bigger response to output than the estimated responses under the
benchmark regime. The optimal macroprudential policy rule requires the central bank to adjust
4We assume that monetary and macroeconomic policies are conducted under full coordination, i.e., the two
policies are used to minimise the same objective function. We leave aside a case where there are two policymakers
each assigned a separate mandate: a central bank assigned a macroeconomic stability mandate and a macropruden-
tial authority assigned a financial stability mandate. We do not attempt to study the interaction between monetary




the capital requirement ratio proportionately to deviations of the credit-to-output ratio from the
steady state, irrespective of whether it is jointly deployed with a standard monetary policy rule
or an augmented monetary policy rule. Regime III delivers the highest welfare gains, but at a
much higher cost of increasing inflation volatility.
Based on the optimal policy rules derived previously, we then compare the dynamics of the
model under the three policy regimes, following housing demand, LTV and NPL shocks. We
find that a simultaneous deployment of the optimal monetary and macroprudential policy rules
attenuates fluctuations in the housing market, the credit market and the real sector. A policy
regime that combines a standard monetary policy rule and macroprudential policy rule (regime
II) delivers a more stable economic system than a regime that combines an augmented monetary
policy rule and macroprudential policy rule (regime III). The central bank faces a more severe
trade-off between price and financial stability when monetary policy also responds to credit
growth. While this policy regime seems to be effective from the financial stability point of
view, it can compromise price stability (Tayler and Zilberman, 2016). This is especially the
case when shocks generate a negative correlation between credit and inflation. As we note in
our analysis, a housing demand, LTV or NPL shock generates a negative correlation between
credit and inflation. The central bank is forced to choose between price stability or financial
stability when deploying an augmented monetary policy rule. The policy rate response required
to achieve price stability is inconsistent with that required to achieve financial stability. For
example, a positive housing demand shock increases credit but reduces inflation. The reduction
in inflation calls for a reduction in the policy rate, but a boom in the credit market calls for an
increase in the policy rate. This conflict compromises the central bank’s ability to deliver on
it’s price stability mandate. Nevertheless, the trade-off between price and financial stability is
minimised and the policy conflict is absent under regime II.
Lastly, we perform a policy frontier analysis to assess the efficiency of a simultaneous de-
ployment of monetary and macroprudential policies under the three policy regimes. We see that
the introduction of macroprudential policy enhances both financial and price stability. A com-
parison between regime II and regime III suggests that regime II is more efficient than regime
III in promoting financial and price stability. The efficient policy frontiers under the three policy
regimes present a clear trade-off between inflation and credit-to-output ratio volatilities, as the
central bank adjusts its preference for stabilising the credit-to-output ratio relative to stabilising
inflation. The maximum attainable reduction in credit-to-output volatility can be achieved at
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the expense of increasing inflation volatility. The relatively inelastic efficient policy frontiers,
especially when the economy faces a housing demand shock, imply that it is not wise for the
central bank to put a relatively high weight on the credit-to-output ratio in its loss function.
This is because a marginal reduction in the volatility of the credit-to-output ratio is achieved at
a relatively high cost in terms of the volatility of inflation.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the model and Sec-
tion 4.3 discusses the model estimation strategy and presents the estimation results. Section 4.4
describes the model’s business cycle properties. Section 4.5 studies the optimal combination of
monetary and macroprudential policies under the two alternative policy regimes and compares
their effectiveness in enhancing financial and macroeconomic stability. Section 4.6 reports the
results of the impulse response analysis and Section 4.7 the results of the efficient policy frontier
analysis. Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 The model
We construct a closed economy New Keynesian DSGE model.5 The model economy is pop-
ulated by two types of households (patient and impatient), entrepreneurs, retailers, banks and
a central bank. The two types of households work and consume final consumption goods and
housing services. In equilibrium, patient households are savers while impatient households are
borrowers. Entrepreneurs produce intermediate goods using labour and housing (commercial
real estate) as inputs.6 They also consume final consumption goods and borrow from banks.
The two types of borrowers (impatient households and entrepreneurs) face a borrowing con-
straint which ties the amount of borrowing to the expected value of collateral assets (housing
stock). Retailers are the source of nominal rigidity in the model. They buy intermediate goods
from entrepreneurs and transform them into final consumption goods. Banks mediate funds
between savers and borrowers. Banks are subject to the capital requirement constraint. While
the constraint limits banks’ ability to provide loans to borrowers, it also constrains the amount
of deposits they can take from savers. The central bank implements monetary and macropru-
5We opt for a closed economy model for the following reasons. First, the purpose of this study is to investigate
the optimal design and the effectiveness of a simultaneous deployment of monetary and macroprudential policies,
not the impacts of external shocks on the domestic economy. Second, activities of the South African credit market
are largely confined to the domestic economy. Last, the banking sector has a relatively low exposure to foreign
currency. The average ratio of foreign currency deposits to total liabilities is approximately 4.6% while the ratio
of foreign currency loans to total assets is approximately 5.0% over the period 2008Q1–2016Q4 (SARB, 2018).
6Entrepreneurs represent non-financial corporates or firms.
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dential policies to safeguard macroeconomic and financial stability.
4.2.1 Patient Households (Savers)






(1− ηs)log(Cs,t − ηsCs,t−1) + jAj,tlog(Hs,t) + τ log(1−Ns,t)
]
, (4.1)
where E0 is the expectation operator and βs ∈ (0, 1) is the household’s subjective discount
factor. Cs,t is consumption, Hs,t is housing stock and Ns,t is supply of labour (hours of work).7
j and τ are weights of housing and leisure (1−Ns,t) in the utility function, respectively. Aj,t is
the housing demand shock that evolves according to the following law of motion:
logAj,t = ρjlogAj,t−1 + ξj,t, (4.2)
where ρj is a parameter representing the persistence of the shock. ξj,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2j ) is the
white noise process, normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2j .
In each period, the household accumulates housing stock, Hs,t, makes deposits, Dt, at the
bank and supplies labour to entrepreneurs and earns real wage rate ws,t ≡ Ws,t/Pt, where Ws,t
is nominal wage rate and Pt is aggregate price level. The household also receives lump-sum
transfers in the form of profits, Fs,t, from the retailers. The patient household owns retail firms.
The household’s budget constraint is given by:
Cs,t +Dt + qt(Hs,t −Hs,t−1) = ws,tNs,t +
Rt−1
πt
Dt−1 + Fs,t, (4.3)
where qt ≡ Qt/Pt is real house prices and Qt is nominal house prices. πt = Pt/Pt−1 is gross
inflation rate. Rt−1/πt is the real gross return a on one-period risk-free deposit, where Rt is the
nominal deposit rate, which is equal to the policy rate set by the central bank. Fs,t = Xt−1Xt Yt,
where Xt is the markup charged by the retail firms and Yt is output.
Let UCs,t = 1−ηsCs,t−ηsCs,t−1 be the marginal utility of consumption. The first order conditions









7In the utility function,Hs,t represent consumption of housing services which is proportional to housing stock.
Consumption appears in the utility function relative to external habit formation, with ηs measuring degree of habit
persistence. In line with Iacoviello (2015) and Guerrieri and Iacoviello (2017), the scaling factor 1 − ηs ensures

















Eq. (4.4) is the standard Euler equation for consumption, which describes the consumption-
saving decision. Eq. (4.5) is the asset pricing equation for housing, which equates the marginal
cost of housing to its marginal benefit. Eq. (4.5) can also be interpreted as the patient house-
hold’s demand for housing. Eq. (4.6) is the household’s labour supply condition. It equates the
real wage rate to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
4.2.2 Impatient Households (Borrowers)







(1− ηb)log(Cb,t − ηbCb,t−1) + jAj,tlog(Hb,t) + τ log(1−Nb,t)
]
, (4.7)
where βb is the impatient household’s subjective discount factor such that βb < βs. Cb,t is





(1− ζb,t(1− ϑb))Lb,t−1 + qt(Hb,t −Hb,t−1) = wb,tNb,t + Lb,t, (4.8)
where Lb,t is bank loans to the household, which accrue a real gross interest rate of Rb,t−1/πt.
wb,t is the real wage rate for the household. ζb,t is a fraction of household NPLs which cap-
tures partial defaults by the household on loan contract. Following Iacoviello (2015) and Zhang
(2019), we introduce ζb,t in line with the literature on the wealth re-distribution (transfer) effect.
For the household, an increase in the fraction of NPLs represents an indirect increase in wealth
(income gain). This is because by paying less than the agreed amount on the loan contract, the
household is able to spend more than previously anticipated. For the bank (the lender), the in-
crease in the fraction of NPLs increases the losses on the bank’s loan portfolio and thus reduces
the bank’s wealth (income). The same variable appears in the bank’s budget constraint, but
with a negative sign (or on the expenditure side of the budget constraint). Following Bouvatier
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and Lepetit (2012), we assume that ζb,t is endogenous and depends on general economic con-
ditions (output growth).8 We argue that NPLs (loan defaults) are symptoms (manifestations) of
distress elsewhere in the economy, such as deteriorating economic conditions that reduce bor-
rowers’ ability to repay loans. This modification also allows us to mimic a real world setting
and introduces an additional macro-financial feedback loop into the model, in which deterio-
rating macroeconomic and financial conditions become mutually reinforcing. Specifically, the




where ζb is the steady-state value of household NPLs and χζb > 0 measures the elasticity of
the NPLs with respect to output growth. ρεb measures the persistence of the NPLs. ξεb,t is
an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) NPL shock with mean zero and variance
σ2εb. That is, ξεb,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2εb). Following Zhang (2019), we assume that in the event
of a default the household incurs an indirect cost in the form of a bad repayment record that
results in a low credit score. To capture the cost associated with credit default, we introduce
ϑb ∈ [0, 1], which is a fraction of the wealth transfer that the household must use to pay for the
cost associated with the credit default.
The household also faces the following borrowing constraint that limits the amount of bor-








mb ∈ (0, 1) is the LTV ratio for the impatient household. The term γb,t is an exogenous shock to
the borrowing capacity of the household in line with Mendicino and Punzi (2014) and Iacoviello
(2015). This shock evolves as follows:
logγb,t = ργblogγb,t−1 + ξγb,t, (4.11)
where ργb is a parameter governing the persistence of the shock. ξγb,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2γb) is the
white noise process, normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2γb. The shock captures
exogenous changes in the bank’s (lender’s) confidence or optimism in the credit market which
changes the bank’s valuation of the collateral assets (housing).10
8This is in contrast to Iacoviello (2015), in which the author introduces a redistribution shock (that transfers
wealth from the bank to the borrowers, analogous to a fraction of NPLs) in an ad hoc manner and assumes that it
is exogenous.
9The assumption that βb < βs ensures that the borrowing constraint binds in the neighborhood of the steady
state. As is common in the literature, we also assume that the magnitude of uncertainty in the economy (the size
of the shocks) is too small to induce agents to borrow less than the credit limit (see for e.g., Iacoviello, 2005).
10See also Ngo (2015) and Funke et al. (2018).
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Let UCb,t = 1−ηbCb,t−ηbCb,t−1 be the marginal utility of consumption and λb,t be the multiplier
on the borrowing constraint. The first order conditions which define the impatient household’s




































Eq. (4.12) describes the household’s demand for bank loans. Eq. (4.13) is the household’s
optimal demand for housing. It equates the current price of housing to its marginal benefit,
which is given by the marginal utility of consuming one extra unit of housing, its expected
resale value and its ability to serve as collateral. Eq. (4.14) is the labour supply condition for
the household.
4.2.3 Entrepreneurs




βte(1− ηe)log(Ce,t − ηeCe,t−1), (4.15)
where βe is the entrepreneur’s subjective discount factor such that βe < βs. Ce,t is the en-
trepreneur’s consumption. Since the entrepreneur is the owner of production firms, Ce,t can be
regarded as profits or dividends. Therefore, ηeCe,t−1 captures some form of dividend smoothing
in line with Liu et al. (2013). Liu et al. (2013) point out that this form of dividend smoothing
is essential for the model to adequately explain the dynamics between asset prices and real
variables.
In each period, the representative entrepreneur, z, produces intermediate goods, Yt(z), using
the patient and impatient households’ labour supply, Ns,t(z) and Nb,t(z), and housing, He,t(z),
as inputs. The entrepreneur then sells these goods to the retailers at a wholesale price Pw,t(z).







where ν ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output with respect to housing and, σ ∈ (0, 1) is the rela-
tive share of the impatient household’s labour supply in the production (share of the impatient
household’s labour income). The technology shock, Zt, evolves according to the following law
of motion:
log(Zt) = ρzlog(Zt−1) + ξz,t, (4.17)
where ρz is the persistence of the shock. ξz,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2z) is the white noise process,
normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2z .








where Xt = Pt/Pw,t is the markup or the inverse of the marginal cost. Le,t is bank loans to the
entrepreneur, which accrue a real gross interest rate, Re,t/πt. ζe,t is a fraction of entrepreneur
NPLs, which captures partial defaults by the entrepreneur on the loan contract, as in the case of
the impatient household. ϑe is a fraction of the wealth transfer that the entrepreneur must pay
for the costs related to the default, similar to that of the impatient household. The fraction of




where ζe is the steady-state value of entrepreneur NPLs and χζe > 0 measures the elasticity
of the NPLs with respect to output growth. ρεe measures the persistence of the NPLs. ξεe,t is
an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) NPL shock with mean zero and variance σ2εe.
That is, ξεe,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2εe).
The entrepreneur also faces a borrowing constraint, which limits the total amount of bor-








where me,t is the LTV ratio for the entrepreneur. The term γe,t is an exogenous shock to the
borrowing capacity of the entrepreneur which evolves as follows:
logγe,t = ργelogγe,t−1 + ξγe,t, (4.21)
where ργe is the persistence of the shock. ξγe,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2γe) is the white noise process,
normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ2γe.
11Note that symmetry across entrepreneurs allows us to write the budget constraint without the index z.
86
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Let UCe,t = 1−ηeCe,t−ηeCe,t−1 be the marginal utility of consumption and λe,t be the multiplier
on the borrowing constraint (4.20). The first order conditions which define the entrepreneur’s














































Eq. (4.22) is the optimal demand for bank loans. Eq. (4.23) represents the entrepreneur’s
demand for housing. It equates the current price of housing to its expected resale value plus
the pay-off from holding this asset for one period (given by its marginal productivity and its
ability to serve as collateral asset). Eqs. (4.24) and (4.25) are the optimal demand for patient
and impatient households’ labour, respectively.
4.2.4 Retailers
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive retailers, indexed by k ∈ [0, 1]. They
buy undifferentiated intermediate goods, Yt(z), from entrepreneurs at the price, Pw,t. They
then brand these goods and transform them into differentiated goods, Yt(k), at no costs and
sell them at the price, Pt(k). The final good, Yt, is a constant elasticity of substitution (CES)








where ε > 1 is the intratemporal elasticity of substitution across goods. The profit maximisation





















To motivate for price rigidity, following Calvo (1983), we assume that the retailers operate
in a monopolistically competitive environment and set prices in a staggered manner. In each
period, each retailer gets the opportunity to adjust prices to a new level with a probability of
(1 − θ). Furthermore, we introduce price inertia by assuming that prices of the retailers who
do not receive the Calvo signal are partially indexed to the last period’s inflation rate as in




















where, Λt,i = βi(UCs,t+i/UCs,t) is the patient household’s stochastic discount factor and Xt is
the markup, which at the steady state is X = ε/(ε− 1).









+ (1− θ)(P̃t)1−ε, (4.30)
where ιp is the degree of indexation to past inflation. Combining Eq. (4.29) and Eq. (4.30)
and log-linearising yields a forward-looking New Keynesian Phillips curve to which we add a










x̂t + ξπ,t, (4.31)
where ξπ,t is an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) cost-push shock with mean zero
and variance σ2π. That is, ξπ,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2π).13
4.2.5 The bank
The main role of the bank is to mediate funds between savers (patient households) and bor-
rowers (impatient households and entrepreneurs). The bank chooses consumption (Cf,t) to




βtf (1− ηf )log(Cf,t − ηfCf,t−1), (4.32)
13Variables with a hat denote percent deviations from the steady state.
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where βf is the bank’s subjective discount factor, such that βf < βs. Note that Cf,t can be
interpreted as dividends or profits generated by the bank, which are assumed to be fully con-
sumed by the bank. ηfCf,t−1 represents some form of dividend smoothing. The bank’s budget












where Dt is the patient household’s deposits. Lb,t and Le,t are bank loans to impatient house-










are quadratic loan portfolio adjustment costs associated with household and entrepreneur loans,
respectively. ζb,t and ζe,t are household and entrepreneur NPLs, respectively. For the bank, these
represent loan losses that the bank incurs when the impatient households and the entrepreneurs
default on their loan contracts.
In addition to the budget constraint, the bank faces a capital requirement constraint. In line
with the Basel capital regulations, the bank capital requirement constraint states that the bank
must finance a certain fraction (κ) of new loans by equity (retained earnings in this model). In
other words, the regulation requires the bank to hold a capital-to-assets ratio greater than or
equal to some predetermined ratio (κ). Let bank capital be BKt = Lt − Etζt+1 − Dt.14 The
capital requirement constraint is given by:
Lt − Etζt+1 −Dt
wb
(




Le,t − Et Re,t+1πt+1 ζe,t+1Le,t
) ≥ κ, (4.34)
where κ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital requirement ratio (CRR) and Lt = Lb,t + Le,t is total loans.
Etζt+1 represents the allowance for the expected loan losses. wb and we are risk weights on
household and entrepreneur loans, respectively. These parameters capture different degrees
of risk associated with household and entrepreneur loans. The capital requirement constraint
(4.34) can be rewritten as a borrowing constraint, as follows:















Eq. (4.35) states that the amount of deposits that the bank can take from the patient house-










is the expected loan losses on the bank’s loan portfolio
and Lt − Etζt+1 is net loans.
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losses), where the weights attached to the household loans and entrepreneur loans are (1−wbκ)
and (1 − weκ), respectively. This constraint limits the extent to which the bank can take on
leverage. The condition that βf < βs ensures that the constraint (4.35) is always binding at the
steady state. In the absence of this assumption, the bank may find that it is optimal to post-
pone current consumption indefinitely and accumulate capital to the point where the capital




be the marginal utility of consumption and λf,t be the multiplier
on the bank’s borrowing constraint (4.35). The first order conditions which define the bank’s

























































Eq. (4.36) describes the bank’s demand for deposits. Eqs. (4.37) and (4.38) are the bank’s
optimal conditions for supplying loans to households and entrepreneurs, respectively.
4.2.6 Monetary policy












where φr is the degree of interest rate smoothing, φπ and φy measure the response of the policy
rate to inflation and output growth, respectively. R and π are steady-state values of Rt and πt,
respectively. ξr,t is an i.i.d. monetary policy shock with mean zero and variance σ2r . That is,
ξr,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2r).
15This is consistent with monetary policy under an inflation-targeting regime such as the one the South African
Reserve Bank has been following since 2000.
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4.2.7 Market clearing conditions and equilibrium
The aggregate resource constraint is obtained by adding together the budget constraints of all
agents in the economy (households, entrepreneurs and the bank), including the profit functions
of the retailers:
Yt = Cs,t + Cb,t + Ce,t + Cf,t + Adjt, (4.40)
where Adjt = ACbf,t + ACef,t.
Total consumption is given by:
Ct = Cs,t + Cb,t + Ce,t + Cf,t. (4.41)
The housing market clearing condition requires:
Hs,t +Hb,t +He,t = 1. (4.42)
In the credit market, the total supply of loans equals the demand by impatient households
and entrepreneurs:
Lt = Lb,t + Le,t. (4.43)
4.3 Estimation
We estimate the model for the South African economy using Bayesian techniques as discussed
in An and Schorfheide (2007).16 In what follows, we briefly discuss the observable variables
being used for estimation, the calibrated parameters, and the prior and posterior distribution of
the parameters.
4.3.1 Data
We use quarterly data over the sample period 2000Q1–2016Q4, which coincides with the
inflation-targeting monetary policy regime in South Africa. The model allows for a total of 8
shocks. In line with the standard practice in the DSGE literature, we have as many shocks as the
number of observable variables in the data set. The observable variables are real gross domes-
tic product (GDP) per capita, real household credit per capita, real corporate credit per capita,
inflation rate, short-term nominal interest rate, real house prices, ratio of household NPLs to
16We use Dynare (version 4.5.7) to estimate the model.
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total household loans and ratio of corporate NPLs to total corporate loans.17 Fig. 4.1 plots the
transformed observable variables being used for estimation. Before proceeding with the estima-
tion, we detrend the logarithm of real variables by taking the first-difference of each variable
and subtracting the corresponding sample mean. Inflation, interest rate, ratios of household
NPLs and corporate NPLs are demeaned. Most of the data are obtained from the South African
Reserve Bank database. House price data are obtained from ABSA bank (one of the leading
banks in South Africa), interest rate data from the International Monetary Fund’s International
Financial Statistics database, and population data from World Bank database.


































































Figure 4.1: Observable variables. Note: Output, house prices, household loans and entrepreneur loans are de-
meaned percentage growth rates. Inflation rate, interest rate, ratios of household and entrepreneur (corporate)
NPLs are in percentage deviations from their respective sample means.




As is standard in Bayesian estimation of DSGE models, we calibrate a subset of parameters
for which the data set being used for estimation cannot provide sufficient information. Some
of these parameters are calibrated based on the data and steady state conditions of the model,
while others are borrowed from the literature. These parameters are presented in Table 4.1.
The discount factor for patient households is set at βs = 0.995, for impatient households
at βb = 0.97 and for entrepreneurs at βe = 0.96. The choice of these values ensures that both
impatient households’ and entrepreneurs’ borrowing constraints are binding in the neighbour-
hood of steady state. The steady-state value of the gross inflation rate is set at π = 1.016, which
implies an annual inflation rate of 6.4% in the steady state, which is fairly in line with the data
over the sample period. Together with patient households’ discount factor, this value implies a
steady-state nominal interest rate of 8.5% per annum, which is slightly higher than the sample
mean from the data for the period 2000Q1–2016Q4.
Table 4.1: Calibrated parameters.
Parameter Symbol Value Parameter Symbol Value
Discount factor (patient HH) βs 0.995 NPL persistence (impatient HH) ρεb 0.7
Discount factor (impatient HH) βb 0.97 NPL persistence (Entrep.) ρεe 0.7
Discount factor (Entrep.) βf 0.96 Steady-state capital requirement ratio κ 0.13
Discount factor (Bank) βb 0.95 Steady-state LTV ratio (impatient HH) mb 0.80
Housing preference j 0.12 Steady-state LTV ratio (Entrep.) me 0.60
Labor supply parameter τ 2 Steady-state ratio of HH NPLs ζb 0.04
Housing share in production ν 0.1 Steady-state ratio of Entrep. NPLs ζe 0.034
Risk weight (impatient HH loans) wb 1 Steady-state inflation π 1.016
Risk weight (Entrep. loans) we 1 Steady-state gross markup X 1.10
Note: HH, Entrep and NPL stand for household, entrepreneur and non-performing loan.
The weight on leisure in the households’ utility function is set at τ = 2. This value implies
that households devote approximately one third of their time to work in line with the literature.
The share of housing in production is set at ν = 0.1 in the ballpark of the values widely used
in the literature for emerging market economies (e.g., Iacoviello and Minetti, 2006; Minetti
and Peng, 2018). The housing weight in the utility functions is calibrated at j = 0.12. The
choice of these values implies that in the steady state the share of households’ housing wealth
(residential housing wealth) to total housing wealth is 0.80 while the remaining share of 0.20
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is entrepreneurs’ housing wealth (commercial housing wealth). These values are fairly in line
with the South African data on housing wealth.18
Leverage ratios for impatient households and entrepreneurs are set based on the South
African credit market data over the sample period. The steady-state LTV ratio for impatient
households is set at mb = 0.8. This value is fairly consistent with the minimum down-payment
that South African banks require for providing home loans. For the entrepreneurs, the steady-
state LTV ratio is set at me = 0.6. Both values are well within the observed maximum LTV
ratios for a first-time mortgage buyer typically found in emerging and developing economies
(see, e.g., IMF, 2011). These values pin down the steady-state ratio of household loans to out-
put at 0.35 and of entrepreneur loans to output at 0.34, consistent with the South African credit
market data.
The steady-state capital requirement ratio is set at κ = 0.13 to match the historical average
observed in the South African banking data. The risk weights assigned to household and en-
trepreneur loans are both set at wb = we = 1. The discount factor for banks is set at βf = 0.95.
This value is lower than the patient households’ discount factor (βs) and guarantees that the
banks’ borrowing constraint (4.35) is binding in the neighbourhood of the steady state. The
steady-state ratios of household and entrepreneur NPLs are set at ζb = 0.04 and ζe = 0.034,
respectively, matching their historical average values. Together with impatient households’ and
entrepreneurs’ discount factors, these values imply the spread of more than 500 basis points be-
tween the effective lending rates (risk-adjusted lending rates) and deposit (policy) rate, which
is broadly in line with the South African interest rate data.19
We set the steady-state gross markup at X = 1.10, which is in the ballpark of values widely
used in the literature.20 This implies a steady-state markup of 10% in the retail sector. The
parameters measuring the persistence of household and entrepreneur NPLs are set at ρεb =
ρεe = 0.7.
18The 2016 Property Sector Charter Council’s report suggests that residential housing wealth constitutes ap-
proximately 80% of the total South African housing wealth while the remainder is commercial housing wealth.
Source: http://www.sacommercialpropnews.co.za/property-investment/8211-sa-property-sector-volumes-to-r5-8-
trillion.html.
19The risk-adjusted lending rate or effective lending rate is approximated by the average of a sum of lending
rates, as reported by the South Africa Reserve Bank, and ratios of NPLs.




Tables 4.2 and 4.3 report prior distributions, means and standard deviations of the remaining
set of parameters to be estimated. The choice of these priors is guided by the DSGE literature,
particularly in the context of South Africa.
The degree of habit persistence is assumed to follow a beta distribution with a mean of 0.5
and a standard deviation of 0.05. The parameter for the impatient household’s labour income
share is assumed to follow a beta distribution with a mean of 0.3 and a standard deviation of
0.02. These priors are based on Iacoviello (2015) and Gupta and Sun (2018). The priors for the
parameters of the monetary policy rule are set as follows. The interest rate smoothing parameter
is assumed to follow a beta distribution with a mean of 0.7 and a standard deviation of 0.05.
The coefficients on inflation and output growth are assumed to follow a gamma and a normal
distribution with means of 1.5 and 0.5, respectively, and a standard deviation of 0.05. These
values are in line with Steinbach et al. (2009),Alpanda et al. (2010),Liu (2013) and du Plessis
et al. (2014).
The elasticities of household and entrepreneur NPLs with respect to output are assumed to
follow a beta distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.1. This is in line with
Steinbach et al. (2014). The prior mean for these parameters is also consistent with the esti-
mated elasticity of NPLs with respect to output growth across major developing economies,
including South Africa, in Glen and Mondragón-Vélez (2011). The parameters governing
household and entrepreneur default costs (ϑb and ϑe) follow a beta distribution with a mean
of 0.5 and a standard deviation of 0.2, in line with Zhang (2019). The loan portfolio adjustment
cost parameters are assumed to follow a gamma distribution with a mean of 0.25 and a standard
deviation of 0.125, in line with Iacoviello (2015).
The persistence of all structural shocks is assumed to follow a beta distribution with a mean
of 0.8 and a standard deviation of 0.1 in line with the literature (e.g., Steinbach et al., 2009;
Alpanda et al., 2010; Gupta and Sun, 2018). The standard deviation of the shocks is assumed
to follow an inverse gamma distribution with a mean of 0.1 and standard deviation of 0.25.
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Table 4.2: Prior and posterior distributions of the structural parameters.
Parameter
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Density Mean St.dev. 5 % Mean 95 %
Habit persistence η beta 0.50 0.05 0.5257 0.5609 0.5959
Impatient HH income share σ beta 0.30 0.02 0.2250 0.2412 0.2581
Calvo parameter θ beta 0.65 0.02 0.4693 0.5057 0.5435
Price indexation ιπ beta 0.50 0.05 0.3030 0.3884 0.4787
Interest rate smoothing φr beta 0.70 0.05 0.4085 0.4688 0.5266
Taylor coefficient on inflation φπ gamma 1.70 0.05 1.6071 1.7016 1.7965
Taylor coefficient on output φy normal 0.50 0.05 0.4752 0.5589 0.6437
Elasticity of HH NPLs w.r.t output χζb gamma 0.50 0.10 0.3010 0.4916 0.6821
Elasticity of Entrep. NPLs w.r.t output χζe gamma 0.50 0.10 0.2749 0.4468 0.6228
HH default cost parameter ϑb beta 0.50 0.10 0.5954 0.7042 0.8108
Entrep. default cost parameter ϑe beta 0.50 0.10 0.0640 0.1287 0.2024
Impatient HH loan adj. cost φbf gamma 0.25 0.125 0.9309 1.0396 1.1500
Entrep. loan adj. cost φef gamma 0.25 0.125 0.0061 0.0281 0.0542
Notes: The posterior density is constructed by simulation using the Random-Walk Metropolis algorithm (two chains
with 250,000 draws each). HH, Entrep. and NPL stand for household, entrepreneur and non-performing loan.
4.3.4 Posterior estimates
The last three columns of Tables 4.2 and 4.3 show the posterior mean and the 5 and 95 per-
centiles of the posterior distributions of the estimated parameters.21 The habit persistence pa-
rameter is estimated at 0.56 and the impatient households’ labour income share parameter at
0.24. These values are fairly in line with the estimated values in Iacoviello (2015) and Gupta
and Sun (2018). The Calvo parameter, which measures the degree of price stickiness, is es-
timated at 0.51. This implies that entrepreneurs adjust prices approximately every 2 quarters.
The results also imply a moderate degree of price indexation to the past inflation, at the esti-
mated value of 0.39, for entrepreneurs who do not adjust prices every quarter.
Turning to the parameters governing the monetary policy rule, we find that the parameters
for the response of the policy rate to inflation and output growth (Taylor coefficients) are φπ =
1.70 and φy = 0.56, respectively. The results also suggest that there is a modest degree of
interest rate smoothing, estimated at φπ = 0.47. These values are fairly in line with the Taylor
principle and the South African literature (see for e.g., Steinbach et al., 2009; Liu, 2013). The
elasticities of household and entrepreneur NPLs with respect to output growth are 0.49 and 0.45,
21We present the prior and posterior marginal densities of the structural parameters and multivariate conver-
gence diagnostics plots in appendices C.3 and C.4. Results for the impulse response functions (IRFs) analysis and
the historical shock decomposition analysis are reported in appendices C.5 and C.6.
96
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
Table 4.3: Prior and posterior distributions of the shocks.
Parameter
Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Density Mean St.dev. 5 % Mean 95 %
AR(1) coefficients
Housing demand shock ρj beta 0.80 0.10 0.9896 0.9929 0.9959
Technology shock ρz beta 0.80 0.10 0.9864 0.9924 0.9977
HH LTV shock ργb beta 0.80 0.10 0.8924 0.9342 0.9748
Entrep. LTV shock ργe beta 0.80 0.10 0.9252 0.9483 0.9695
Standard deviations
Housing demand shock σj invg 0.10 0.25 0.0282 0.0367 0.0456
Technology shock σz invg 0.10 0.25 0.0099 0.0108 0.0118
HH LTV shock σγb invg 0.10 0.25 0.0174 0.0197 0.0220
Entrep. LTV shock σγe invg 0.10 0.25 0.0165 0.0177 0.0189
Monetary policy shock σr invg 0.10 0.25 0.0078 0.0088 0.0098
Cost-push shock σπ invg 0.10 0.25 0.0120 0.0138 0.0155
HH NPL shock σεb invg 0.10 0.25 0.1038 0.1172 0.1307
Entrep. NPL shock σεe invg 0.10 0.25 0.1227 0.1434 0.1656
Notes: The posterior density is constructed by simulation using the Random-Walk Metropolis algo-
rithm (two chains with 250,000 draws each). HH, Entrep. and NPL stand for household, entrepreneur
and non-performing loan. AR stands for autoregressive.
respectively. These values are fairly in line with the estimated value in Glen and Mondragón-
Vélez (2011) for emerging markets. The default cost parameter for impatient households is 0.70
and for entrepreneurs 0.13. This implies that, in the event of loan default, impatient households
use approximately 70% of transfers of wealth from the bank to pay the costs associated with
default, whereas entrepreneurs use only 13% of transfers of wealth to pay the default costs.
4.4 Business cycle properties
In this section we assess the performance of the estimated model. Specifically, we evaluate how
well the model conforms to the actual data in terms of standard deviation and correlation of key
variables with output.
Table 4.4 shows that the estimated model does a fairly good job of matching the data mo-
ments. The model reproduces the standard deviations of house prices, inflation and the policy
rate fairly in line with the data. It also does a reasonably good job of reproducing the standard
deviations of output, household loans and corporate loans, but somewhat overstates them. Im-
portantly, the model does a good job in reproducing the fact that entrepreneur loans are more
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Table 4.4: Business cycle properties.
Variable
Standard deviation Correlation with output
Data Model Data Model
Output 0.61 0.96 1.00 1.00
House prices 2.44 2.33 0.42 0.72
Inflation 0.96 0.99 -0.03 -0.50
Policy rate 0.51 0.63 0.10 -0.70
Household loans 2.28 3.12 0.46 0.55
Entrepreneur loans 3.60 6.41 0.09 0.54
Notes: We do not report the business cycle properties for household and
entrepreneur NPLs because we have used proxies for these two variables.
volatile than household loans, and also the fact that entrepreneur loans, household loans, house
prices and inflation are more volatile than output, while the policy rate is less volatile than
output. Turning to the correlation of the variables with output, the results show that the model
reproduces a strong correlation of output with house prices and household loans, consistent
with the data. Although the model overestimates the correlation of output with corporate loans
and inflation, it does a good job of predicting a countercyclical (negative correlation with) in-
flation and a procyclical (positive correlation with) corporate loans. However, the model fails
to reproduce the positive correlation of output with the policy rate. In general, the estimated
model does a reasonably good job of matching the stylised facts observed in the South African
data over the period 2000Q1–2016Q4.
4.5 Optimal monetary and macroprudential policy
In this section we investigate the optimal design and effectiveness of a simultaneous deployment
of monetary and macroprudential policies in promoting macroeconomic and financial stability.
To conduct this analysis, we set the model parameters at their posterior means obtained from
the estimation and use the optimal simple rule (OSR) optimisation routine in Dynare to derive
the optimal monetary and macroprudential policy parameters. In what follows, we first describe
the loss function and policy regimes to be used for the optimal simple rule analysis and then
report the results of the OSR analysis.
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4.5.1 Policy loss function
To find the optimal policy, following Angelini et al. (2014) and Agénor et al. (2018), we assume
the central bank minimises the quadratic welfare loss function in terms of a weighted sum of
the volatilities of inflation, output, credit-to-output ratio and house prices as follows:







q are the volatilities of inflation, output, credit-to-output ratio and house
prices, respectively. Parameters λy, λl/y, λq ≥ 0 are the relative weights of output, credit-
to-output ratio and house prices in the loss function, respectively. To simplify our analysis,
we conduct policy experiments with the weights of λy = 0.5, λl/y = 0.5 and λq = 0.05
in the loss function.22 We assign a lower weight to output than to inflation, to reflect South
Africa’s inflation-targeting monetary policy regime over the sample period. We assign a lower
weight to the volatility of house prices than to the volatility of credit-to-output ratio, based
on the empirical evidence that fluctuations in credit-to-output ratio are more important than
fluctuations in asset prices in predicting financial distress (Agénor and Pereira da Silva, 2017;
Agénor et al., 2018). We only consider the case where there is a single policymaker (a central
bank) that pursues both macroeconomic and financial stability objectives using the two policy
instruments – the policy rate and the capital requirement ratio. That is, we assume that monetary
and macroeconomic policies are conducted under full coordination.
4.5.2 Policy regimes
To study the effectiveness of a joint implementation of monetary and macroprudential poli-
cies, we assess two alternative policy regimes (II and III) against a benchmark regime (I).
The benchmark regime is described by the standard Taylor rule (4.39), and a constant capi-
tal requirement ratio without the macroprudential policy rule, i.e. the countercyclical capital
requirement (CcCR).
Regime II is a combination of the standard Taylor rule (4.39) and the CcCR which relates







22We also perform additional experiments with different weights on the volatilities of output and credit-to-
output ratio in the ranges λy = [0.5, 1] and λl = [0.1, 1]. The results are very similar to those reported here.
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where κ is the steady-state value of capital requirement ratio. Y and L are steady-state values
of output and total loans, respectively. χl ≥ 0 measures the extent to which capital requirement
ratio reacts to the credit-to-output gap. The CcCR rule is consistent with the main objective of
macroprudential policy: to protect the banking sector from excessive fluctuations in the credit-
to-output ratio which could have dire consequences for financial stability and negative spillover
on the real economy.














where φl measures the extent to which the policy rate reacts to credit growth. The choice of
credit growth rather than other financial variables such as house prices is motivated by the em-
pirical findings in the literature that excessive fluctuations in a measure of credit (credit growth
or credit-to-output ratio) is a robust indicator of a build-up of systemic risk (e.g., Schularick
and Taylor, 2012; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012; Mallick and Sousa, 2013; Jordà et al., 2015;
Taylor, 2015). Furthermore, credit-driven bubbles are easier to measure, monitor, predict and
control than asset price bubbles (Verona et al., 2017).






l ) in Eqs. (4.39),
(4.45) and (4.46) by minimising the welfare loss function Eq. (4.44), subject to the constraints
given by the model.23 We perform the grid search over the ranges φπ = [1.1, 3], φy = [0, 1],
φl = [0, 0.2], χl = [0, 10], following the literature (see for e.g., Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe,
2007; Lambertini et al., 2013; Bailliu et al., 2015; Verona et al., 2017). We set the upper bound
for φl to be less than that for φπ because the primary objective of monetary policy is price
stability. We assume that monetary policy provides a supporting role only to the financial sta-
bility objective. On the other hand, we set the upper bound for χl higher because the primary
objective of macroprudential policy is financial stability.
4.5.3 Optimal simple rules
In this section we present the results of the optimal policy analysis: the optimal combination
of policy parameters, welfare gain or loss, and standard deviations of the variables in the loss
function relative to those under the benchmark regime. The top panel of Table 4.5 shows the
23As in Bailliu et al. (2015), we fix the smoothing parameter (ρr) at the estimated value to avoid a highly
volatile policy rate and optimise over other policy parameters in the Taylor rule.
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results of the optimal combination of a standard monetary policy rule and a macroprudential
policy rule (regime II) while the bottom panel shows those of the optimal combination of an
augmented monetary policy rule and the macroprudential policy rule (regime III). To provide a
more intuitive analysis, we conduct the optimal policy analysis conditional on specific shocks:
housing demand shock (column 2), LTV shocks (column 3) and NPL shocks (column 4). The
choice of these shocks is motivated by the findings in the literature that macroprudential poli-
cies are effective in mitigating the impact of financial shocks, but inefficient for non-financial
shocks (Kannan et al., 2012; Angelini et al., 2014; Benes and Kumhof, 2015). For robust-
ness purposes we also conduct the analysis for a technology shock in columns 5 and for all
the shocks considered in the paper in column 6. As mentioned previously, we set all other
parameters at their posterior means from the estimation.
The results show that both the optimal standard monetary policy rule and the optimal aug-
mented monetary policy rule feature a moderate reaction to inflation in the ranges of 1.1 to 1.5,
which are lower than the estimated value of 1.70. This implies that a strong reaction to infla-
tion is not optimal when the central bank pursues both financial and macroeconomic stability
mandates using the two policy instruments. These results hold across the five shock scenar-
ios. It is also evident that the optimal standard and augmented monetary policy rules feature a
stronger response to output than the estimated response of 0.56 under the benchmark regime.
The optimal coefficient on output remains virtually unchanged across the five shock scenarios,
especially under regime II. Across all the shock scenarios, the optimal coefficient on credit
growth hits the upper bound of 0.2. Regarding the optimal design of macroprudential policy,
the results suggest that the central bank should adjust the capital requirement ratio proportion-
ately to the credit-to-output gap (i.e., χl ≈ 1). These results hold in both regime II and regime
III and regardless of the source of the shock.
Turning to the welfare effect, the results suggest that the optimal combination of the mon-
etary policy (standard or augmented) rule and the macroprudential policy rule enhances the
central bank’s ability to minimise the welfare loss. In comparison to the benchmark regime,
both regimes II and III yield welfare gains regardless of the source of shock. Such welfare gains
are far larger under regime III than under regime II.
It is evident that under regime II the welfare gains are mainly coming from the reduced
volatilities of output, credit-to-output ratio and house prices. The volatility of inflation, how-
ever, increases. This trade-off between financial stability and price stability worsens under
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LTV shocks NPL shocks Technologyshock All shocks
Regime II (φr = 0.47):
φπ 1.20 1.10 1.10 1.10 1.16
φy 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
χl 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12
Welfare gain (%) 23.09 26.19 21.39 10.11 20.03
Standard deviation relative to benchmark
πt 2.20 1.40 1.67 2.59 1.45
Yt 0.90 0.71 0.75 0.98 0.97
Lt/Yt 0.86 0.86 0.89 0.27 0.84
qt 0.99 0.76 0.75 0.99 0.99
Regime III (φr = 0.47):
φπ 1.25 1.31 1.53 1.10 1.25
φy 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.93 1.00
φl 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
χl 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12 1.12
Welfare gain (%) 33.52 40.27 30.33 10.32 28.14
Standard deviation relative to benchmark
πt 5.60 4.20 2.00 2.78 1.51
Yt 0.83 0.54 0.75 0.97 0.97
Lt/Yt 0.79 0.77 0.83 0.29 0.77
qt 0.99 0.78 0.92 0.98 0.99
Notes: Welfare gain is calculated as the percentage difference between welfare loss under the
benchmark regime and an alternative policy regime (II or III). That is, Welfare gain = 100 ∗[
(Lbenchmark − Lalternative)/Lbenchmark
]
. A positive value implies a welfare gain under an alter-
native regime. The standard deviation relative to the benchmark is calculated by dividing the standard
deviation of a given variable i, i = {π, y, l/y, q}, under an alternative regime by the standard devia-
tion under the benchmark regime. That is, σ2i,alternative/σ
2
i,benchmark. A value less than 1 means that
an alternative regime reduces the volatility of variable i relative to the benchmark regime.
regime III where the central bank adjusts the policy rate to credit growth in addition to infla-
tion and output growth. In this case, the increase in financial stability comes at the cost of a
much larger increase in the volatility of inflation. These findings are consistent with Gelain
et al. (2013) and Tayler and Zilberman (2016), in which the authors note that a policy regime
that combines an augmented monetary policy and macroprudential policy generates a trade-
off between price and financial stability. In separate experiments, we set the upper bound for
φl greater than 0.2. The results of these experiments are very similar to those reported here.
The only difference is that financial stability benefits increase further at a much higher cost of
increasing volatility of inflation than reported here. Furthermore, such experiments result in
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large values of the optimal policy coefficients on credit growth, in which case the objective of
financial stability dominates that of price stability in the setting of the policy rate. We try to
avoid such unrealistic scenario in our analysis. Besides, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007) note
that large values of the optimal policy coefficients are difficult to communicate to policymakers
or the public.24
4.6 Impulse response analysis
To gain more insights into how monetary policy interacts with macroprudential policy, we
present the impulse responses of the key variables following housing demand, LTV and NPL
shocks. We contrast the benchmark regime with the two alternative policy regimes. We use the
parameter values derived from the optimal rule analysis reported in Table 4.5 for the parameters
in the monetary policy and macroprudential policy rules. We set other parameter values at their
posterior means obtained from the estimation.
Fig. 4.2 shows the impulse responses of the key variables following a positive housing de-
mand shock. Under the benchmark regime, the shock generates expansionary effects in the
economy. It increases house prices and, through collateral constraints, leads to an increase in
both household loans and entrepreneur loans. This in turn stimulates consumption and output
growth. The policy rate increases and inflation decreases. Lending rates increase following the
increase in demand for loans. When the central bank adopts regime II, we see the expansion-
ary effect of the housing demand shock is dampened. The central bank increases the capital
requirement ratio as the credit-to-output ratio increases. This prompts the bank to adjust its bal-
ance sheet by reducing the supply of credit (loans) relative to the supply under the benchmark
regime. The reduction in credit supply induces borrowers to reduce their demand for housing.
This dampens the increase in house prices and thus mitigates the amplification effect of the bor-
rowing constraints. Consequently, consumption and output do not increase as much as under
the benchmark regime.
Regime III significantly attenuates the expansionary effect of the shock, mainly through two
channels. First, it works through the intertemporal substitution effect of the monetary policy
on savers. The further increase in the policy rate prompts patient households to substitute from
24Agénor et al. (2013) also note that allowing the policy rate to react aggressively to financial variables (credit
growth or credit-to-output ratio) increases the volatility of the policy rate which could be a concern for the central
bank as it could generate instability in the economy.
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Figure 4.2: Impulse responses to a positive housing demand shock under different policy regimes: Benchmark
regime I (standard Taylor rule), regime II (standard Taylor rule and CcCR) and regime III (augmented Taylor rule
and CcCR). Aggregate variables are expressed in % deviations from the steady state, and interest rates and inflation
are in percentage point deviations from the steady state. HH and Entrep. stand for household and entrepreneur.
Ordinate: time horizon in quarters.
consumption to savings. This causes the increase in aggregate consumption and output to de-
cline under regime III. Second, it works through the expectation effect of the monetary policy.
Intuitively, in a policy regime where monetary policy also responds to credit growth, private
agents would expect the policy rate to react more aggressively than in a policy regime where
monetary policy does not respond to financial conditions. Under regime III, forward-looking
borrowers take into account the potential further increase in the policy rate when making eco-
nomic decisions, and react by borrowing less. Hence, household loans and entrepreneur loans
increase much less than under regime II. This in turn helps the central bank to implement a




The attenuation effect of regime III, however, does not come for free. Consistent with the
findings in the previous section, it is evident that the central bank faces a more severe trade-
off between price and financial stability under regime III. A further increase in the policy rate
stabilises credit market, house prices and output, but exacerbates the fluctuation of inflation.
This suggests that regime III creates conflicts between price and financial stability objectives.
The fall in inflation requires the central bank to reduce the policy rate, while the credit market
boom requires the central bank to increase it. However, this policy conflict is absent under
regime II because here monetary policy focuses solely on its primary objective of price stability,
not financial stability.
We now turn to the impact of the credit market shocks (household LTV and NPL shocks).
Fig. 4.3 shows the impulse response functions (IRFs) of the key variables following a positive
household LTV shock.25 Under the benchmark regime, the shock increases the borrowing
capacity of impatient households and leads to an increase in the demand for housing and an
increase in house prices. Both impatient households and entrepreneurs increase their demand
for loans and thus stimulate aggregate spending and production. The increase in demand for
loans prompts banks to increase the lending rates. The expansionary effect of the shock pushes
up inflation. The policy rate increases initially to counteract the increase in inflation.
As in the case of the housing demand shock, a simultaneous deployment of monetary and
macroprudential policies dampens the expansionary effects of the LTV shock. Under regime II,
the central bank tightens the capital requirement regulation when the credit-to-output ratio in-
creases. This induces the bank to adjust its balance sheet by reducing the supply of loans to im-
patient households and entrepreneurs. As a result, both impatient households and entrepreneurs
reduce spending, including investment in housing. This in turn dampens the increase in house
prices and thus mitigates the amplification effect of the borrowing constraint on the real sector.
As a consequence, consumption and output increase by less under regime II than under the
benchmark regime.
The results suggest that regime III is more effective than regime II in dampening fluctuations
in total loans, house prices, consumption and output following a positive household LTV shock.
As in the case of the housing demand shock, this attenuation effect comes at a higher cost in
terms of the trade-off between price and financial stability. Specifically, regime III enhances
25For brevity, we report only the impulse response functions to a positive household LTV shock. Similar results
as those reported here also hold for the case of a positive entrepreneur LTV shock. The only notable difference is
that impatient household lending rate declines under regime III in the case of a shock to entrepreneur LTV. The
results are reported in appendix C.7.1.
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Figure 4.3: Impulse responses to a positive household LTV shock under different policy regimes: Benchmark
regime I (standard Taylor rule), regime II (standard Taylor rule and CcCR) and regime III (augmented Taylor rule
and CcCR). Aggregate variables are expressed in % deviations from the steady state, and interest rates and inflation
are in percentage point deviations from the steady state. HH and Entrep. stand for household and entrepreneur.
Ordinate: time horizon in quarters.
financial stability at the cost of destabilising inflation.
In Fig. 4.4 we compare the responses of the key variables to a negative household NPL
shock under the three policy regimes.26 The shock affects financial variables mainly through
the bank balance sheet channel. Under the benchmark regime, the shock increases the ratio
of impatient households’ NPLs and leads to an increase in the banks’ loan losses. This in
turn reduces the banks’ net worth (bank capital) and forces them to reduce the total supply of
loans in order to meet the capital requirement. Because the NPL shock occurs in the household
loan sector of the credit market, the decrease in household loans is much larger than that in
26For brevity, we report only the impulse responses of the key variables to a negative household NPL shock.
The results for a negative entrepreneur NPL shock are qualitatively similar to those reported here. The results are




In addition to this indirect effect stemmed from the balance sheet adjustment, the shock
prompts the banks to increase lending rates in response to an increase in the perceived credit
risk and in an attempt to rebuild their net worth by increasing interest rate earnings. This
further weakens the demand for loans, and prompts borrowers to reduce spending, including
investment in housing. House prices decrease as the demand for housing falls, and this gener-
ates a negative housing wealth effect, leading to a fall in consumption and output. The central
bank increases the policy rate to counteract the increase in inflation.
Regime II dampens the negative impact of the shock. In this case, the central bank relaxes
the capital requirement regulation as credit-to-output ratio declines. This reduces the pressure
on banks to adjust their balance sheet as aggressively as under the benchmark regime. As a
result, total loans fall by less under regime II than under the benchmark regime. This mitigates
the spillover effects of the shock on the housing market and the real sector. As a consequence,
house prices, consumption and output decline by less under regime II than under the benchmark
regime.
Fig. 4.4 also shows that regime III enhances this stabilisation effect through the expectation
channel of monetary policy and the intertemporal substitution effect of monetary policy. In
this case, the policy rate increases less than under regime II. This is because the policy rate
also responds to the decline in credit growth. Because of a smaller increase in the policy rate,
inflation increases more under regime III than under regime II. As a result, the real interest
rate decreases more and this in turn prompts patient households to increase consumption and
reduce investment in housing due to the intertemporal substitution effect. In the anticipation of
a smaller increase in the policy rate, both types of borrowers increase their borrowing. Conse-
quently, impatient households’ and entrepreneurs’ spending, including investment in housing,
fall by less under regime III than that under regime II. This mitigates the fall in house prices
and, through the borrowing constraint, mitigates the negative impact of the shock on the real
sector. Similar to the cases of housing demand shock and LTV shock, we find that regime III
outperforms regime II in dampening fluctuations in the credit market, the housing market and
the real sector. But this comes at the expense of increasing fluctuations in inflation.
The main conclusions we can draw from this analysis are as follows. A policy regime that
combines a standard monetary policy rule and a macroprudential policy rule delivers a more
stable economic system than a regime that combines an augmented monetary policy rule and
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Figure 4.4: Impulse responses to a negative shock to impatient household non-performing loans under different
policy regimes: Benchmark regime I (standard Taylor rule), regime II (standard Taylor rule and CcCR) and regime
III (augmented Taylor rule and CcCR). Aggregate variables are expressed in % deviations from the steady state,
and interest rates and inflation are in percentage point deviations from the steady state. HH and Entrep. stand for
household and entrepreneur. Ordinate: time horizon in quarters.
a macroprudential policy rule. The central bank faces a trade-off between price and financial
stability objectives when monetary policy also responds to credit growth. While this policy
regime seems to be effective from the financial stability point of view, it can compromise price
stability, as noted by Tayler and Zilberman (2016). This is especially the case when shocks
generate a negative correlation between credit and inflation. As noted in our analysis, a housing
demand, LTV or NPL shock generates a negative correlation between credit and inflation. The
central bank is forced to choose between price stability and financial stability when deploying
an augmented monetary policy rule. The policy rate response required to achieve price stability
is inconsistent with that required to achieve financial stability. For example, a positive housing
demand shock increases credit but reduces inflation. While the fall in inflation calls for a
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reduction in the policy rate, a boom in the credit market calls for an increase. The opposite is
also true in the case of a negative shock. As we have seen in the impulse response analysis,
this conflict compromises the central bank’s ability to deliver on its price stability mandate.
Nevertheless, the trade-off between price and financial stability is minimised and the policy
conflict is absent under regime II.
4.7 Efficient policy frontiers
In this section we compare the three policy regimes in terms of two-dimensional efficient policy
frontiers. The efficient policy frontier shows the locus of the volatilities of key policy variables
(inflation and credit-to-output ratio), calculated for each set of optimal policy coefficients that
are obtained for different combinations of loss function weights. To perform the exercise, we
simplify the loss function (4.44) by setting the weights on the volatilities of output and house
prices to 0.5 and 0.1 (λy = 0.5 and λq = 0.1), respectively, and allow the weight on the
volatility of credit-to-output ratio to vary within the range λl/y ∈ [0, 1]. That is,
L = σ2π + 0.5σ2y + λl/yσ2l/y + 0.1σ2q . (4.47)
Fig. 4.5 shows the efficient policy frontiers when the economy faces housing demand, LTV
and NPL shocks considered in the previous section. Moving from right to left in Fig. 4.5, the
weight on the volatility of credit-to-output ratio (λl/y) increases from 0 to 1. A curve closer to
the origin represents a more efficient (preferred) policy regime. We see that the introduction of
macroprudential policy enhances both financial and price stability, especially regime II. That
is, given the same weight on the volatility of credit-to-output ratio (λl/y) in the loss function,
regime II delivers a more efficient policy outcome in terms of a lower volatility of inflation and
the credit-to-output ratio. A comparison between regime II and regime III suggests that regime
III is more effective than regime II in promoting financial stability. However, this can only be
achieved at a much higher cost of price stability.
The efficient policy frontiers under the three policy regimes present a clear trade-off be-
tween inflation and credit-to-output ratio volatilities, as the central bank adjusts its preference
for stabilising the credit-to-output ratio relative to stabilising inflation. The maximum attain-
able reduction in credit-to-output volatility can be achieved at the expense of increasing infla-
tion volatility, especially under regime III. Moveover, the relatively inelastic efficient policy
frontiers, especially when the economy faces a housing demand shock, imply that it is not wise
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for the central bank to put a relatively high weight on the credit-to-output ratio in its loss func-
tion. This is because a marginal reduction in the volatility of credit-to-output ratio is achieved
at a relatively high cost in terms of the volatility of inflation.



























(a) Housing demand shock















































Figure 4.5: The efficient policy frontiers: inflation vs credit-to-output ratio (λl/y ∈ [0, 1]).
Fig. 4.6 shows, with the presence of macroprudential policy, the trade-off between the
volatilities of output and inflation when the economy faces housing demand, LTV and NPL
shocks. The efficiency policy frontiers under the three policy regimes present a clear trade-off
between inflation and output volatility, as the central bank adjusts its preference for stabilis-
ing the credit-to-output ratio relative to stabilising inflation and output. The results show that
the introduction of macroprudential policy (regime II) shifts the efficiency frontier to the left,
implying a more efficient policy outcome in terms of reducing the volatilities of inflation and
output relative to the benchmark regime (regime I). This implies that macroprudential policy
enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy. When the central bank implements a policy
regime III, we see that the frontier shifts further to the left and up. This means that allowing
monetary policy to react to financial imbalances weakens monetary policy’s ability to deliver
on its primary objective - price stability.
The efficient policy frontier analysis reaffirms the findings in the previous section. A policy
regime that combines a standard monetary policy and macroprudential policy enhances both
macroeconomic (price) stability and financial stability. This policy regime delivers the maxi-
mum attainable financial stability benefits at the lowest cost of price stability. These findings
also concur with Rubio and Carrasco-Gallego (2014), in which the authors establish that a pol-
icy combination of a standard monetary policy and countercyclical LTV regulation enhances
the overall economic stability. In addition, our analysis suggests that a policy regime that
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Figure 4.6: The efficient policy frontiers: inflation vs output (λl/y ∈ [0, 1]).
combines an augmented monetary policy and macroprudential policy can compromise price
stability, consistent with Rubio (2016) and Gelain et al. (2013).
4.8 Conclusion
This paper investigates the optimal design and the interaction between monetary and macro-
prudential policies for the South African economy. We find that a simultaneous deployment of
monetary and macroprudential policies enhances macroeconomic (price) and financial stability.
A policy regime that combines an augmented monetary policy with macroprudential policy de-
livers the highest welfare gains, but at a much higher cost of price instability than a regime that
combines a standard monetary policy with macroprudential policy. An efficient policy frontier
analysis shows that a combination of a standard monetary policy and a macroprudential policy
is the most efficient policy regime in terms of enhancing both macroeconomic and financial
stability.
The policy implication of our findings is that the central bank should be cautious when al-
lowing monetary policy to react to financial conditions. In particular, our analysis suggests that
the central bank should not use monetary policy to lean against the wind of credit cycles in an
attempt to promote financial stability. Rather the central bank should introduce macropruden-
tial policy instruments (like CcCR, studied here) with a primary objective of financial stability,
and let monetary policy focus exclusively on its primary objective of price stability. Such a
policy coordination will facilitate a simultaneous pursuit of both macroeconomic (price) and






In the aftermath of the 2007/08 financial crisis, consensus emerged among world leaders to
adopt macroprudential policies with the overall objective of financial stability. This ignited a
wave of research to enhance our understanding of how macroprudential policies work including
their interaction with other policies such as monetary policy. This thesis contributes to this
growing literature in three main respects.
The main contribution of Chapter 2 lies on its ability to provide some general guidance on
appropriate design and implementation of Basel III countercyclical capital buffers. In Chap-
ter 2 a real business cycle dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that features
a stylised banking sector, a housing market and a role of a macroprudential authority in imple-
menting bank capital requirement regulation is developed. The calibrated model is then used,
first, to investigate the extent to which Basel III countercyclical capital requirements attenu-
ate fluctuations in credit and housing markets and mitigate the pro-cyclicality of Basel II bank
capital regulations in the context of South Africa. This is done by decomposing the transition
from Basel II to Basel III bank capital regulations into two stages - the permanent increase of
the capital requirement ratio (CRR) by 2.5% in line with the capital conservation buffer and the
additional countercyclical capital buffer. Second, a comparative assessment of four Basel III
countercyclical capital requirement rules, in terms of enhancing financial and macroeconomic
stability, is performed. The main findings in chapter 2 are as follows. The rule-based Basel III
countercyclical capital requirements are effective in attenuating fluctuations in the credit and
housing markets and in mitigating the pro-cyclicality of the Basel II capital regulation. The im-
pact of a permanent increase in capital requirement ratio (a 2.5% conservation capital buffer)
is marginal. The comparative assessment of four Basel III countercyclical capital requirement
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rules suggests that the most effective rule for enhancing financial and macroeconomic stabil-
ity is the one in which the authority adjusts CRR to deviations of credit and output from their
steady states.
Chapter 3 extends the model in Chapter 2 to incorporate a role of a macroprudential author-
ity in implementing countercyclical loan-to-value (CcLTV) regulation. The calibrated model
is then used to investigate the implications of the CcLTV regulation in a setting where two
types of borrowers (households and non-financial corporates) from distinct sectors of the credit
market co-exist. This is done by comparing the effectiveness of two policy regimes for the
implementation of the CcLTV regulations - one generic and one sector-specific - in terms of
financial and macroeconomic stability. Under the generic regime, the authority adjusts house-
hold and corporate LTV ratios to changes in aggregate credit and output whilst adjusting these
ratios according to specific sectoral credit conditions and output, with different intensities, un-
der the sector-specific regime. The findings in chapter 3 suggest that both the generic and the
sector-specific regimes are effective in enhancing financial and macroeconomic stability. The
comparative assessment of the two policy regimes dependents on the source of economic dis-
turbances in the economy. The two policy regimes are equally effective and therefore can serve
as substitutes when the economy faces a technology shock. However, when one sector of the
credit market is hit by a financial shock, the sector-specific regime outperforms the generic
regime. The generic regime outperforms the sector-specific regime when the economy is hit
by a housing demand shock that has similar spillover effects on household and corporate credit
markets. The main policy implication of these findings is that the regulator should assess po-
tential risks in the specific sectors of credit market and tailor the CcLTV regulation according
to the specific financial conditions of each sector rather than tailoring the regulation according
to aggregate financial conditions. Specifically, the findings highlight the risks associated with
the implementation of a "one-size-fits-all" CcLTV regulation, and emphasis on the importance
of identifying the source of economic disturbances for the appropriate implementation of the
CcLTV regulation.
In Chapter 4 a new Keynesian DSGE model which features a stylised banking sector, a
housing market and the role of monetary and macroprudential policies is developed and esti-
mated using Bayesian techniques. The estimated model is then used to compare the effective-
ness of a simultaneous deployment of monetary and macroprudential policies under the two
alternative policy regimes against a benchmark regime in which there is only monetary pol-
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icy. The first alternative regime is a combination of a standard monetary policy and a macro-
prudential policy for countercyclical capital requirements. The second alternative regime is a
combination of an augmented monetary policy and countercyclical capital requirements. The
findings in Chapter 4 suggest that the policy regime that combines a standard monetary policy
and macroprudential policy enhances both macroeconomic stability and financial stability. The
regime that combines an augmented monetary policy and macroprudential policy is superior
in enhancing output and financial stability, but compromises price stability. The findings in
this chapter provide an alternative explanation on why monetary policy should not account for
financial stability objective as this threatens central bank’s ability to foster price stability. In
particular, the findings suggest that monetary policy should focus solely on its primary objec-
tive of price stability and let macroprudential policy facilitates financial stability on its own.
Such a policy coordination facilitates a simultaneous pursuit of both macroeconomic (price)
and financial stability objectives.
To further enhance our understanding of macroprudential policies, the analysis in this thesis
can be developed further in several directions. One possible avenue is to extend the analysis to
a small open economy model and study the role of macroprudential policies in mitigating the
impact of foreign financial shocks. Such an extension can also provide richer information about
dynamics in the economy and form part of an analytical contribution towards the development







Housing and credit market shocks:
Exploring the role of rule-based Basel III
countercyclical capital requirements
A.1 Complete set of equations for the baseline model1
Households


















where UCs,t = (1− ηs)/(Cs,t − ηsCs,t−1).
Entrepreneurs
Ce,t + qt(He,t −He,t−1) +Re,tLe,t−1 +WtNt + ACle,t = Yt + Le,t + ζt, (A.1.5)
































(1− ν)Yt = WtNt, (A.1.9)
where UCe,t = (1 − ηe)/(Ce,t − ηeCe,t−1), ACle,t = (φle/2Le)(Le,t − Le,t−1)2 and AC ′le,t =
(φle/Le)(Le,t − Le,t−1).
Banks
Cf,t +Rd,t−1Dt−1 + Le,t + AClf,t = Dt +Re,tLe,t−1 − ζt, (A.1.10)
Dt = (1− κt)[Le,t − ζt+1], (A.1.11)
1− (1− κt) + AC ′ef,t = βfEt
UCf,t+1
UCf,t
(Re,t+1 − (1− κt)Rd,t), (A.1.12)
where ACef,t = (φef/2Le)(Le,t − Le,t−1)2, AC ′ef,t = (φef/Le)(Le,t − Le,t−1) and UCf,t =
(1− ηf )/(Cf,t − ηfCf,t−1).
Aggregate consumption and market clearing conditions
Ct = Cs,t + Ce,t + Cf,t. (A.1.13)
Hs,t +He,t = 1. (A.1.14)
Interest rate spread











log(At) = ρalog(At−1) + ξa,t, (A.1.17)
ζt = ρζζt−1 + ξζ,t, (A.1.18)
log(Zt) = ρzlog(Zt−1) + ξz,t. (A.1.19)
A.2 Complete set of equations for the extended model
Patient households (savers)


















where UCs,t = 1−ηsCs,t−ηsCs,t−1 .
Impatient households (borrowers)




































where UCb,t = 1−ηbCb,t−ηbCb,t−1 and AClb,t = (φlb/2Lb)(Lb,t − Lb,t−1)
2.
Entrepreneurs





























Ws,tNs,t = (1− σ)(1− ν)Yt, (A.2.14)
Wb,tNb,t = σ(1− ν)Yt, (A.2.15)
1− φle
Le




where UCe,t = 1−ηeCe,t−ηeCe,t−1 and ACle,t = (φle/2Le)(Le,t − Le,t−1)
2.
Banks
Cf,t +Rd,t−1Dt−1 +Lb,t +Le,t +ACbf,t +ACef,t = Dt +Rb,t−1Lb,t−1 +Re,tLe,t−1− ζb,t− ζe,t,
(A.2.17)
Dt ≤ (1− weκt)[Le,t − Etζe,t+1] + (1− wbκt)[Lb,t − Etζb,t+1], (A.2.18)









Re,t+1 = 1− (λf,t/UCf,t)(1− weκt) +
φef
Le




Rb,t = 1− (λf,t/UCf,t)(1− wbκt) +
φbf
Lb




,ACef,t = (φef/2Le)(Le,t−Le,t−1)2 andACef,t = (φef/2Le)(Le,t−
Le,t−1)
2.
Aggregate Consumption and market clearing conditions
Ct = Cs,t + Cb,t + Ce,t + Cf,t, (A.2.22)
Hs,t +Hb,t +He,t = 1, (A.2.23)
Lb,t + Le,t = Lt. (A.2.24)
Interest rate spreads
Sprdb,t = Rb,t −Rd,t, (A.2.25)









log(At) = ρalog(At−1) + ξa,t, (A.2.28)
ζb,t = ρζζb,t−1 + ξζb,t, (A.2.29)
ζe,t = ρζζe,t−1 + ξζe,t, (A.2.30)
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log(Zt) = ρzlog(Zt−1) + ξz,t. (A.2.31)
A.3 Data and sources
The data are obtained from the South African Reserve Bank database. The exceptions is house
price data from ABSA bank
1. Output (yt): real GDP, quarterly, seasonally adjusted at annual rate.
2. Consumption (ct): Final consumption expenditure by households, quarterly, seasonally
adjusted at annual rate.
3. Household loans (Lb,t): Total credit to households (sum of mortgage credit, instalment
sales credit, leasing finance, overdrafts, credit cards and other loans and advances), not
seasonally adjusted. These data are deflated by the GDP deflator to get the real counter-
part.
4. Entrepreneur (Corporate) loans (Le,t): Total credit to non-financial corporates (sum of
mortgage credit, instalment sales credit, leasing finance, overdrafts, credit cards, other
loans and advances and investments and bills), not seasonally adjusted. These data are
deflated by the GDP deflator to get the real counterpart.
5. Household deposits (Dt): Banking institutions: Residents: Households deposits.
6. Bank capital (BKt): Liabilities of banking institutions: Share capital and reserves.
7. Household lending rate (Rb,t): Predominant rate: Mortgages.
8. Corporate lending rate (Re,t): Predominant prime lending rate.
9. House prices (qt): Middle-segment nominal house price index (seasonally adjusted) ob-
tained from ABSA bank. This index is available monthly, and is converted to quarterly
values based on a three-month average. The use of the entire middle-segment house price
data set is justified on the basis that these data are regarded as the most representative of
the general house price level prevailing in the South African economy (Aye et al., 2014,
476). These data are deflated by the GDP deflator to get the real counterpart.
10. Inflation (πt): Inflation is measured by quarterly changes in implicit GDP deflator.
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A.4 Results with the extended model: Rule-based Basel III
countercyclical capital requirements
In the following we present the simulation results with the extended model under the two Basel
regimes to get more insight on the impact of the Rule-based Basel III countercyclical capital
requirements. We first consider a positive housing demand shock and then a negative financial
shock. For the sake of brevity, we discuss the results for the variables that have been affected
by the modifications in the extended model in more detail and only briefly summarise the rest.
The discussion focuses on a complete transition to the Basel III regulation.2
A.3.1 Housing demand shock
Figure A.1 depicts the impulse responses of the main variables to a positive housing demand
shock. The shock increases house prices and, through the borrowing constraint channel, results
in an increase in impatient households’ and entrepreneurs’ demand for credit. This stimulates
output growth and consumption for impatient households, entrepreneurs and banks. For patient
households, the increased preference for housing services creates incentives for them to substi-
tute from consumption goods to housing services. As such, patient households’ consumption
declines.
Under Basel III (red solid line), capital requirement ratio increases in response to the in-
crease in the credit-to-output ratio. To meet higher capital requirement ratio, banks refrain
from providing more credit to entrepreneurs and impatient households. This attenuates the ex-
tent of the increase in entrepreneurs’ and impatient households’ demand for housing, house
prices and output. This is in contrast to the case under the Basel II regime. Under Basel II
(black asterisk lines), the decrease of capital requirement promotes more lending and amplifies
the impact of the shock on fluctuations in both financial and real variables. These results concur
with the findings in the literature (see e.g., Repullo and Suarez, 2013; Angeloni and Faia, 2013;
Angelini et al., 2014, 2015; Gersbach and Rochet, 2017), where the authors show that Basel III
is effective in mitigating pro-cyclical effects of Basel II and has potential to promote financial
stability.
2We exclude the Basel II.5 regime in this section.
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Figure A.1: Impulse responses to a positive housing demand shock under two Basel regimes. Notes: Black asterisk
lines: Basel II; Red solid line: Basel III. Variables are expressed in % deviations from steady states, interest rates
are in percentage points. Cons, HHs and Entrep stand for consumption, households and entrepreneur.
A.3.2 Loan repayment shock (impatient household)
Figure A.2 shows the impulse responses of the main variables following a negative loan repay-
ment shock, corresponding to an unexpected increase in loan losses on impatient households
loans.3 The shock reduces banks’ net worth and, through the bank capital constraint channel,
leads to a fall in credit supply to both impatient households and entrepreneurs. As a conse-
quence, borrowers’ (impatient households and entrepreneurs) demand for housing and house
3In this section, we only report the results for the impatient household loan repayment shock. The results for
the entrepreneur loan repayment shock are similar to those of the impatient household loan repayment shock. The
only difference is that, in the case of the entrepreneur loan repayment shock, entrepreneurs’ consumption increases
while that of impatient households does not. Furthermore, additional resources (due to income redistribution from
banks to entrepreneurs) enable entrepreneurs to hire more labour and boost production over time.
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prices declines. The shock also results in a protracted decline in output and agents’ consumption
except for impatient households. For impatient households, the shock increases their income:
by paying less than the contractual amount of loans, borrowers are able to spend more than
previously anticipated.
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Figure A.2: Impulse responses to a negative loan repayment shock (impatient household) under two Basel regimes.
Notes: Black asterisk lines: Basel II; Red solid lines: Basel III. Variables are expressed in % deviations from steady
states, and interest rates are in percentage points. Cons, HHs and Entrep stand for consumption, households and
entrepreneur.
Under the Basel II regime (black asterisk lines), capital requirement ratio increases as credit-
to-output fall. This forces banks to adjust their balance sheet by curtailing demand for deposits
and credit supply. Lending rates also increase, especially on impact. These exacerbate the
recessionary effects of the shock and induces a large fall in impatient households’ and en-
trepreneurs’ demand for housing, consumption and output. In contrast, under the Basel III
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regime (red solid line), the regulatory requirement becomes accommodative and bank capital
requirement ratio temporarily falls. This assists banks to better absorb the impact of the shock
without being forced to reduce credit rapidly. Consequently, the extent of the fall in credit
supply becomes smaller under Basel III than under Basel II. This also mitigates the fall in im-
patient household’ and entrepreneurs’ demand for housing and output. Banks further curtail




The effectiveness of the countercyclical
loan-to-value regulation: generic versus
sector-specific rules
B.1 Complete set of equations for the model1
Patient households (Savers)


















where UCs,t = 1−ηsCs,t−ηsCs,t−1 .
Impatient households (Borrowers)
Cb,t +Rb,t−1Lb,t−1 + qt(Hb,t −Hb,t−1) = Wb,tNb,t + Lb,t + ζb,t, (B.5)


































where UCb,t = (1− ηb)/(Cb,t − ηbCb,t−1).
Entrepreneurs





























Ws,tNs,t = (1− σ)(1− ν)Yt, (B.14)
Wb,tNb,t = σ(1− ν)Yt, (B.15)
where UCe,t = (1− ηe)/(Ce,t − ηeCe,t−1).
The bank
Cf,t+Rd,t−1Dt−1+Lb,t+Le,t+ACbf,t+ACef,t = Dt+Rb,t−1Lb,t−1+Re,tLe,t−1−ζt, (B.16)














Rb,t = 1− (1− wbκ)(λf,t/UCf,t) +
φbf
Lb




Re,t+1 = 1− (1− weκ)(λf,t/UCf,t) +
φef
Le
(Le,t − Le,t−1), (B.20)









Aggregate consumption and market clearing conditions
Ct = Cs,t + Cb,t + Ce,t + Cf,t. (B.21)
Hs,t +Hb,t +He,t = 1. (B.22)




















log(At) = ρalog(At−1) + ξa,t, (B.26)
ζb,t = ρζζb,t−1 + ξζb,t , (B.27)
ζe,t = ρζζe,t−1 + ξζe,t , (B.28)
128
Stellenbosch University https://scholar.sun.ac.za
log(Zt) = ρzlog(Zt−1) + ξz,t. (B.29)
B.2 Data and sources
The data are obtained from the South African Reserve Bank database. The exceptions is house
price data from ABSA bank
1. Output (yt): real GDP, quarterly, seasonally adjusted at annual rate.
2. Consumption (ct): Final consumption expenditure by households, quarterly, seasonally
adjusted at annual rate.
3. Household loans (Lb,t): Total credit to households (sum of mortgage credit, instalment
sales credit, leasing finance, overdrafts, credit cards and other loans and advances), not
seasonally adjusted. These data are deflated by the GDP deflator to get the real counter-
part.
4. Entrepreneur (Corporate) loans (Le,t): Total credit to non-financial corporates (sum of
mortgage credit, instalment sales credit, leasing finance, overdrafts, credit cards, other
loans and advances and investments and bills), not seasonally adjusted. These data are
deflated by the GDP deflator to get the real counterpart.
5. Household deposits (Dt): Banking institutions: Residents: Households deposits.
6. Household lending rate (Rb,t): Predominant rate: Mortgages.
7. Corporate lending rate (Re,t): Predominant prime lending rate.
8. House prices (qt): Middle-segment nominal house price index (seasonally adjusted) ob-
tained from ABSA bank. This index is available monthly, and is converted to quarterly
values based on a three-month average. The use of the entire middle-segment house price
data set is justified on the basis that these data are regarded as the most representative of
the general house price level prevailing in the South African economy (Aye et al., 2014,
476). These data are deflated by the GDP deflator to get the real counterpart.
9. Inflation (πt): Inflation is measured by quarterly changes in implicit GDP deflator.
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B.3 Efficient policy frontier
In this section, we present the outcome of credit-output volatility trade-off for technology and
housing demand shocks. The left panel in Fig. B.1 shows the results with productivity shock
while the right panel shows the results with housing demand shock. The black square mark
shows the outcome of credit-output volatility under the baseline regime (constant LTV ratios).
This is compared with the outcome under the generic CcLTV regime (red dash-dot line) and
the sector-specific regime (blue dashed line).
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Figure B.1: Credit-output stability trade-off. Left panel: productivity shock; right panel: housing demand shock.
Consistent with the findings in the previous sections, the results show that the sector-specific
regime is more effective than the generic regime in enhancing financial and macroeconomic sta-
bility. The volatility frontiers for the two shocks present a clear trade-off between financial and
macroeconomic stability. It is evident that both regimes are more effective in enhancing fi-
nancial stability but has limited impact in enhancing macroeconomic stability. The maximum
attainable financial stability benefits can be achieved without compromising macroeconomic
stability, irrespective of the shock hitting the economy. On the contrary, the maximum attain-
able macroeconomic stability benefits can only be achieved by compromising financial stability.
With the exception of the sector-specific regime when the economy is hit by housing demand





The optimal monetary and
macroprudential policies for the South
African economy
C.1 Complete set of equations for the log-linearised model1
Variables with a hat denote percent deviations from steady state and those without a time sub-









Et(ûcs,t+1 − ûcs,t) + Et(r̂t − π̂t+1) = 0, (C.2)




n̂s,t − ûcs,t, (C.4)
1The implied steady-states of the model, full diagnostic statistics of the estimated model as well as the codes




































l̂b,t = Et(q̂t+1 + ĥb,t − r̂b,t + π̂t+1) + γ̂b,t, (C.7)
Γb1Et(ûcb,t+1 − ûcb,t + r̂b,t − π̂t+1) = βbζb(1− ϑb)
rb
π






n̂b,t − ûcb,t, (C.10)










































(ĉe,t − ηeĉe,t−1), (C.13)
l̂e,t = Et(q̂t+1 − r̂e,t+1 + π̂t+1 + ĥe,t) + γ̂e,t, (C.14)
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Γe1Et(ûce,t+1− ûce,t + r̂e,t+1− π̂t+1) = βeζe(1−ϑe)
re
π
ζ̂e,t+1− (1−Γe1)(λ̂e,t− ûce,t), (C.15)
q̂t = (1− Γe2)(ŷt+1 − x̂t+1 − ĥe,t) + Γe2q̂t+1 + (Γe2 − βe)(λ̂e,t − ûce,t − r̂e,t+1 + π̂t+1 + γ̂e,t)+
(1 + βe − Γe2)(ûce,t+1 − ûce,t),
(C.16)
ŵs,t = ŷt − x̂t − n̂s,t, (C.17)
ŵb,t = ŷt − x̂t − n̂b,t, (C.18)
ŷt = ẑt + νĥe,t−1 + (1− ν)(1− σ)n̂s,t + σ(1− ν)n̂b,t, (C.19)




















































Et(r̂t − π̂t+1) = −βf
r
π
Et(ûcf,t+1 − ûcf,t)− λfss(λ̂f,t − ûcf,t), (C.23)







ζ̂b,t+1 − (1− wbκ)λfssΓfb3(λ̂f,t − ûcf,t) + wbκλfssΓfb3κ̂t











ζ̂e,t+1 − (1− weκ)λfssΓfe3(λ̂f,t − ûcf,t) + weκλfssΓfe3κ̂t



































where, Γfb1 = βf rbπ (1 − ζb), Γfb2 = Γfb1 − (1 − wbκ)λfss
rb
π










































Monetary policy rule, inflation dynamics and shock processes










x̂t + ξπ,t, (C.31)
âj,t = ρj âj,t−1 + ξj,t, (C.32)
ẑt = ρz ẑt−1 + ξz,t, (C.33)
γ̂b,t = ργbγ̂b,t−1 + ξγb,t, (C.34)
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γ̂e,t = ργeγ̂e,t−1 + ξγe,t, (C.35)
ε̂b,t = ρεbε̂b,t−1 + ξεb,t, (C.36)
ε̂e,t = ρεeε̂e,t−1 + ξεe,t, (C.37)
where ξi,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, σ2i ) is the white noise process, normally distributed with mean zero and
variance σ2i , ∀i = {r, π, j, z, γb, γe, εb, εe}.
Measurement equation
The measurement equation describes how the empirical data (actual times series) is matched to
the corresponding model variables:
































where ∆ is the temporal difference operator and γ̄i is the sample mean of the respective trans-
formed variables. ξmeεb,t and ξ
me
εe,t are measurement errors to allow for the fact that the data on
household and entrepreneur NPLs is an approximation of the actual underlying series.
C.2 Data and sources
Most of the data are obtained from the South African Reserve Bank database. The exceptions
are house price data from ABSA bank, interest rate data from the IMF’s International Financial
Statistics database, and population data from the World Bank database.
1. Output (yt): real GDP, quarterly, seasonally adjusted at annual rate.
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2. Household loans (Lb,t): Total credit to households (sum of mortgage credit, instalment
sales credit, leasing finance, overdrafts, credit cards and other loans and advances), not
seasonally adjusted. These data are deflated by the GDP deflator to get the real counter-
part.
3. Entrepreneur (Corporate) loans (Le,t): Total credit to non-financial corporates (sum of
mortgage credit, instalment sales credit, leasing finance, overdrafts, credit cards, other
loans and advances and investments and bills), not seasonally adjusted. These data are
deflated by the GDP deflator to get the real counterpart.
4. House prices (qt): Middle-segment nominal house price index (seasonally adjusted) ob-
tained from ABSA bank. This index is available monthly, and is converted to quarterly
values based on a three-month average. The use of the entire middle-segment house price
data set is justified on the basis that these data are regarded as the most representative of
the general house price level prevailing in the South African economy (Aye et al., 2014,
476). These data are deflated by the GDP deflator to get the real counterpart.
5. Inflation (πt): Inflation is measured by quarterly changes in the GDP deflator.
6. Short-term nominal interest rate (Rt): 90-day treasury bill rate as a proxy for policy
rate. Since nominal interest rate data are provided in an annualised form, we transformed
these data into quarterly data by dividing the original data by 400 to match the frequency
of the model. These data are obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
database.
7. Population: The population aged between 15 and 64. Data on population are obtained
from World Bank database and available at annual frequency. To construct quarterly
population data, we assume that the population increases at a linear rate throughout the
year.
8. Ratios of household and corporate NPLs (non-performing loans) (ζb,t and ζe,t): Im-
paired advances (advances in respect of which the bank has raised a specific impairment).
These data are available only at aggregate level (total NPLs). To construct data on house-
hold NPLs, we multiply the ratio of household loans to total loans by total NPLs. We
then divide the resulting household NPLs by household loans to get data on the ratio of
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household NPLs (ζb,t). We do the same to construct data on the ratio of corporate NPLs
(ζe,t).
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Figure C.3.1: Note: Blue solid lines denote the posterior distribution and red dashed lines the prior distribu-
tion. The marginal posterior densities are based on simulation using the Random-Walk Metropolis algorithm with
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Figure C.3.2: Note: Blue solid lines denote the posterior distribution and red dashed lines the prior distribu-
tion. The marginal posterior densities are based on simulation using the Random-Walk Metropolis algorithm with
250,000 draws for two chains.
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C.4 Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) multivariate
convergence diagnostics


















Figure C.4.1: MCMC multivariate convergence diagnostics
C.5 Model dynamics
Fig. C.5.1 shows the impulse responses of the selected variables to the estimated shocks, at
the mean of estimated parameter values. Each row illustrates the impact of a specific shock on
variables in columns 1 to 5 (output, policy rate, inflation, house price and total loans).
The first row illustrates the impact of a positive housing demand shock. The shock increases
the marginal utility of housing services and drives up households’ demand for housing. This
leads to an increase in house prices, which in turn stimulates borrowing through the borrow-
ing constraint channel. The increase in borrowing (loans) stimulates aggregate spending in the
economy and leads to an increase in output. Despite the increase in aggregate spending and
output, inflation declines. This is because the increase in access to external finance (loans),
consequent upon the shock, provides an incentive for the entrepreneur to reduce reliance on
internal finance (retained earnings) by reducing prices. As a result, inflation declines. This
prompts the central bank to reduce the policy rate (nominal interest rate) to counteract the fall
in inflation. These results are also consistent with studies such as Gupta and Sun (2018) in the
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context of South Africa and Turdaliev and Zhang (2019) in the context of Canada. The second
and the third rows (rows 2 and 3) show the impulse responses to a positive shock on the bor-
rowing capacity of the impatient household (row 2) and the entrepreneur (row 3), respectively.
In both cases, the shock increases the marginal benefit of housing (as a collateral asset) by im-
proving the valuation of the housing stock. This relaxes the borrowing constraints faced by the
impatient household (row 2) and the entrepreneur (row 3) and enables them to borrow more for
the given value of the housing stock. Demand for housing increases and drives up house prices.
Through the borrowing constraint channel, the increase in house prices leads to an increase in
loans and output. As in the case of a positive housing demand shock, inflation declines which
in turn prompts the central bank to reduce the policy rate.
Rows 4 and 5 illustrate the impact of a negative household NPL shock and entrepreneur
NPL shock, respectively. In both cases, the shock increases the ratio of borrowers’ NPLs
(household NPLs in row 4 and entrepreneur NPLs in row 5). This in turn increases the bank’s
loan losses and impairs the bank’s net worth (bank capital). Through bank capital requirement
constraint, the fall in the bank’s net worth forces the bank to adjust its balance sheet by reducing
supply of loans in order to continue meeting the regulatory requirement ratio. In addition to this
effect, the increase in the borrowers’ NPLs drives up lending rates and together with the bank’s
deleveraging process lead to a decline in total loans, house prices, aggregate spending and
output in the economy. Consistent with the empirical findings of Gilchrist et al. (2017), inflation
increases despite the fall in aggregate demand and output.2 As a result, the policy rate increases
in order to mitigate the inflationary pressures in the economy. The results compare favourably
with Steinbach et al. (2014) and Agénor and Zilberman (2015), in which the authors document
that an increase in non-performing loans generates recessionary effects in the economy.
The last three rows illustrate the impact of technology shock, monetary policy shock and
cost push shock. The impact of these shock are largely standard and consistent with the litera-
ture. A positive productivity shock generates expansionary effects in the economy but leads to a
fall in inflation which in turn prompts the central bank to reduce the policy rate. Contractionary
monetary policy shock increases the policy rate (nominal interest rate) and leads to a fall in
total loans, house prices and inflation. A positive cost-push shock increases inflation. This in
turn prompts the central bank to increase the policy rate (nominal interest rate) and generates
2Specifically, Gilchrist et al. (2017) note that due to financial distortions (brought about by the borrowing con-
straint), firms have incentives to preserve internal financing (profits) by raising prices following adverse financial


























































































































































































































Figure C.5.1: Impulse responses to all shocks considered in this paper. Variables are expressed in % deviations
from the steady state while interest rates and inflation are in percentage point deviations from the steady state. HH,
Entrep, LTV and NPL stand for household, entrepreneur, loan-to-value and non-performing loans, respectively.




recessionary effects in the economy.
C.6 Historical decomposition
Fig. C.6.1 shows the historical variance decomposition of output, house prices, household and
entrepreneur loans, inflation and nominal interest rate (policy rate) over the estimated sam-
ple period 2000Q1–2016Q4. We group household and entrepreneur LTV shocks into LTV
shocks and household and entrepreneur NPL shocks into NPL shocks. The historical shock
decomposition of output suggests that output dynamics are largely driven by technology shock
and monetary policy shock to some extent. The relative contributions of housing demand and
credit market shocks are also non-negligible. In particular, housing demand shock contributed
positively to output growth from 2002 to 2005 whilst LTV shocks appear to have contributed
negatively to growth around the same period. While the fall in output growth during the fi-
nancial crisis is mainly driven by negative technology shock and somewhat by housing demand
and monetary policy shocks, the negative contribution of NPL shocks become evident too. This
period coincides with a significant increase is the ratio of household and entrepreneur NPLs. In
the housing market, historical shock decomposition of house prices unequivocally shows that
housing demand shock is the main driver of house prices. The results suggest that the South
African housing market boom period (2000 - 2006), characterised by sustain increase in house
prices, was largely drive by housing demand shock. Nevertheless, the subsequent reversal in
house prices was driven by a combination of negative technology shocks (particularly during
the financial crisis) and negative monetary policy shock in addition to housing demand shock.
LTV shocks seem to have a counteracting effects on house price dynamics while the marginal
contribution of NPL shocks to a fall in house price during the financial crisis is also evident.
Turning to the credit market, the observation is that most of fluctuations in household loans
and entrepreneur loans are driven by credit market shocks (LTV and NPL shocks) and the hous-
ing demand shock. The increase in household loans over the period 2002 to 2008 appear to be
driven largely by a positive housing demand shock and to a lesser extent by monetary policy and
NPL shocks. The subsequent decline in household loans appear to be driven by a combination
of a negative housing demand shock, negative NPL, monetary policy and technology shocks,
especially from 2008 to 2012. In most cases, LTV shocks appear to be contributing negatively
to fluctuations in household loans. On the contrary, most of fluctuations in entrepreneur loans
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appear to be driven positively by LTV shocks while housing demand shock appears to have a
counteracting effects on the fluctuations in entrepreneur loans. The contribution of NPL shocks
to the fluctuations in entrepreneur loans becomes evident during the financial crisis period (2007
– 2009).
Output
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Figure C.6.1: Historical decomposition of output, house prices, household and entrepreneur loans, inflation and
nominal interest rate over the period 2000Q1–2016Q4.
Fig. C.6.1 also shows that most of the movements in inflation is mainly driven by monetary
policy shock and cost-push shock while movements in interest rate appear to be driven mainly
by cost-push shock. This is consistent with the South Africa Reserve Bank monetary policy
strategy of inflation targeting. Intuitively, a positive cost-push shock increases inflation. This
in turn prompts the central bank to increase nominal interest rate (policy rate). It is also evident
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that credit market shocks (LTV and NPL shocks) also played non-negligible role in shaping the
movements in nominal interest rate, particularly over the period 2004 to 2013. In summary,
Fig. C.6.1 shows that housing demand shock and credit market shocks play significant role in
shaping dynamics in the South African economy, particularly dynamics in the housing market
and the credit market.
C.7 Impulse response functions: entrepreneur LTV and
NPL shocks under the three policy regimes.
C.7.1 Entrepreneur LTV shock
Fig. C.7.1 illustrates the impact of a positive entrepreneur LTV shock. Under the baseline
regime, the shock increases the borrowing capacity of the entrepreneur and leads to an increase
in demand for housing. This drives up house prices and through the borrowing constraint chan-
nel generates expansionary effects in the economy. Demand for loans by both the impatient
household and the entrepreneur increases and result in an increase in aggregate spending and
output. Inflation declines and prompts the authority to reduces the policy rate. The results show
that a simultaneous deployment of monetary and macroprudential policies dampens the expan-
sionary effects of the shock on the economy. Under Policy regime II (a policy combination of
a standard monetary policy and macroprudential policy), the authority tightens capital require-
ment regulation when credit-to-output ratio increases. As a result, the bank reduces the supply
of loans to the two credit-dependent agents. Both the impatient household and the entrepreneur
reduce investment in housing. This in turn dampens the increase in house prices and the extent
of the increase in consumption and output in comparison to the benchmark regime.
The results further show that allowing the monetary policy to react to emerging financial im-
balances (Policy III) generates substantial gains in terms of financial stability in comparison to
Policy II. In this case, the authority increases the policy rate in response to the increase in credit
growth. The increase in the policy rate prompts the patient household to reduce consumption
and this exert dampening effect on consumption. Through the expectation channel, the impa-
tient household and the entrepreneur reduces demand for loans in anticipation of high interest
rates consequent up the monetary policy reaction to credit growth. The impatient household’s
lending rate declines on impact because of a substantial reduction in the impatient household’s
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Figure C.7.1: Impulse responses to a positive entrepreneur LTV shock under the three policy regimes: Policy
I, Policy II and Policy III. Variables are expressed in % deviations from the steady state, and interest rates and
inflation are in percentage points. HH and Entrep stand for household and entrepreneur, respectively. Ordinate:
time horizon in quarters.
loans. As a result of the fall in total loans, credit-dependent agents reduces their consump-
tion and together with the reduction in the patient household consumption leads to a decline in
aggregate consumption and hence output in comparison to Policy II. We also find that Policy
III generates a trade-off between financial stability and price stability. Policy III induces an
over-reaction in the real sector and increases volatilities of the policy rate and inflation. On
the contrary, the policy regime that combines a standard monetary policy and macroprudential
policy (Policy II) mitigates these costs. In particular, such a policy combination enhances the
overall stability within the economy.
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C.7.2 Entrepreneur NPL shock
Fig. C.7.2 displays the dynamic effects of a negative shock to entrepreneur NPLs. Under the
benchmark regime (Policy I), the shock increases entrepreneur NPLs and result in an increase
in the bank’s loan losses. This reduces the bank’s net worth and forces the bank to adjust
its balance sheet by reducing supply of loans, particularly to the entrepreneur (a more risky
borrower). The entrepreneur lending rate also increases due to the increase in perceived en-
trepreneur’s credit risk and further exert downward pressure on the entrepreneur’s demand for
loans. Meanwhile, impatient household lending rate declines and induces the household to
increase demand for loans. The fall in entrepreneur loans prompts the entrepreneur to reduce
investment in housing and productivity within the economy. This in turn drags down house
prices and, through borrowing constraint, leads to a fall in total loans, consumption and output.
Inflation, on the other hand, increases and prompts the central bank to increase the policy rate.
When the authority complements monetary policy with macroprudential policy, the nega-
tive impact of the shock is dampened. In this case, the regulator relaxes capital requirement
regulation as credit-to-output ratio declines. This reduces pressure on the bank to adjust its
balance sheet aggressively in comparison to the benchmark regime. As a result, the extent of
a decline in total loans becomes smaller under the regime that combines monetary policy and
CcCR regulation, particularly under Policy III, than under the benchmark regime. This miti-
gates the spill-over effects of the shock to the housing market and the real sector and results in a
reduced fall in house prices, consumption and output. Again, the reduction is more pronounced
under Policy III than under Policy II. In the credit (loan) market, we observe that the policy
regime that combines monetary policy and CcCR regulation, particularly Policy III, mitigates
the decline in entrepreneur loans and reduces the extent of an increase in entrepreneur lending
rate. At the same time, this policy combination attenuates the increase in household loans.
However, in this case the attenuation effect is larger under Policy II than under Policy III.
In a nutshell, the results suggest that the stabilisation effects of Policy III marginal outper-
forms that of Policy II, especially at aggregate level. However, as is the case with LTV shock,
allowing the monetary policy to react to emerging financial imbalances compromises price sta-
bility. In this case, the policy rate declines sharply in response to a fall in credit. This prompts
the patient household to increase consumption on impact, through an intertemporal substitu-
tion effects. At the same time, the forward-looking borrowers (the impatient household and the
entrepreneur) takes into account the potential drop in the interest rates and react by increasing
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Figure C.7.2: Impulse responses to a negative shock to entrepreneur non-performing loans under the three policy
regimes: Policy I, Policy II and Policy III. Variables are expressed in % deviations from the steady state, and inter-
est rates and inflation are in percentage points. HH and Entrep stand for household and entrepreneur, respectively.
Ordinate: time horizon in quarters.
demand for loans. As a result, consumption of the impatient household and the entrepreneur
falls by less under Policy III than under Policy II, and together with the increase in consumption
of the patient household leads to a reduced fall in aggregate consumption and output. Mean-
while inflation drops following an increase on impact. Similar to the case of LTV shock, the
results suggest that allowing monetary policy to react to credit growth induces an over-reaction
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